The Guardian view on the Greek negotiations: out in the cold or in chains
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Version 0 of 1. The Greek crisis began like the proverbial cloud that was no bigger than a man’s hand and has grown into a perfect storm which has shaken Europe to its foundations. Regardless of the final outcome of the negotiations, what unfortunately can be said with certainty is that the union’s fault lines have all but burst under the pressure. Between France and Germany, between north and south and east and west in the union, and even within nations, there are now profound differences, only potential before, which it will take a long time to resolve. The past few days have seen Paris commit itself to keeping Greece in the euro and the union in a way which puts President François Hollande on a collision course with hawks in the German government, headed by the finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble. France’s mentoring of Greece as that country made its own final proposals did not seek an easy or soft arrangement, but nor did it envisage Greece’s reduction to the status of a debt colony, not too different from the conditions once imposed on Egypt and China in the imperial era, with foreigners in controlling positions in its economy. Mr Schäuble’s recent interventions in the talks, coming out in the leaks which have been his ministry’s way of influencing the debate for many weeks, have placed tougher and tougher options on the table. It seems that if Greece leaves the euro, he would not repine; but if Greece stays he wants to see it in manacles. He has canvassed the idea of a “temporary exit” for Greece from the euro for five years, a plan for which there is no legal precedent and one which most people see as a sneaky way of setting things up for a permanent departure. He has emerged as an advocate of a solution that would hand over much of the Greek economy to foreigners, including placing some of its national assets in a trust based in Luxemburg that would hold them as collateral for money advanced and privatise them as needed. In an echo of German reunification, this would treat Greece almost as if it were the German Democratic Republic, an entity that had lost its political credibility and whose assets could be disposed of at will. While European and IMF supervision of Greece’s affairs has long been a reality to some extent, this would take it to a new level. The demand put to the Greeks on Sunday, that they rapidly pass a whole raft of reform bills before negotiations can even begin, also has Mr Schäuble’s mark upon it. The German finance minister is hardly solely responsible, but he has also contributed toward a rancorous hardening of attitudes among members of the union. Above all, what has come sharply into view is the difference between Europe conceived as a project based on consensus and cooperation, and one based on conditions and, if need be, compulsion. Smaller countries such as Latvia or Slovakia see that compulsion in the shape of being forced to go along with a deal for Greece under which that country will still have more generous social provisions than they do. Some in Germany also see that compulsion as their being forced to pay for feckless Greeks. But in Latin Europe generally, the shape up or ship out principle that Mr Schäuble embodies is not admired. They did not join Europe to be ordered about. All this reinforces a miserabilist public opinion everywhere, gradually convincing itself that nothing good ever comes out of Europe. By that is increasingly meant not Brussels, as a synonym for the union’s central institutions, which have been quite sidelined in this crisis, but the collective of the continent’s leaders. Chancellor Angela Merkel now has to choose between alienating her closest partner in the union and her closest allies at home. She may well end up by doing both. Forcing Greece out would undermine the basic relationship with France, and alienate other countries such as Italy and Spain. Keeping Greece under humiliating conditions would not be much better, the Italian prime minister, Matteo Renzi, said on Sunday . Bizarrely, one European politician who seems to have cemented his position is Alexis Tsipras. In spite of his alternation between intransigence and appeasement, and the fact that he is almost certainly going to sign up to a worse deal than was earlier on offer, he seems to be accepted as the national leader in a way he was not before. He has satisfied at the emotional level by expressing, at one moment, the Greek people’s fury at the pain without gain they have endured, and at another their very strong loyalty to the European idea. If only it were as easy to square the circle in the union as a whole. |