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Hillsborough officer: I regret not asking for kick-off delay Hillsborough officer: I regret not asking for kick-off delay
(about 4 hours later)
The South Yorkshire police officer who was in command outside the Leppings Lane terrace at Hillsborough when 96 people died in a crush at the 1989 FA Cup semi-final has said he profoundly regrets not having asked for the match kick-off to be delayed.The South Yorkshire police officer who was in command outside the Leppings Lane terrace at Hillsborough when 96 people died in a crush at the 1989 FA Cup semi-final has said he profoundly regrets not having asked for the match kick-off to be delayed.
Supt Roger Marshall, giving evidence to the new inquest into the disaster, said that as he was in charge of the 24,000 Liverpool supporters’ arrival and access to the Leppings Lane end, he could have asked for the kick-off to be delayed when congestion occurred outside.Supt Roger Marshall, giving evidence to the new inquest into the disaster, said that as he was in charge of the 24,000 Liverpool supporters’ arrival and access to the Leppings Lane end, he could have asked for the kick-off to be delayed when congestion occurred outside.
Questioned by Christina Lambert QC, counsel to the inquest, Marshall said: “I can tell you that it is one of the most profound regrets of my experience at Leppings Lane on April 15 that I did not do so.”Questioned by Christina Lambert QC, counsel to the inquest, Marshall said: “I can tell you that it is one of the most profound regrets of my experience at Leppings Lane on April 15 that I did not do so.”
Approximately 100 family members whose relatives were killed in the disaster listened in silence, sitting in the rows of public seats in the converted courtroom in Warrington, as Marshall expressed that regret.Approximately 100 family members whose relatives were killed in the disaster listened in silence, sitting in the rows of public seats in the converted courtroom in Warrington, as Marshall expressed that regret.
The jury has heard that the scheduled 3pm kick-off was not delayed and that a crush developed outside the Leppings Lane end as large numbers of Liverpool supporters were not processed through the seven turnstiles that led to the standing terraces. Marshall confirmed that the scheduled 3pm kick-off was not delayed and that a crush developed outside the Leppings Lane end as large numbers of Liverpool supporters were not processed through the seven turnstiles that led to the standing terraces.
Marshall said he believed that the seven turnstiles for the 10,100 fans with tickets for the standing terraces, and 23 turnstiles in total for all 24,000 Liverpool fans, were sufficient.Marshall said he believed that the seven turnstiles for the 10,100 fans with tickets for the standing terraces, and 23 turnstiles in total for all 24,000 Liverpool fans, were sufficient.
He said he had not been aware before the disaster that the maximum admission through turnstiles, recommended in the official Home Office guide to safety at sports grounds, known as the green guide, was 750 per hour. Nor was he specifically aware at that time of the Leppings Lane terrace’s capacity, he said.He said he had not been aware before the disaster that the maximum admission through turnstiles, recommended in the official Home Office guide to safety at sports grounds, known as the green guide, was 750 per hour. Nor was he specifically aware at that time of the Leppings Lane terrace’s capacity, he said.
Marshall said he was aware that Lord Justice Taylor’s official 1989 inquiry into the disaster accepted that “some form of filtering” was in place the previous year to stagger supporters’ arrival at the Leppings Lane end. However, he said he had been unaware of that before the 1989 match, and believed there would have been difficulties associated with forming a cordon to filter the fans.Marshall said he was aware that Lord Justice Taylor’s official 1989 inquiry into the disaster accepted that “some form of filtering” was in place the previous year to stagger supporters’ arrival at the Leppings Lane end. However, he said he had been unaware of that before the 1989 match, and believed there would have been difficulties associated with forming a cordon to filter the fans.
Marshall confirmed that he had been on duty at Hillsborough policing the FA Cup semi-final the previous year between the same two clubs, Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. In 1988, Marshall was in command inside the ground; another superintendent, Roger Greenwood, was in command outside, and the two officers swapped roles for 1989.
