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What Thatcherite union buster Sajid Javid learned on Wall Street	What Thatcherite union buster Sajid Javid learned on Wall Street
2015-07-15 18:25:23 UTC	2015-07-18 00:20:08 UTC (2 days later)
One New York morning in 1992, the bankers on Chase Manhattan’s emerging markets desk were told by their boss, Jorge Jasson, that a new hire was joining the team. “I remember that it was a surprise to most of us that he suddenly joined the group,” recalls Marcelo Blanco, then a junior on the desk. “One day he showed up and Jorge said: ‘This guy is good,’” says Blanco, “‘off-the-charts good.’”	One New York morning in 1992, the bankers on Chase Manhattan’s emerging markets desk were told by their boss, Jorge Jasson, that a new hire was joining the team. “I remember that it was a surprise to most of us that he suddenly joined the group,” recalls Marcelo Blanco, then a junior on the desk. “One day he showed up and Jorge said: ‘This guy is good,’” says Blanco, “‘off-the-charts good.’”
The new kid was Sajid Javid, soon to be the star man in the bank’s high-stakes bond adventures in Latin America, and now at the commanding heights of the British government as business secretary, and touted as a future Tory leader.	The new kid was Sajid Javid, soon to be the star man in the bank’s high-stakes bond adventures in Latin America, and now at the commanding heights of the British government as business secretary, and touted as a future Tory leader.
Yesterday, it fell to Javid to announce the new government’s assault on the unions – the most significant crackdown on the rights of organised labour since 1985. The proposals, including the requirement that 40% of union members back a strike, are the kind of pro-market reforms Javid came into politics for. This week, he also signalled his willingness to face down London’s black-cab drivers, saying that Britain should welcome companies such as Uber.	Yesterday, it fell to Javid to announce the new government’s assault on the unions – the most significant crackdown on the rights of organised labour since 1985. The proposals, including the requirement that 40% of union members back a strike, are the kind of pro-market reforms Javid came into politics for. This week, he also signalled his willingness to face down London’s black-cab drivers, saying that Britain should welcome companies such as Uber.
If this is just a start, Javid could be the man who completes the Thatcherite deregulation of the British economy – and no one on the left can accuse him of applying market ideology from a textbook. As a tour through the business secretary’s two decades in finance shows, everything Javid believes about liberalising old-fashioned economies was very much learned on the job.	If this is just a start, Javid could be the man who completes the Thatcherite deregulation of the British economy – and no one on the left can accuse him of applying market ideology from a textbook. As a tour through the business secretary’s two decades in finance shows, everything Javid believes about liberalising old-fashioned economies was very much learned on the job.
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Javid has the best backstory of any senior Conservative. His father came to Britain with only a pound and worked his way to being a bus driver; as a student at Exeter University, young Javid loved Margaret Thatcher but he presciently opposed Britain’s membership of the ERM. A profile of Javid when he was promoted to culture secretary said that “Javid has, reluctantly, grown used to telling this story – or, at least, parts of it,” coached, according to the article’s author, Fraser Nelson, “by Osborne’s formidable Treasury team”. Sensibly, he has said much less about what he actually did in finance, other than widely reported briefings about his fast promotions. The full story is one of glittering achievements – and close proximity to major controversies.	Javid has the best backstory of any senior Conservative. His father came to Britain with only a pound and worked his way to being a bus driver; as a student at Exeter University, young Javid loved Margaret Thatcher but he presciently opposed Britain’s membership of the ERM. A profile of Javid when he was promoted to culture secretary said that “Javid has, reluctantly, grown used to telling this story – or, at least, parts of it,” coached, according to the article’s author, Fraser Nelson, “by Osborne’s formidable Treasury team”. Sensibly, he has said much less about what he actually did in finance, other than widely reported briefings about his fast promotions. The full story is one of glittering achievements – and close proximity to major controversies.
