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You can find the current article at its original source at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/26/lee-rigby-report-politicians-powers-not-cure-terrorism
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| Post-Rigby report, politicians grabbing new powers will not ‘cure’ terrorism | Post-Rigby report, politicians grabbing new powers will not ‘cure’ terrorism |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| As yesterday’s report from the Intelligence and Security Committee into the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby showed, often security agencies know a great deal about people who go on to commit appalling acts of terrorism. It was chillingly true of the men who perpetrated the 9/11 attack, and it was true all over again of Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, both of whom were in the sights of both MI5 and MI6 long before they decided on action. | As yesterday’s report from the Intelligence and Security Committee into the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby showed, often security agencies know a great deal about people who go on to commit appalling acts of terrorism. It was chillingly true of the men who perpetrated the 9/11 attack, and it was true all over again of Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, both of whom were in the sights of both MI5 and MI6 long before they decided on action. |
| The problem for the security agencies was that Adebowale and Adebolajo were only two among many other possible threats. Faced with a great haystack of knowledge, the agencies had no real indication of which glistening strand was the needle. The subsequent discovery that Facebook had closed down some of Adebowale’s accounts because of their content, and that he had threatened in one post to kill a soldier, a piece of information that did not emerge until after the attack, has been presented as the vital key to piecing together all the other bits of information. | The problem for the security agencies was that Adebowale and Adebolajo were only two among many other possible threats. Faced with a great haystack of knowledge, the agencies had no real indication of which glistening strand was the needle. The subsequent discovery that Facebook had closed down some of Adebowale’s accounts because of their content, and that he had threatened in one post to kill a soldier, a piece of information that did not emerge until after the attack, has been presented as the vital key to piecing together all the other bits of information. |
| Certainly that’s how the politicians on the ISC report saw it. They found that with the Facebook data, the attack might have been anticipated. Conveniently, it is being taken as evidence to support demands for further powers to monitor internet activity, starting with the counter-terrorism legislation that begins its helter-skelter progress towards the statute book today. In the Commons yesterday, David Cameron suggested new and even more extensive powers were under review. | Certainly that’s how the politicians on the ISC report saw it. They found that with the Facebook data, the attack might have been anticipated. Conveniently, it is being taken as evidence to support demands for further powers to monitor internet activity, starting with the counter-terrorism legislation that begins its helter-skelter progress towards the statute book today. In the Commons yesterday, David Cameron suggested new and even more extensive powers were under review. |
| Everything is so much clearer in the rear-view mirror. But look ahead. Imagine the squillions of extra bytes of data the security agencies will soon have in their already mountainous haystack of information. Even more possible leads to try to make sense of, more names and more contacts to join up or not to join up. As the tech journal Wired reports, GCHQ is already laden with a load more knowledge than it can organise. | Everything is so much clearer in the rear-view mirror. But look ahead. Imagine the squillions of extra bytes of data the security agencies will soon have in their already mountainous haystack of information. Even more possible leads to try to make sense of, more names and more contacts to join up or not to join up. As the tech journal Wired reports, GCHQ is already laden with a load more knowledge than it can organise. |
| Clearly, understanding the nature of the threat and how it might be delivered is the biggest single asset in tackling terror, but as with medical knowledge it is far from the whole story. In the first of this year’s Reith lectures on Tuesday, Dr Atul Gawande, Harvard professor, columnist for the New Yorker magazine and former public health policy researcher for Bill Clinton, discussed some of the reasons why doctors fail. He talked about how failure led to the pursuit of knowledge, and the astounding developments in medicine produced with the courage and imagination that are the mark of great scientists. | Clearly, understanding the nature of the threat and how it might be delivered is the biggest single asset in tackling terror, but as with medical knowledge it is far from the whole story. In the first of this year’s Reith lectures on Tuesday, Dr Atul Gawande, Harvard professor, columnist for the New Yorker magazine and former public health policy researcher for Bill Clinton, discussed some of the reasons why doctors fail. He talked about how failure led to the pursuit of knowledge, and the astounding developments in medicine produced with the courage and imagination that are the mark of great scientists. |
| He described how the doctor who first realised that it might be possible to see what was going on in your heart by running a catheter up a vein, Werner Forssmann, proved his theory – which colleagues were confident would be fatal – by doing it to himself, illicitly, with the help of an interested radiographer. (First he was sacked. Later he won the Nobel prize.) Gawande then considered how knowledge itself is never enough. Patients die who might have been saved because the doctors weren’t good enough. They were perhaps ignorant of the latest knowledge, or they may have misread the symptoms or they may simply have been not very good doctors. | |
| It is difficult to challenge the idea that the restless human urge always to know more might be flawed, that even the pursuit of knowledge has its limits – in fact is not much use at all if not enough of the right people know about it and can use it effectively. A short study of why terrorist attacks succeed might be one way of thinking more openly about why doctors fail. | It is difficult to challenge the idea that the restless human urge always to know more might be flawed, that even the pursuit of knowledge has its limits – in fact is not much use at all if not enough of the right people know about it and can use it effectively. A short study of why terrorist attacks succeed might be one way of thinking more openly about why doctors fail. |
| Making sure Donald Rumsfeld’s known knowns are known by all the people who need to know them matters too. | Making sure Donald Rumsfeld’s known knowns are known by all the people who need to know them matters too. |
| And so does making society more resilient, both less likely to be attacked and better able to withstand attack if it comes. There is a reason why politicians instinctively grab for the powers to acquire more and fuller knowledge. It makes it look as if the problem’s solved. It’s terrorism’s cancer cure, and like most cancer cures it promises much, much more than ever gets delivered. | And so does making society more resilient, both less likely to be attacked and better able to withstand attack if it comes. There is a reason why politicians instinctively grab for the powers to acquire more and fuller knowledge. It makes it look as if the problem’s solved. It’s terrorism’s cancer cure, and like most cancer cures it promises much, much more than ever gets delivered. |