Shown CCTV footage of the congestion that developed on 15 April 1989, Marshall said had he realised that at 2.30pm 5,700 supporters were left to gain access through the seven turnstiles to the standing area, he would have been “concerned.” Had he been able to see the scene from above, he might have called for reserve police officers to try to “stem the tide” of people still walking towards the turnstiles and into the congested area, he said. They might have tried to form a cordon then, to prevent more supporters arriving, but this would have been difficult and he did not have sufficient officers, Marshall told the jury of seven women and four men.Shown CCTV footage of the congestion that developed on 15 April 1989, Marshall said had he realised that at 2.30pm 5,700 supporters were left to gain access through the seven turnstiles to the standing area, he would have been “concerned.” Had he been able to see the scene from above, he might have called for reserve police officers to try to “stem the tide” of people still walking towards the turnstiles and into the congested area, he said. They might have tried to form a cordon then, to prevent more supporters arriving, but this would have been difficult and he did not have sufficient officers, Marshall told the jury of seven women and four men.
From 2.35pm onwards, Marshall said “a tremendous congestion” built up, in which people were “pushing” from the back, and it was becoming “an extremely worrying situation”. At 2.40pm, Marshall climbed onto the parapet of the bridge over the river on Leppings Lane, saw his first “really good view” of the congestion, and became “really anxious”, he said. He told the inquest the supporters had “no chance” of getting into the ground by 3pm for the kick-off, but at the time, he did not think about that. He was unable to contact the control room in which Ch Supt Richard Duckenfield was commanding match operations, because his police radio was dead. From 2.35pm onwards, Marshall said “a tremendous congestion” built up, in which people were “pushing” from the back, and it was becoming “an extremely worrying situation”. At 2.40pm, Marshall climbed onto the parapet of the bridge over the river on Leppings Lane, saw his first “really good view” of the congestion, and became “really anxious”, he said. He told the inquest the supporters had “no chance” of getting into the ground by 3pm for the kick-off, but at the time, he did not think about that. He was unable to contact the control room in which the officer in charge at Hillsborough, Ch Supt David Duckenfield was commanding match operations, because his police radio was dead.
“You don’t need to use your imagination to realise what a difficult situation that was,” he said. “I had no means of contacting match control.” “You don’t need to use your imagination to realise what a difficult situation that was,” Marshall said. “I had no means of contacting match control.”
After that, the congestion continued to build and became worse outside the seven standing turnstiles.After that, the congestion continued to build and became worse outside the seven standing turnstiles.
“You were thinking at the time it was absolute bedlam?” Lambert asked him.“You were thinking at the time it was absolute bedlam?” Lambert asked him.
“Absolutely, yes,” he said.“Absolutely, yes,” he said.
The jury has heard that Duckenfield, ordered an exit gate to be opened at Leppings Lane to allow in a large group of supporters and alleviate the pressure outside. The lethal crush in which 96 supporters died took place inside, in the central pens of the terrace.
Marshall told the inquest that Duckenfield’s policy on delaying kick-off was that he would do so if there had been “fog on the Pennines or a serious accident on the motorway” that had delayed “very, very large numbers of people”.Marshall told the inquest that Duckenfield’s policy on delaying kick-off was that he would do so if there had been “fog on the Pennines or a serious accident on the motorway” that had delayed “very, very large numbers of people”.
Asked by Lambert if those were the only circumstances in which Duckenfield would allow the kick-off to be delayed, Marshall replied: “No. I think that it would have been possible for me to seek a delay in the kick-off, given the numbers that were besieging the turnstiles at 20 to and quarter to three.”Asked by Lambert if those were the only circumstances in which Duckenfield would allow the kick-off to be delayed, Marshall replied: “No. I think that it would have been possible for me to seek a delay in the kick-off, given the numbers that were besieging the turnstiles at 20 to and quarter to three.”
Marshall confirmed that he had been on duty at Hillsborough policing the FA Cup semi-final the previous year between the same two clubs, Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. In 1988, Marshall was in command inside the ground; another superintendent, Roger Greenwood, was in command outside, and the two officers swapped roles for 1989. Finally, at 2:47pm, Marshall asked for a wide exit gate to be opened, to allow a large number of supporters in and alleviate the pressure outside because, he said, he believed somebody would die. Marshall said supporters had been drinking before the match to a degree which amounted to abusing alcohol, and that they were “pushing and shoving” outside Leppings Lane to “get into the ground come what may.”