The often-quoted line about his early years in finance is that he became the youngest vice-president in Chase’s history at age 25 (the Conservative party website goes further and claims he was 24). When I read the line to Jasson, he laughs. “No, no, no. I don’t know, I would be surprised. I’m not saying it is not true, but it doesn’t ring a bell.”	The often-quoted line about his early years in finance is that he became the youngest vice-president in Chase’s history at age 25 (the Conservative party website goes further and claims he was 24). When I read the line to Jasson, he laughs. “No, no, no. I don’t know, I would be surprised. I’m not saying it is not true, but it doesn’t ring a bell.”
Blanco – now on the boards of several major Argentinian firms, with parallel ambitions to be a finance minister himself – was the desk’s head of sales when Javid turned up fresh from London and university in 1991. Blanco soon realised that his new colleague was very serious for his age. “Sajid was honestly like a priest in a suit,” says Blanco. “Everything that you see in those movies, [such as] the Wolf of Wall Street – he was far away from that. He was disciplined as they come – very methodical, spotless.”	Blanco – now on the boards of several major Argentinian firms, with parallel ambitions to be a finance minister himself – was the desk’s head of sales when Javid turned up fresh from London and university in 1991. Blanco soon realised that his new colleague was very serious for his age. “Sajid was honestly like a priest in a suit,” says Blanco. “Everything that you see in those movies, [such as] the Wolf of Wall Street – he was far away from that. He was disciplined as they come – very methodical, spotless.”
The bank’s emerging markets group took up half a floor in the 250-metre-high One Chase Manhattan Plaza building in downtown Manhattan. “We all worked on the trading floor with open seating and adjoining desks, so everyone knew everyone,” says a US-based economist who worked in the desk’s research department and asked not to be named. “We would all share take-in for dinner. We worked crazy long hours but we were young men and we all thrived on it.”	The bank’s emerging markets group took up half a floor in the 250-metre-high One Chase Manhattan Plaza building in downtown Manhattan. “We all worked on the trading floor with open seating and adjoining desks, so everyone knew everyone,” says a US-based economist who worked in the desk’s research department and asked not to be named. “We would all share take-in for dinner. We worked crazy long hours but we were young men and we all thrived on it.”
“When we used to work for Jorge Jasson, it was a no-bullshit situation,” says Blanco. “You will spend the time – that is the way you made a name for yourself. It was a very hardcore group of professionals.”	“When we used to work for Jorge Jasson, it was a no-bullshit situation,” says Blanco. “You will spend the time – that is the way you made a name for yourself. It was a very hardcore group of professionals.”
Jasson told the Guardian earlier this year that the young man he picked up from the London office was “very creative, very energetic, and a very likable guy”. He says he was impressed by his drive, “without being somebody who would come across as aggressively ambitious – which is something that is very common in the industry”.	Jasson told the Guardian earlier this year that the young man he picked up from the London office was “very creative, very energetic, and a very likable guy”. He says he was impressed by his drive, “without being somebody who would come across as aggressively ambitious – which is something that is very common in the industry”.
The desk was international. One banker was a Chinese immigrant whose parents owned a liquor store on Times Square. Many were Argentine and Mexican. In London, Javid felt his ethnicity and comprehensive school education held him back – noting that his only job offers came from foreign banks, not British ones such as Rothschild, whose first interview question was which school he went to. At Chase, his difference was appreciated. When he asked the HR manager why the bank had hired him, they reportedly replied: “Because you don’t wear green wellies and because you’ve got hunger in your belly.” “It brought a good chemistry to that team,” says Blanco. “He brought a different perspective.”	The desk was international. One banker was a Chinese immigrant whose parents owned a liquor store on Times Square. Many were Argentine and Mexican. In London, Javid felt his ethnicity and comprehensive school education held him back – noting that his only job offers came from foreign banks, not British ones such as Rothschild, whose first interview question was which school he went to. At Chase, his difference was appreciated. When he asked the HR manager why the bank had hired him, they reportedly replied: “Because you don’t wear green wellies and because you’ve got hunger in your belly.” “It brought a good chemistry to that team,” says Blanco. “He brought a different perspective.”
