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| Panel Questions Whether West Tapped U.N. Chief's Communications | Panel Questions Whether West Tapped U.N. Chief's Communications |
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| London — When a panel appointed by the United Nations reported this week on one of Africa’s most enduring mysteries, its findings raised an intriguing question: In the days before the plane crash that killed Dag Hammarskjold in 1961, were Western intelligence agencies bugging the encryption device he used to communicate with his headquarters in New York? | |
| Given the massive, clandestine harvesting of data in the digital era, including revelations that the National Security Agency surreptitiously monitored the phone conversations of French and German leaders, the idea of eavesdropping on the United Nations secretary general might raise few eyebrows. Even in 2004, a British lawmaker, Clare Short, accused her country’s spies of listening in on Kofi Annan, one of Mr. Hammarskjold’s successors. | Given the massive, clandestine harvesting of data in the digital era, including revelations that the National Security Agency surreptitiously monitored the phone conversations of French and German leaders, the idea of eavesdropping on the United Nations secretary general might raise few eyebrows. Even in 2004, a British lawmaker, Clare Short, accused her country’s spies of listening in on Kofi Annan, one of Mr. Hammarskjold’s successors. |
| But, even though it seemed little more than a footnote in the panel’s exhaustive 91-page report, the newest suggestion that Mr. Hammarskjold’s Swiss-made CX-52 encryption device may have been compromised seemed to point once more to the catalog of hidden narratives compiled by intelligence agencies over the years and jealously guarded from the prying eyes of the public. | But, even though it seemed little more than a footnote in the panel’s exhaustive 91-page report, the newest suggestion that Mr. Hammarskjold’s Swiss-made CX-52 encryption device may have been compromised seemed to point once more to the catalog of hidden narratives compiled by intelligence agencies over the years and jealously guarded from the prying eyes of the public. |
| Indeed, the three-member panel, and Ban Ki-moon, the incumbent secretary general who appointed the commission, both buttressed calls for further investigation with appeals to intelligence agencies to, as Mr. Ban put it, “disclose, declassify or otherwise allow privileged access to” their secret files. “This may be our last chance to find the truth,” he said. | Indeed, the three-member panel, and Ban Ki-moon, the incumbent secretary general who appointed the commission, both buttressed calls for further investigation with appeals to intelligence agencies to, as Mr. Ban put it, “disclose, declassify or otherwise allow privileged access to” their secret files. “This may be our last chance to find the truth,” he said. |
| It could be a very slim chance indeed. Citing security considerations, British and American officials declined to declassify information sought by the panel, although the United States permitted one of its members to take a peek at two classified N.S.A. documents to establish that they “do not contain information which would shed light” on the crash. | It could be a very slim chance indeed. Citing security considerations, British and American officials declined to declassify information sought by the panel, although the United States permitted one of its members to take a peek at two classified N.S.A. documents to establish that they “do not contain information which would shed light” on the crash. |
| Nonetheless, it is tempting to ask what secret could be so great — almost 55 years after the fact — to justify the continued cloud of obfuscation surrounding Mr. Hammarskjold’s death and the maneuvers of great powers intent on molding Africa’s destiny to their political and economic will at the height of the Cold War. | Nonetheless, it is tempting to ask what secret could be so great — almost 55 years after the fact — to justify the continued cloud of obfuscation surrounding Mr. Hammarskjold’s death and the maneuvers of great powers intent on molding Africa’s destiny to their political and economic will at the height of the Cold War. |
| Mr. Hammarskjold’s DC-6B airliner crashed on the night of September 17-18, 1961, just outside Ndola in what was then Northern Rhodesia and is now Zambia. He was on a peace mission as fighting raged between secessionist troops backed by mercenaries in the neighboring Congolese province of Katanga and United Nations forces sent to subdue their revolt. Mr. Hammarskjold was flying into a maelstrom. | Mr. Hammarskjold’s DC-6B airliner crashed on the night of September 17-18, 1961, just outside Ndola in what was then Northern Rhodesia and is now Zambia. He was on a peace mission as fighting raged between secessionist troops backed by mercenaries in the neighboring Congolese province of Katanga and United Nations forces sent to subdue their revolt. Mr. Hammarskjold was flying into a maelstrom. |
| In its report, the panel said enough new information had come to light in recent years to suggest that the airplane could have been brought down deliberately. It also assigned “moderate probative value” to assertions that Western officials may have conspired to cover up key elements of the story. | In its report, the panel said enough new information had come to light in recent years to suggest that the airplane could have been brought down deliberately. It also assigned “moderate probative value” to assertions that Western officials may have conspired to cover up key elements of the story. |
| The panel concluded that there was some evidence to support the assertion that the CX-52 encryption device may have been “among those intentionally designed such that their transmissions could be surreptitiously intercepted by the N.S.A. and other select intelligence agencies.” | The panel concluded that there was some evidence to support the assertion that the CX-52 encryption device may have been “among those intentionally designed such that their transmissions could be surreptitiously intercepted by the N.S.A. and other select intelligence agencies.” |
| While Mr. Hammarskjold sought to keep his itinerary secret, his own messages “if intercepted, could have provided information about the travel and other arrangements being made” for his scheduled encounter in Ndola with Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Katangese secessionists. | While Mr. Hammarskjold sought to keep his itinerary secret, his own messages “if intercepted, could have provided information about the travel and other arrangements being made” for his scheduled encounter in Ndola with Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Katangese secessionists. |
| In the climate of the time, when many of Mr. Tshombe’s sympathizers and Western sponsors regarded Mr. Hammarskjold as their worst enemy, that would have been valuable information. | In the climate of the time, when many of Mr. Tshombe’s sympathizers and Western sponsors regarded Mr. Hammarskjold as their worst enemy, that would have been valuable information. |
| The panel’s evidence relating to the encryption device came from Sixten Svensson, the Swedish brother-in-law of the founder of the Swiss company that produced it, who died in the 1980s. | The panel’s evidence relating to the encryption device came from Sixten Svensson, the Swedish brother-in-law of the founder of the Swiss company that produced it, who died in the 1980s. |
| According to Mr. Svensson in a telephone interview on Wednesday, one of the last messages sent using Mr. Hammarskjold’s encryption device on Sept. 17, 1961 — hours before he flew to Ndola — set out his tentative schedule and chronicled his expectation of a “favorable reaction.” But the stakes were high. Had he survived to test Mr. Tshombe’s sentiment, Africa’s history might have taken a different course altogether. |