Paradox of the post-Omar Taliban

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In the aftermath of Mullah Omar's death, the Taliban movement he headed is in a curious position: success on the battlefield, amid turmoil at the top.

For supporters of the now-delayed peace talks between the Afghan government and Taliban that started in Pakistan last month, the hope is that pragmatic factions might be more easily peeled away from hardline rivals.

But the danger is that talks might do nothing to ease escalating violence, while making it impossible to agree or enforce any peace settlement.

The Taliban - or a network of armed groups to which we apply that label - may be strong enough to keep waging war, but too weak to make peace.

The Taliban's spring offensive, which began four months ago, has been working. Even with the US ramping up air strikes - more than 106 in June, compared with 40 in previous months - the Taliban have been mounting more attacks, in larger formations, in more areas, and imposing greater casualties.

Even the traditionally quiet northern regions have seen security incidents grow by over a tenth compared with the same period last year.

More members of the Afghan security forces were killed in the first six months of this year than the total number lost by the Nato-led coalition in over a decade of war, and several thousand are lost each month to desertion.

The UN estimates that civilian casualties are also at their highest levels since 2009, with insurgents responsible for 70% of these.

But across the border in Pakistan, a power struggle is unfolding.

Several Taliban leaders walked out of the leadership council that chose Mullah Mansour as Omar's successor, portraying it as a stitch-up.

On 4 August, the leader of the Taliban's political office in the Qatari capital Doha, Syed Tayyab Agha, resigned. Agha reportedly felt duped, excluded from talks with Kabul, and concerned that the process had been hijacked by Pakistan.

Infighting

Even if Mansour can consolidate his leadership, his authority seems weakened.

How will political dissension affect the war? There have been some reports of violent infighting between supporters and opponents of Mansour in northern and western Afghanistan.

Many commanders and fighters are clearly embittered at having been deceived for so long by some of their leaders, including Mansour, about Mullah Omar's death - which Afghan officials say happened two years ago.

They are likely to be concerned and confused by the conflicting reports of dialogue between the organisation they represent and the government they are seeking to overthrow.

The optimistic view is that some, tired of fighting and mistrustful of their leadership, will decide to strike their own local peace deals. But it seems equally likely that others will either defect to other groups, including some to Islamic State's budding outfit in Afghanistan, operate with greater autonomy from the Taliban's leadership, or tilt towards Mansour's rivals, such as Mullah Omar's son Yaqub.

In some ways, this would reinforce a longstanding trend.

Writing three years ago, the scholar Antonio Giustozzi noted that the Taliban had "decentralised their insurgency as much as they could", partly in response to US targeted killings of their commanders.

This decentralisation could simply accelerate. The decisions of Pakistan's military, which has supported and shaped the Taliban through its history, will be crucial: will they corral factions behind Mansour, as expected, or hedge their bets?

Splintering would reduce Mansour's authority, by reducing his overall control over violence in Afghanistan.

Mansour's first message as leader included a promise to fight "until the Islamic system rules" and a denunciation of a peace process as "enemies' propaganda". But if this is for show, and Mansour does sanction another round of talks, then these splits would also make it harder to enforce any eventual settlement.

Without Mullah Omar's imprimatur, many on the ground would feel free to ignore pieces of paper signed in Pakistani cities.

On the other hand, Mansour could redirect the focus of talks away from Pakistan and to the political office in Doha, whose new head has reiterated his loyalty. This could provoke opposition from the Pakistani military, but it might be more palatable to Mansour's rivals.

New threats

The US will be watching with great interest. Washington has committed to spending about $4bn (£2.6bn) a year on Afghan security forces until 2017.

It can't do so indefinitely. With new and greater threats in the Middle East and North Africa, and fewer than 100 al-Qaeda members thought to be left in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama wants a peace deal.

But the US will be concerned at the appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani as one of Mansour's deputies.

Haqqani's network was formally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) in 2012 (unlike the Taliban proper) and Sirajuddin has worked closely with al-Qaeda.

Weaker Afghan security forces, a fragmented insurgency, and the lure of the Islamic State could all give new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit Afghan soil.

While Syria and Iraq will remain the focus of Western efforts, Afghanistan might start demanding more attention.