Javid found himself at an interesting juncture in the history of Wall Street – and of Latin America. Mexico had just reached a US-led accord to restructure its debt after a decade in default. Chase was one of a handful of US banks that had loaned Latin American companies a lot of money, and when the Mexican government started fixing its problems, the loans were restructured into corporate bonds and sold to whichever US investors had the nerve to take them on.	Javid found himself at an interesting juncture in the history of Wall Street – and of Latin America. Mexico had just reached a US-led accord to restructure its debt after a decade in default. Chase was one of a handful of US banks that had loaned Latin American companies a lot of money, and when the Mexican government started fixing its problems, the loans were restructured into corporate bonds and sold to whichever US investors had the nerve to take them on.
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Javid’s main role was structuring and selling the bonds – working out how best to package the debt in a way that would entice interest from pension funds and big institutional investors in the US. “He would actually oversell it – the order book he would build would be like $2.5bn, and we were only trying to get $700m,” says Federico Amadeo, who was in charge of originating Mexican bonds and is now an adviser to the Argentinian government.	Javid’s main role was structuring and selling the bonds – working out how best to package the debt in a way that would entice interest from pension funds and big institutional investors in the US. “He would actually oversell it – the order book he would build would be like $2.5bn, and we were only trying to get $700m,” says Federico Amadeo, who was in charge of originating Mexican bonds and is now an adviser to the Argentinian government.
“He was clearly the team leader in his group – he was just very, very clever,” says the US-based economist, who remembers Javid teaching him the rules of cricket one late night in the office.	“He was clearly the team leader in his group – he was just very, very clever,” says the US-based economist, who remembers Javid teaching him the rules of cricket one late night in the office.
It’s hard to calculate in retrospect how much the market was worth to Chase, but one report in 1995 claimed the bank held $1.5bn in Mexican securities alone. Then, on 19 December 1994, the desk was blindsided by a crash in the value of the Mexican peso, demolishing confidence in the bonds Chase had spent so much hard work burnishing. They called it the “Tequila crisis”.	It’s hard to calculate in retrospect how much the market was worth to Chase, but one report in 1995 claimed the bank held $1.5bn in Mexican securities alone. Then, on 19 December 1994, the desk was blindsided by a crash in the value of the Mexican peso, demolishing confidence in the bonds Chase had spent so much hard work burnishing. They called it the “Tequila crisis”.
“I will never forget it – I was at home, it was on the television and I went straight to the office,” recalls a member of the desk. “It was chaos. Everyone [the investors] assumed the Mexicans couldn’t pay and they were calling us to sell. Some people made their names, and some people lost their jobs over it.” Javid was good at “crisis situations”, says José Barrionuevo, a former IMF economist who was Chase’s chief economist for Latin America in the mid-90s. A report in the New York Times quoted estimates for the potential loss to US investors in Mexican bonds and stocks, not just those dealing with Chase, at roughly $8bn to $10bn.	“I will never forget it – I was at home, it was on the television and I went straight to the office,” recalls a member of the desk. “It was chaos. Everyone [the investors] assumed the Mexicans couldn’t pay and they were calling us to sell. Some people made their names, and some people lost their jobs over it.” Javid was good at “crisis situations”, says José Barrionuevo, a former IMF economist who was Chase’s chief economist for Latin America in the mid-90s. A report in the New York Times quoted estimates for the potential loss to US investors in Mexican bonds and stocks, not just those dealing with Chase, at roughly $8bn to $10bn.
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A US-led bailout stabilised the market, and in their bid to persuade US investors to trust Mexican bonds again, Chase’s sales team were helped by a bright idea that several former colleagues credit – at least partially – to Javid. It was a dual currency bond (or “note”, in the financial parlance) that paid out in dollars and pesos, so that if the currency crashed again, investors could still be confident of receiving returns. According to Barrionuevo, Mexico’s then undersecretary of finance, Martin Werner (now a partner at Goldman Sachs), was “very, very impressed with Sajid’s ideas”. Promotion to vice-president soon followed.	A US-led bailout stabilised the market, and in their bid to persuade US investors to trust Mexican bonds again, Chase’s sales team were helped by a bright idea that several former colleagues credit – at least partially – to Javid. It was a dual currency bond (or “note”, in the financial parlance) that paid out in dollars and pesos, so that if the currency crashed again, investors could still be confident of receiving returns. According to Barrionuevo, Mexico’s then undersecretary of finance, Martin Werner (now a partner at Goldman Sachs), was “very, very impressed with Sajid’s ideas”. Promotion to vice-president soon followed.
