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| C.I.A. Director Says Iran’s Economic Peril Helped Drive Nuclear Deal | C.I.A. Director Says Iran’s Economic Peril Helped Drive Nuclear Deal |
| (35 minutes later) | |
| CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the first public glimpse of American intelligence assessments about why Iran’s leadership agreed to the tentative nuclear accord last week, saying that Iran’s president persuaded its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that their country’s economy was “destined to go down” unless he reached an understanding with the West. | CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the first public glimpse of American intelligence assessments about why Iran’s leadership agreed to the tentative nuclear accord last week, saying that Iran’s president persuaded its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that their country’s economy was “destined to go down” unless he reached an understanding with the West. |
| The director, John O. Brennan, speaking Tuesday night at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, also dismissed as “wholly disingenuous” the claim of Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that the framework accord reached last Thursday in Lausanne, Switzerland, would provide Iran with a “pathway to a bomb.” | The director, John O. Brennan, speaking Tuesday night at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, also dismissed as “wholly disingenuous” the claim of Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that the framework accord reached last Thursday in Lausanne, Switzerland, would provide Iran with a “pathway to a bomb.” |
| Without naming Mr. Netanyahu directly, but quoting from his language, Mr. Brennan said that he was “pleasantly surprised” that the Iranians had given up as much as they did. He also backed the Obama administration’s assessment that the accord would greatly extend the amount of time it would take Iran to put together a bomb, either from plutonium or uranium. | Without naming Mr. Netanyahu directly, but quoting from his language, Mr. Brennan said that he was “pleasantly surprised” that the Iranians had given up as much as they did. He also backed the Obama administration’s assessment that the accord would greatly extend the amount of time it would take Iran to put together a bomb, either from plutonium or uranium. |
| “When I look at the concessions that they made, going from 19,000 centrifuges to 6,000 centrifuges with 5,000 still operating, nobody thought they would do it,” Mr. Brennan said. | “When I look at the concessions that they made, going from 19,000 centrifuges to 6,000 centrifuges with 5,000 still operating, nobody thought they would do it,” Mr. Brennan said. |
| Mr. Brennan’s views were considered important because President Obama had said in recent days that he had sought an assessment of Ayatollah Khamenei’s intentions from the intelligence community, telling the New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman on Saturday that “he’s a pretty tough read — I don’t have great insight beyond what I think I get from our intelligence folks.” | |
| While Mr. Obama is usually deeply suspicious of intelligence reporting, his relationship with Mr. Brennan has been an especially tight one since the 2008 campaign, and in the first term Mr. Brennan was his top intelligence adviser. | While Mr. Obama is usually deeply suspicious of intelligence reporting, his relationship with Mr. Brennan has been an especially tight one since the 2008 campaign, and in the first term Mr. Brennan was his top intelligence adviser. |
| Mr. Brennan suggested that the key to the deal was the election of President Hassan Rouhani, who had hardly been the supreme leader’s first choice. It took more than two years, he suggested, for the new president, a former nuclear negotiator himself, to convince the far more isolated Ayatollah Khamenei that “six years of sanctions had really hit,” and that the economic future imperiled the regime. | Mr. Brennan suggested that the key to the deal was the election of President Hassan Rouhani, who had hardly been the supreme leader’s first choice. It took more than two years, he suggested, for the new president, a former nuclear negotiator himself, to convince the far more isolated Ayatollah Khamenei that “six years of sanctions had really hit,” and that the economic future imperiled the regime. |
| During this time, the ayatollah kept referring publicly to Iran’s “resistance economy,” a phrase that resounded among hard-liners who liked to portray the country as thriving by confronting the United States and its allies. | During this time, the ayatollah kept referring publicly to Iran’s “resistance economy,” a phrase that resounded among hard-liners who liked to portray the country as thriving by confronting the United States and its allies. |
| But Mr. Brennan also suggested that Ayatollah Khamenei, who has not spoken publicly on the accord but has not permitted hard-liners to speak out against it, had performed a careful political calculation. If the effort to reach an accord collapsed, or the price seemed too high, prominent members of Mr. Rouhani’s government could be blamed, starting with the lead negotiator, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. | But Mr. Brennan also suggested that Ayatollah Khamenei, who has not spoken publicly on the accord but has not permitted hard-liners to speak out against it, had performed a careful political calculation. If the effort to reach an accord collapsed, or the price seemed too high, prominent members of Mr. Rouhani’s government could be blamed, starting with the lead negotiator, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. |
| “I think Khamenei was in the position of being able to say to Rouhani and Zarif, ‘O.K., see if you can get a deal,’’’ said Mr. Brennan, speaking to hundreds of students in an hourlong interview conducted by Graham T. Allison, a Harvard professor and former dean of the school who has long specialized in nuclear strategy. “Because if you do, Khamenei is going to be able to derive the benefits from it, and if you don’t get one, Rouhani has Zarif to blame.” | “I think Khamenei was in the position of being able to say to Rouhani and Zarif, ‘O.K., see if you can get a deal,’’’ said Mr. Brennan, speaking to hundreds of students in an hourlong interview conducted by Graham T. Allison, a Harvard professor and former dean of the school who has long specialized in nuclear strategy. “Because if you do, Khamenei is going to be able to derive the benefits from it, and if you don’t get one, Rouhani has Zarif to blame.” |
| But the process took time, he said, playing out long after two secret envoys from the Obama administration — a former deputy secretary of state, William Burns, and a former close adviser to Hillary Rodham Clinton, Jake Sullivan — made the first efforts to draw the Rouhani government into a conversation. | But the process took time, he said, playing out long after two secret envoys from the Obama administration — a former deputy secretary of state, William Burns, and a former close adviser to Hillary Rodham Clinton, Jake Sullivan — made the first efforts to draw the Rouhani government into a conversation. |