Marshall said he had regarded the 1988 match as a success. Asked by Lambert if he had been made aware afterwards that in fact there had been “a degree of congestion” on the Leppings Lane terrace at that semi-final, and that the tunnel leading to the central pens had been closed off when they were full, Marshall replied: “I was not aware of that, no.” The police radio was not working, he said, and finally after four attempts his message reached Duckenfield in the control room, who ordered the exit gate, C, to be opened. Asked by Lambert if he thought about where the fans who entered through gate C would go, Marshall replied: “Not at that time, no.”
The jury has heard that at the 1989 match, the tunnel leading to the central pens was not closed off, either before or after the exit gate was opened to allow large numbers of supporters in. The jury has heard that most went through the tunnel in front of them, which led to the central “pens” of the Leppings Lane terrace, and that is where the lethal crush took place in which the 96 supporters were killed.
Asked whether he had attended the debriefing meeting held after the 1988 semi-final, Marshall said: “I don’t remember actually going to it. It might have been my day off or something.” Asked by Lambert about the 1988 semi-final, Marshall said he had not been aware that there had been “a degree of congestion” in the Leppings Lane “pens” at that semi-final, and that the tunnel leading to the central “pens” had been closed off when they were full. Later, questioned by Pete Weatherby QC, representing 22 families whose relatives were killed in the 1989 disaster, Marshall agreed it would have been “helpful” if he had been told the tunnel was closed, and the police could have planned for such an eventuality at the 1989 match.
Marshall said it would have been helpful if the closure of the tunnel at the 1988 semi-final had been brought to light at the debriefing, and for it to have been included in the operational order for the 1989 match. Asked if he had attended the debriefing meeting held after the 1988 semi-final, Marshall said: “I don’t remember actually going to it. It might have been my day off or something.”
The inquest has heard that the possibility of closing the tunnel leading to the central pens was not included in the South Yorkshire police operational order. The inquest continues. Weatherby asked him if Duckenfield, as the match commander, should have arranged for the tunnel to be closed when gate C was opened on his orders.
“It would have been a very, very useful step,” Marshall replied, although he said he was “not here to criticise David Duckenfield, and I won’t do so.”
Marshall said that “one of the great regrets” is that he did not contact the control room and ensure “a reception committee” of police officers was inside the turnstile area when the gate was opened. He said his main concern was a “public order” issue, because he was allowing drunk fans in, and “an indeterminate number” who did not have tickets.
The inquest dealt only briefly with the lethal crush in which the 96 people died, because that is to be examined in detail later in proceedings. Marshall said when he went inside the ground and saw the terrible crush:
“I was on auto pilot. I linked the awful events on the terraces directly with my opening of the gate, and I really had to dig deep to bring any sort of leadership to that situation.”
“You felt a strong sense of responsibility?” Lambert asked him.
“I certainly did, yes,” he replied.
Weatherby, for the 22 bereaved families, put it to Marshall that he was “pointing the finger” at supporters by claiming that they were drunk, pushing and shoving, and that this made the crowd outside impossible to control.
“Your references to the behaviour of the Liverpool fans are simply offloading responsibility, aren’t they?” Weatherby asked.
“No,” Marshall replied.
He agreed, though, with six of a list of ten propositions Weatherby advanced as the real causes of the disaster: too few turnstiles combined with misleading signs at Leppings Lane; the Leppings Lane “pens” did not have dedicated entrances and were “dangerous” if not carefully monitored; no contingency plans to deal with the unexpected problems which arose with crowd entry; confused planning for responsibility inside the Leppings Lane turnstiles; failure by Marshall and other match commanders to take “appropriate action” once the problems outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles developed; and “woeful” police communications.
Marshall said, however, that the same match plan had been a success the previous year, did not agree that the police took no “consequential action” once the exit gate was opened, nor that there was a failure by the match commanders to initiate a sufficient emergency response once the disaster started to unfold.
“I don’t accept that at all,” he said.
The inquest continues, with Marshall scheduled to be in the witness box for another full day.