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The case for rejecting air strikes on Syria The case for rejecting air strikes on Syria
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Mary Dejevsky is in extensive and starry company (including the prime minister) in her assertion that “Two years ago, parliament rejected a plan for air strikes on Syria”, but it’s still wrong (The well of trust is still poisoned by Iraq: a war on Isis will be a hard sell, 21 July). In 2013, parliament simply rejected two rival sets of suggested criteria for a decision to take military action against Syria. Mr Cameron unaccountably (but fortunately) chose to misinterpret this as parliamentary rejection of any military action at all. What the government now proposes is completely different: UK participation in military action against parts of a sovereign state controlled by an armed insurrection against its government, not this time against the recognised government’s own forces as in 2013.Mary Dejevsky is in extensive and starry company (including the prime minister) in her assertion that “Two years ago, parliament rejected a plan for air strikes on Syria”, but it’s still wrong (The well of trust is still poisoned by Iraq: a war on Isis will be a hard sell, 21 July). In 2013, parliament simply rejected two rival sets of suggested criteria for a decision to take military action against Syria. Mr Cameron unaccountably (but fortunately) chose to misinterpret this as parliamentary rejection of any military action at all. What the government now proposes is completely different: UK participation in military action against parts of a sovereign state controlled by an armed insurrection against its government, not this time against the recognised government’s own forces as in 2013.
Related: David Cameron, stones and glass houses | Letters
Parliamentary approval for what is now proposed should be strictly conditional on (1) legality – meaning either the explicit authority of the UN security council or a request for military support from President Assad, the former difficult and the latter distasteful; (2) explicit, attainable military and political objectives with a high chance of success; (3) specific measures to minimise civilian casualties; and (4) a plausible exit strategy. Unless all four conditions are satisfied, I hope parliament will this time reject not just the government’s suggested criteria for this war but the proposed military action itself.Brian BarderLondonParliamentary approval for what is now proposed should be strictly conditional on (1) legality – meaning either the explicit authority of the UN security council or a request for military support from President Assad, the former difficult and the latter distasteful; (2) explicit, attainable military and political objectives with a high chance of success; (3) specific measures to minimise civilian casualties; and (4) a plausible exit strategy. Unless all four conditions are satisfied, I hope parliament will this time reject not just the government’s suggested criteria for this war but the proposed military action itself.Brian BarderLondon
• Last September, MPs approved a motion for air strikes on Islamic State in Iraq. Part of it read: “This motion does not endorse UK air strikes in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in parliament.” On Monday Michael Fallon admitted that, last autumn (ie near the time of the motion), he had given permission for British pilots to take part in air strikes in Syria. He could do this, he argued, because the pilots were embedded with allied forces and therefore not directly responsible to the UK government. It was up to our allies, not the UK government, to publicise the British pilots’ involvement and, if MPs did not know about this, it was their fault for not asking questions. A logical conclusion to this sophistry, unquestioned by MPs, is that many of the UK’s forces could be at war with another country without parliament’s knowledge or approval as long as they were deemed to be embedded with allied forces. Only Michael Meacher asked whether Mr Fallon’s position was still tenable. • Last September, MPs approved a motion for air strikes on Islamic State in Iraq. Part of it read: “This motion does not endorse UK air strikes in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in parliament.” On Monday Michael Fallon admitted that, last autumn (ie near the time of the motion), he had given permission for British pilots to take part in air strikes in Syria. He could do this, he argued, because the pilots were embedded with allied forces and therefore not directly responsible to the UK government. It was up to our allies, not the UK government, to publicise the British pilots’ involvement and, if MPs did not know about this, it was their fault for not asking questions. A logical conclusion to this sophistry, unquestioned by MPs, is that many of the UK’s forces could be at war with another country without parliament’s knowledge or approval as long as they were deemed to be embedded with allied forces. Only Michael Meacher asked whether Mr Fallon’s position was still tenable.
If this is the best our elected representatives can do, is it any wonder that we are in a constant state of ill-conceived war and in a constant state of suffering the consequences?Brian DerbyshireManchesterIf this is the best our elected representatives can do, is it any wonder that we are in a constant state of ill-conceived war and in a constant state of suffering the consequences?Brian DerbyshireManchester