| “I think over time Rouhani was able to explain to Khamenei just how challenging the economic environment was in Iran right now, and it was destined to go down,” he said. “The only way they were going to address” the problem was to get sanctions lifted. | “I think over time Rouhani was able to explain to Khamenei just how challenging the economic environment was in Iran right now, and it was destined to go down,” he said. “The only way they were going to address” the problem was to get sanctions lifted. |
| The description stood in stark contrast to the assessments American intelligence officials made in 2009, when a much smaller deal with Iran on nuclear production fell apart after negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. At that time, Obama administration officials said the decision to abandon the deal had come from Ayatollah Khamenei himself. They did not say how they knew of his role, but it appeared they had some capability to monitor his communications, or those of his aides. | The description stood in stark contrast to the assessments American intelligence officials made in 2009, when a much smaller deal with Iran on nuclear production fell apart after negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. At that time, Obama administration officials said the decision to abandon the deal had come from Ayatollah Khamenei himself. They did not say how they knew of his role, but it appeared they had some capability to monitor his communications, or those of his aides. |
| But at the time, the sanctions on oil and financial transactions had not yet been imposed, and a cybersabotage program against Iran, code-named “Olympic Games,” was still developing. | But at the time, the sanctions on oil and financial transactions had not yet been imposed, and a cybersabotage program against Iran, code-named “Olympic Games,” was still developing. |
| When pressed about the sabotage, Mr. Brennan indirectly acknowledged it had played a role, suggesting the Iranians had been frustrated they could not get their centrifuges and other equipment operating more quickly and more efficiently. But he was careful not to acknowledge the activity, and the United States has never publicly talked about its extensive sabotage program, which started under President George W. Bush and accelerated by Mr. Obama. In private, many intelligence officials say that effort was at least as important as the sanctions. | When pressed about the sabotage, Mr. Brennan indirectly acknowledged it had played a role, suggesting the Iranians had been frustrated they could not get their centrifuges and other equipment operating more quickly and more efficiently. But he was careful not to acknowledge the activity, and the United States has never publicly talked about its extensive sabotage program, which started under President George W. Bush and accelerated by Mr. Obama. In private, many intelligence officials say that effort was at least as important as the sanctions. |
| Mr. Brennan’s description of Mr. Rouhani as a man who “has a history of engaging with the West, and he is much more practical and reasonable individual,” is bound to inflame Mr. Netanyahu’s government. In October 2013, speaking at the United Nations, Mr. Netanyahu called Mr. Rouhani “a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a wolf who thinks he can pull the wool over the eyes of the international community.” | Mr. Brennan’s description of Mr. Rouhani as a man who “has a history of engaging with the West, and he is much more practical and reasonable individual,” is bound to inflame Mr. Netanyahu’s government. In October 2013, speaking at the United Nations, Mr. Netanyahu called Mr. Rouhani “a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a wolf who thinks he can pull the wool over the eyes of the international community.” |
| In the same speech he described the Iranian president as a man who “thinks he can have his yellowcake and eat it, too,” referring to the raw uranium ore that can be processed into nuclear fuel. | In the same speech he described the Iranian president as a man who “thinks he can have his yellowcake and eat it, too,” referring to the raw uranium ore that can be processed into nuclear fuel. |
| But Mr. Brennan suggested that the provisions of the accord that allow international inspectors to trace Iran’s efforts back to its uranium mills and mines, and track the fuel as it is sent off for processing — including into yellowcake — was important to improving intelligence collection about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. | But Mr. Brennan suggested that the provisions of the accord that allow international inspectors to trace Iran’s efforts back to its uranium mills and mines, and track the fuel as it is sent off for processing — including into yellowcake — was important to improving intelligence collection about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. |
| The C.I.A.’s ability to detect covert nuclear sites has been mixed at best. More than a decade ago it detected, with the help of allies, the large enrichment plant at Natanz. Under the agreement, it would be the only site where Iran would be able to enrich uranium, in limited quantities. The agency missed a large underground site called Fordo, which was first detected by Britain and Israel, and it also missed a nearby nuclear reactor in Syria, built by North Korea and bombed by Israel in September 2007. | The C.I.A.’s ability to detect covert nuclear sites has been mixed at best. More than a decade ago it detected, with the help of allies, the large enrichment plant at Natanz. Under the agreement, it would be the only site where Iran would be able to enrich uranium, in limited quantities. The agency missed a large underground site called Fordo, which was first detected by Britain and Israel, and it also missed a nearby nuclear reactor in Syria, built by North Korea and bombed by Israel in September 2007. |
| Mr. Brennan expressed confidence that the C.I.A. would be able to build on the international inspections and detect new covert activity, saying “we’ve gone to school” on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. | Mr. Brennan expressed confidence that the C.I.A. would be able to build on the international inspections and detect new covert activity, saying “we’ve gone to school” on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. |
| Mr. Brennan hinted he had little expectation that the agreement would change Iran’s behavior in the region, including its sponsorship of terrorism. And he acknowledged that the increased revenue Iran would receive as sanctions are lifted could bolster those efforts. | Mr. Brennan hinted he had little expectation that the agreement would change Iran’s behavior in the region, including its sponsorship of terrorism. And he acknowledged that the increased revenue Iran would receive as sanctions are lifted could bolster those efforts. |
| “I don’t think this is going to lead to a light switch and the Iranians are going to become passive, docile,” he said. | “I don’t think this is going to lead to a light switch and the Iranians are going to become passive, docile,” he said. |