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SAS officer says lack of build-up marches 'contributory factor' in deaths SAS officer says lack of build-up marches 'contributory factor' in deaths
(about 4 hours later)
The commanding officer of an SAS unit has said he cannot recollect telling a bereaved family that a test march in which three candidates suffered fatal heat illness in soaring temperatures could not be cancelled because it would create too much paperwork. The commanding officer of an SAS unit has said he cannot recollect telling a bereaved family that a test march in which three candidates suffered fatal heat illness in soaring temperatures could not be cancelled because it would create too much paperwork. The officer, identified only as 9L, said he believed a “contributory factor” in the deaths of the three part-time soldiers was that they did not take part in the same build-up marches as regular troops.
Identified only as 9L, the officer said he believed a “contributory factor” in the deaths of the three part-time soldiers was that they did not take part in the same build-up marches as regular troops. The officer also admitted that he had not read Ministry of Defence guidance that spells out how heat illness should be prevented, claiming that it did not apply to the sort of specialist exercise the men were undertaking.
The officer also admitted that he had not read Ministry of Defence guidance that spells out how heat illness should be prevented, claiming it did not apply to the sort of specialist exercise the men were undertaking. The inquest of Lance Corporals Edward Maher and Craig Roberts and Corporal James Dunsby has been hearing how they collapsed during the 16-mile test march in the Brecon Beacons, south Wales, in mid July 2013. Candidates have given vivid accounts of running out of water and having to be helped by civilians and concerns have been raised about the way the men were monitored and about the rescue operation once they fell ill.
The inquest of Lance Corporals Edward Maher and Craig Roberts and Corporal James Dunsby has been hearing how they collapsed during the 16-mile test march in the Brecon Beacons, south Wales, in mid July 2013. Roberts’ family have told the inquest that after they travelled to Wales to view his body, they spoke to 9L, who told them the march was not cancelled because it would lead to too much paperwork. Giving evidence from behind a screen, 9L said: “Those aren’t words that I recollect... I truly don’t.” Asked if cancelling the march would have generated paperwork, he replied: “None at all.” He said it would have meant the selection process would have been halted but added that was “inconsequential”.
Candidates have given vivid accounts of running out of water and having to be helped by civilians and concerns have been raised about the way the men were monitored and about the rescue operation once they fell ill. 9L told the inquest he was “deeply sorry” for the men’s deaths, but said he did not believe the tragedy could have been foreseen. The inquest in Solihull, West Midlands, has been told that the reservists did not do build-up marches as their regular counterparts did in days before the test march. 9L said: “I think the fact they didn’t do exactly the same conditioning has to be a contributory factor. There was a clear difference between the regulars and reserves.”
Roberts’ family have told the inquest that after they travelled to Wales to view his body, they spoke to 9L, who told them the march was not cancelled because it would lead to too much paperwork. 9L said he had not read a document called JSP539, which details the MoD’s guidance on heat illness. “There are a large number of JSPs – I can’t read them all,” he said, adding that it would have been “too prohibitive” to have applied it to the training the men were doing. “It’s there as a useful guide,” he said.
Giving evidence from behind a screen, 9L said: “Those aren’t words that I recollect... I truly don’t.” Asked if cancelling the march would have generated paperwork, he replied: “None at all.” He said it would have meant the selection process would have been halted but added that was “inconsequential”. Keith Morton QC, representing Dunsby’s father, David, put it to him that a quarter of the 37 reservists who began the march on 13 July had suffered heat illness. Morton said there was a “fundamental failure to plan and manage this exercise”. 9L said: “You make it sound so scientific and so easy. I think you’re wrong.”
9L told the inquest he was “deeply sorry” for the men’s deaths but said he did not believe the tragedy could have been foreseen. 9L was asked why he allowed another march to take place the next day even though by then two men had died and one was in intensive care. He said what had happened “weighed heavily on our minds”, but he thought it was reasonable for the march to go ahead.
The inquest in Solihull, West Midlands, has been told that the reservists did not do build-up marches as their regular counterparts did in days before the test march. Earlier a soldier codenamed 1C, who was in charge of tracking the progress of the candidates during the fatal march, denied falsifying an official log and providing an incorrect timing in a statement. It also emerged that the soldier’s original logbook detailing the chronology of the day on which three men collapsed had vanished. He said he thought it would be under lock and key at the “lead regiment’s” [the SAS’s] headquarters in Hereford.
He said: “I think the fact they didn’t do exactly the same conditioning has to be a contributory factor. There was a clear difference between the regulars and reserves.”
9L said he had not read a document called JSP539, which details the MoD’s guidance on heat illness. “There are a large number of JSPs, I can’t read them all,” he said, adding it would have been “too prohibitive” to have applied it to the training the men were doing. “It’s there as a useful guide,” he said.
Keith Morton QC, representing Dunsby’s father David, put it to him that a quarter of the 37 reservists who began the march on 13 July had suffered heat illness. Morton said there was a “fundamental failure to plan and manage this exercise”. 9L said: “You make it sound so scientific and so easy. I think you’re wrong.”
9L was asked why he allowed another march to take place next day even though by then two men had died and one was in intensive care. He said what had happened “weighed heavily on our minds” but he thought it was reasonable for the march to go ahead.
Earlier a soldier codenamed 1C, who was in charge of tracking the progress of the candidates during the fatal march, denied falsifying an official log and providing an incorrect timing in a statement.
It also emerged that the soldier’s original logbook detailing the chronology of the day on which three men collapsed has vanished. He said he thought it would be under lock and key at the “lead regiment’s” [the SAS’s] headquarters in Hereford.
It took between 45 minutes and around two hours for 1C and others in a control vehicle to spot that the three men who died had stopped. Asked by the Birmingham coroner, Louise Hunt, why it had taken so long, he said: “I have to check everyone else. I couldn’t concentrate on one specific student.”It took between 45 minutes and around two hours for 1C and others in a control vehicle to spot that the three men who died had stopped. Asked by the Birmingham coroner, Louise Hunt, why it had taken so long, he said: “I have to check everyone else. I couldn’t concentrate on one specific student.”
1C was asked about a series of entries on the log relating to the timings some candidates had left at checkpoint. Hunt, asked him if the list had been “created after this tragic event to clarify timings”. He insisted they had been made on the day.1C was asked about a series of entries on the log relating to the timings some candidates had left at checkpoint. Hunt, asked him if the list had been “created after this tragic event to clarify timings”. He insisted they had been made on the day.
In court on Tuesday, 1C said it was 4.40pm when the control team realised that Dunsby had not been moving. Morton asked him why in a statement prepared six days after the tragedy he had put this timing at 4.10pm. Morton asked if this earlier time had been “made up” to given the impression that Dunsby’s lack of progress had been noticed earlier. 1C denied this. In court on Tuesday, 1C said it was 4.40pm when the control team realised that Dunsby was not moving. Morton asked him why in a statement prepared six days after the tragedy he had put this timing at 4.10pm. Morton asked if this earlier time had been “made up” to give the impression that Dunsby’s lack of progress had been noticed earlier. 1C denied this.
The inquest continues.The inquest continues.