The young bankers lived away from the financial district. The desk’s long hours didn’t leave much time for socialising, which was just as well. “Chase Manhattan Bank was not going to put up with foolishness,” says the US economist. They earned well, but not by the standards of pre-Lehman crash investment bankers. “Your base salary wasn’t enough to live extravagantly,” he says. One member of the desk says, after bonus, he earned in the region of half a million dollars in 1994/95, and almost $1m by 1998. He doesn’t know exactly what Javid earned, but he says of the 1998 figure, “I think Saj must have been a bit north of that.”	The young bankers lived away from the financial district. The desk’s long hours didn’t leave much time for socialising, which was just as well. “Chase Manhattan Bank was not going to put up with foolishness,” says the US economist. They earned well, but not by the standards of pre-Lehman crash investment bankers. “Your base salary wasn’t enough to live extravagantly,” he says. One member of the desk says, after bonus, he earned in the region of half a million dollars in 1994/95, and almost $1m by 1998. He doesn’t know exactly what Javid earned, but he says of the 1998 figure, “I think Saj must have been a bit north of that.”
In February 1995, however, the world saw a darker side of Chase’s work in Latin America. The arrival of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in 1994 had made Mexico an even more attractive prospect to Wall Street, but had provoked a peasant uprising in the southern state of Chiapas, bordering Guatemala. The rebels, known as the Zapatistas, were protesting against – among other things – Nafta’s removal from the Mexican constitution of an article that guaranteed land rights to peasants who worked the fields together. They had taken the state’s capital, San Cristóbal De Las Casas, in January 1994, resulting in dozens of deaths in clashes with government forces. Despite a ceasefire shortly after, their charismatic leader, the mysterious Subcomandante Marcos, embarrassed the government with communiques sent from the laptop he powered via the cigarette lighter of his jeep. “The people had some legitimate concerns,” says the US economist. “It was poverty, clear social inequity in that area of Mexico.”	In February 1995, however, the world saw a darker side of Chase’s work in Latin America. The arrival of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in 1994 had made Mexico an even more attractive prospect to Wall Street, but had provoked a peasant uprising in the southern state of Chiapas, bordering Guatemala. The rebels, known as the Zapatistas, were protesting against – among other things – Nafta’s removal from the Mexican constitution of an article that guaranteed land rights to peasants who worked the fields together. They had taken the state’s capital, San Cristóbal De Las Casas, in January 1994, resulting in dozens of deaths in clashes with government forces. Despite a ceasefire shortly after, their charismatic leader, the mysterious Subcomandante Marcos, embarrassed the government with communiques sent from the laptop he powered via the cigarette lighter of his jeep. “The people had some legitimate concerns,” says the US economist. “It was poverty, clear social inequity in that area of Mexico.”
The disastrous moment for Chase was a leaked memo to investors – written in January 1995. It said the president’s PRI party, which had ruled since 1929, “will need to consider carefully whether or not to allow opposition victories if fairly won at the ballot box”. It declared that a peaceful solution to the clash with the Zapatistas was unlikely. “While Chiapas, in our opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the investment community,” it read. And then continued: “The government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and of security policy.”	The disastrous moment for Chase was a leaked memo to investors – written in January 1995. It said the president’s PRI party, which had ruled since 1929, “will need to consider carefully whether or not to allow opposition victories if fairly won at the ballot box”. It declared that a peaceful solution to the clash with the Zapatistas was unlikely. “While Chiapas, in our opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the investment community,” it read. And then continued: “The government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and of security policy.”
