Lee Rigby report: Six things the Parliamentary investigation uncovered
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Version 0 of 1. The 191-page Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report indicates a number of failings in SIS (Secret Intelligence Services) actions leading up to the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in May last year. 1. “Let’s kill a soldier”: Internet conversations Michael Adebowale, one of the two killers, had an internet account that urged violence against the military, but the account was not spotted until a week after the attack. He also had online conversations with a suspected al-Qaeda extremist – who encouraged Adebowale to become a martyr – but these exchanges were neither found by MI5 nor reported by the internet company. “This is the single issue which,” the report states, “had it been known at the time – might have enabled MI5 to prevent the attack.” Drummer Lee Rigby, 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 2. Internet firms failed to report extremist activities online Another of the key findings from the report lays much of the blame at internet and social media companies who failed to report findings. Accounts under Adebowale’s name were closed for suspected terror activities – but this action was not shared with security officials. The companies were criticised strongly for providing a “safe haven” for terrorists. Additionally, the significant difficulties faced by the agencies accessing this information was “of great concern” to the committee, who noted that the companies defence (of privacy of their users) “should not be allowed to prevail” at the cost of national security. 3. MI5 and SIS’s procedures were at fault The report noted the lengthy delays between identification of a concern and action upon it. They also discovered that when actions were recommended they were not always carried out. Although the report acknowledges this may not have prevented Fusilier Rigby’s murder, the committee “expects MI5 to rectify their procedures”. Members of the committee noted it can take 69 days to process a “low priority” individual – i.e. Adebowale – which they state is too long and must be changed as “a matter of urgency.” It adds: “in Adebowale’s case, the delays were significantly longer than the average, without any obvious explanation.” They suggest a reform of process, again. A court sketch by Elizabeth Cook of Adebolajo (left) and Adebowale (right) 4. SIS’s apparent lack of interest in Adebojalo’s arrest “deeply unsatisfactory” Despite Michael Adebojalo’s arrest by anti-terrorist police in Kenya in 2011, SIS failed to take an interest after April 2013 when intensive surveillance on him was stopped, and he dropped from being a person of “sufficient priority”. 5. SIS and police provided “conflicting accounts” There was a breakdown in communication between police and security services. This affected the abilities of both organisations to act prior to Adebolajo’s arrest. Again, the report indicates that records were shoddily kept or failed to be recorded entirely. The report added there is “insufficient co-ordination between MI5 and police investigations”. It went on to state that police failure to provide all information on Adebowale – while not affecting this particular case – must be not repeated. The site where Lee Rigby was killed outside the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich 6. No systems in place to deal with individuals on periphery of number of investigations Between them, the two men appeared on the periphery of seven different agency investigations as low-level suspects of interest (SoI). The report notes that there appears to be no strategy in dealing with individuals like this, and neither the police or security service have improved their approach, despite the issue having been raised in the past. |