The question of Chase’s influence over a sovereign government went around the world. Members of the team were used to meeting officials such as finance minister Guillem Ortiz, and Agustín Carstens at the Bank of Mexico. It must amuse Javid now, when he meets foreign finance ministers, to recall attending the same kind of meetings in his 20s. “Part of his job was spending a lot of time travelling across the region,” recalls Blanco. “I met every single president and finance minister in Latin America.” The US-based economist remembers breakfasts with Vicente Fox, later Mexico’s president, and a breakfast with Hugo Chávez in Caracas.	The question of Chase’s influence over a sovereign government went around the world. Members of the team were used to meeting officials such as finance minister Guillem Ortiz, and Agustín Carstens at the Bank of Mexico. It must amuse Javid now, when he meets foreign finance ministers, to recall attending the same kind of meetings in his 20s. “Part of his job was spending a lot of time travelling across the region,” recalls Blanco. “I met every single president and finance minister in Latin America.” The US-based economist remembers breakfasts with Vicente Fox, later Mexico’s president, and a breakfast with Hugo Chávez in Caracas.
Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, the journalists to whom the memo was leaked, said it “should enter business histories as a rare public display of how the captains of capital view the democratic process”, claiming that its author had lobbied “every available ear” on Capitol Hill along the same lines. “Chase’s unusual frankness here is due to the prospect of huge losses on its Mexican operations,” they later wrote in Harper’s. “Under these circumstances, Chase issued what amounts to a call for army terror and fixed elections.”	Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, the journalists to whom the memo was leaked, said it “should enter business histories as a rare public display of how the captains of capital view the democratic process”, claiming that its author had lobbied “every available ear” on Capitol Hill along the same lines. “Chase’s unusual frankness here is due to the prospect of huge losses on its Mexican operations,” they later wrote in Harper’s. “Under these circumstances, Chase issued what amounts to a call for army terror and fixed elections.”
The memo took on new significance when, weeks after it was sent, the government sent the army into Chiapas, in what looked like the requested “show of control”, prompting thousands of Indians to flee into the Lacandon rain forest. After the surprise offensive, many Zapatista villages were left abandoned and some of their former inhabitants were said to be reduced to drinking their own urine in temporary hideouts in the hills. The LA Times reported demonstrations outside Chase offices in New York and San Francisco, and there was violence against Chase’s retail branches in Mexico.	The memo took on new significance when, weeks after it was sent, the government sent the army into Chiapas, in what looked like the requested “show of control”, prompting thousands of Indians to flee into the Lacandon rain forest. After the surprise offensive, many Zapatista villages were left abandoned and some of their former inhabitants were said to be reduced to drinking their own urine in temporary hideouts in the hills. The LA Times reported demonstrations outside Chase offices in New York and San Francisco, and there was violence against Chase’s retail branches in Mexico.
A spokesman for Javid says the minister had “zero involvement” with the memo. Jasson describes it as “a faux pas by a guy who got carried away”. That guy was Riordan Roett, a leading expert on the continent, who the bank maintained was a consultant whose memo did “in no way represent the views of Chase”. The US-based economist says that Roett personally assembled and ran the desk’s research team in New York. “I think we have all grown from that era, from the idea that top-down leadership is better,” he says of the memo’s anti-democratic tone. “The instinct was: we don’t want these leftists coming in.” Roett, who is now a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, replied to my email with the words: “Past history!”	A spokesman for Javid says the minister had “zero involvement” with the memo. Jasson describes it as “a faux pas by a guy who got carried away”. That guy was Riordan Roett, a leading expert on the continent, who the bank maintained was a consultant whose memo did “in no way represent the views of Chase”. The US-based economist says that Roett personally assembled and ran the desk’s research team in New York. “I think we have all grown from that era, from the idea that top-down leadership is better,” he says of the memo’s anti-democratic tone. “The instinct was: we don’t want these leftists coming in.” Roett, who is now a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, replied to my email with the words: “Past history!”
By the time he was sent to Chase’s London office in 1997, Javid’s reputation was made. In 2000, he was headhunted by Deutsche Bank, who soon put him in charge of emerging markets worldwide. The Conservative party website says he went there to “help raise investment for developing countries”.	By the time he was sent to Chase’s London office in 1997, Javid’s reputation was made. In 2000, he was headhunted by Deutsche Bank, who soon put him in charge of emerging markets worldwide. The Conservative party website says he went there to “help raise investment for developing countries”.
Blanco, who also moved to Deutsche Bank, says the senior staff there liked Javid, and regarded him as “an avoider of conflict”. As the head of the bank’s emerging markets structuring, he wasn’t known for generating business with clients, but was an “internal thinker”, who was extremely adept at navigating the bank’s “political waters”. Given what happened next, some would say his smartest manoeuvre was the moment he decided to get out, because the waters of the global credit markets were about to get choppy.	Blanco, who also moved to Deutsche Bank, says the senior staff there liked Javid, and regarded him as “an avoider of conflict”. As the head of the bank’s emerging markets structuring, he wasn’t known for generating business with clients, but was an “internal thinker”, who was extremely adept at navigating the bank’s “political waters”. Given what happened next, some would say his smartest manoeuvre was the moment he decided to get out, because the waters of the global credit markets were about to get choppy.
In the autumn of 2006, Javid was sent to Singapore to lead Deutsche’s credit trading in Asia. That meant, according to the financial magazine Euromoney, that he was in charge of, among other things, collateralised debt obligation (CDOs) – a financial product that was soon to get a very bad name for itself in the coming crisis. Earlier this year, Euromoney highlighted Javid’s role in the controversial pre-crash trading of CDOs. Speaking to a reporter in 2006, Javid had said of emerging-market CDOs: “As long as investors understand the risk/rewards of an emerging-market CDO, they are very appropriate.” That line is now described by a senior debt market reporter as “hilarious”.	In the autumn of 2006, Javid was sent to Singapore to lead Deutsche’s credit trading in Asia. That meant, according to the financial magazine Euromoney, that he was in charge of, among other things, collateralised debt obligation (CDOs) – a financial product that was soon to get a very bad name for itself in the coming crisis. Earlier this year, Euromoney highlighted Javid’s role in the controversial pre-crash trading of CDOs. Speaking to a reporter in 2006, Javid had said of emerging-market CDOs: “As long as investors understand the risk/rewards of an emerging-market CDO, they are very appropriate.” That line is now described by a senior debt market reporter as “hilarious”.
The specific allegation aired in the Euromoney article is that Javid was “responsible for structuring an emerging-market synthetic CDO that incurred millions of dollars’ worth of losses for investors”. A US private equity fund alleged that Deutsche had “stuffed the CDO with ineligible loans that resulted in the 14.28% loss rate”, according to Euromoney, though the bank claimed the losses were due to the financial crisis and the risks had been known. The eventual court case was dismissed because it fell outside the five-year statute of limitations.	The specific allegation aired in the Euromoney article is that Javid was “responsible for structuring an emerging-market synthetic CDO that incurred millions of dollars’ worth of losses for investors”. A US private equity fund alleged that Deutsche had “stuffed the CDO with ineligible loans that resulted in the 14.28% loss rate”, according to Euromoney, though the bank claimed the losses were due to the financial crisis and the risks had been known. The eventual court case was dismissed because it fell outside the five-year statute of limitations.
As the magazine put it: “One former Deutsche Bank colleague expressed amazement to Euromoney at how Javid ‘is spinning his former career’ as a sober investment banker as opposed to a structured credit trader at the heart of the business that precipitated the global financial crisis.” Javid’s spokesman says he does not agree with Euromoney’s description of his activities.	As the magazine put it: “One former Deutsche Bank colleague expressed amazement to Euromoney at how Javid ‘is spinning his former career’ as a sober investment banker as opposed to a structured credit trader at the heart of the business that precipitated the global financial crisis.” Javid’s spokesman says he does not agree with Euromoney’s description of his activities.
One of the two men Javid answered to during this pre-crash period was Rajeev Misra – a star man whose inventiveness devising financial products was legendary. He quit the bank in 2008, with the masonry of finance – not least complex debt products – crashing around everyone’s ears.	One of the two men Javid answered to during this pre-crash period was Rajeev Misra – a star man whose inventiveness devising financial products was legendary. He quit the bank in 2008, with the masonry of finance – not least complex debt products – crashing around everyone’s ears.
Misra, who is now head of finance at SoftBank, says down the line from Japan that Javid had “nothing to do with CDOs” while he worked in Asia, which doesn’t mean he wasn’t working on them before his foreign posting. Why else would he be answering questions from a financial reporter about the riskiness of CDOs in July 2006? “That’s a good question,” he says.	Misra, who is now head of finance at SoftBank, says down the line from Japan that Javid had “nothing to do with CDOs” while he worked in Asia, which doesn’t mean he wasn’t working on them before his foreign posting. Why else would he be answering questions from a financial reporter about the riskiness of CDOs in July 2006? “That’s a good question,” he says.
In 2009, as the crisis began laying waste to the reputations of some of finance’s biggest names, especially in the debt-trading world, Javid got out, turning his back on a salary estimated to be in the region of £3m a year. Through his years in finance, he had maintained his interest in politics – working as an aide to Rudy Giuliani’s New York mayoral campaign in 1993 and remembered by his colleagues for his awareness. He had stayed in touch with his Tory friends from Exeter, including the MP Robert Halfon and the journalist Tim Montgomerie, and when the expenses scandal threw up the seat of Bromsgrove the year before the 2010 general election, Javid decided it was his moment. He won it with ease.	In 2009, as the crisis began laying waste to the reputations of some of finance’s biggest names, especially in the debt-trading world, Javid got out, turning his back on a salary estimated to be in the region of £3m a year. Through his years in finance, he had maintained his interest in politics – working as an aide to Rudy Giuliani’s New York mayoral campaign in 1993 and remembered by his colleagues for his awareness. He had stayed in touch with his Tory friends from Exeter, including the MP Robert Halfon and the journalist Tim Montgomerie, and when the expenses scandal threw up the seat of Bromsgrove the year before the 2010 general election, Javid decided it was his moment. He won it with ease.
In his first register of interests as a newly elected MP in 2010, Javid named Misra as a donor, to the tune of £5,000. Misra later gave £50,000 to the central party, earning his place at the table of the Leader’s Group, where very wealthy donors meet David Cameron and other top Tories. Misra says he donated again this year and does so “because [Javid] is a very smart man, and because I believe people like him will make a positive impact for this country – I mean negotiating Europe, I mean supporting business, [and] I care about Heathrow.”	In his first register of interests as a newly elected MP in 2010, Javid named Misra as a donor, to the tune of £5,000. Misra later gave £50,000 to the central party, earning his place at the table of the Leader’s Group, where very wealthy donors meet David Cameron and other top Tories. Misra says he donated again this year and does so “because [Javid] is a very smart man, and because I believe people like him will make a positive impact for this country – I mean negotiating Europe, I mean supporting business, [and] I care about Heathrow.”
Nelson, who has championed Javid in his magazine the Spectator, says the business secretary’s politics are forged by experience, adding that: “He knows a lot more about business than George Osborne, who has never held down a job outside politics in his life.”	Nelson, who has championed Javid in his magazine the Spectator, says the business secretary’s politics are forged by experience, adding that: “He knows a lot more about business than George Osborne, who has never held down a job outside politics in his life.”
“For him, the global race will not just be a cliche, it will be something that he can properly envisage,” says Nelson. “He will have seen in the emerging markets which companies do well and which don’t. It will have taught him about the great paradox – well-intentioned regulation can end up doing more harm than good.”	“For him, the global race will not just be a cliche, it will be something that he can properly envisage,” says Nelson. “He will have seen in the emerging markets which companies do well and which don’t. It will have taught him about the great paradox – well-intentioned regulation can end up doing more harm than good.”