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| Labour leadership election: could tactical voting sway the result? | |
| (about 1 hour later) | |
| The first ballot papers are being dispatched on Friday in the leadership election that will decide Labour’s future. More than 600,000 people are eligible to cast a ballot and choose who between Jeremy Corbyn, Andy Burnham, Yvette Cooper and Liz Kendall will lead the party. | The first ballot papers are being dispatched on Friday in the leadership election that will decide Labour’s future. More than 600,000 people are eligible to cast a ballot and choose who between Jeremy Corbyn, Andy Burnham, Yvette Cooper and Liz Kendall will lead the party. |
| The leadership election uses an alternative voting (AV) system, which means that voters can rank the candidates in order of preference. | The leadership election uses an alternative voting (AV) system, which means that voters can rank the candidates in order of preference. |
| How does AV work? | How does AV work? |
| Initially only first preferences are counted. If any candidate gets more than 50% of these, they win. If no candidate does, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the second preference of all those who voted for that candidate are reallocated. | Initially only first preferences are counted. If any candidate gets more than 50% of these, they win. If no candidate does, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the second preference of all those who voted for that candidate are reallocated. |
| Related: Who should I vote for in the Labour leadership election? | Related: Who should I vote for in the Labour leadership election? |
| If a candidate now reaches 50% of the vote in this second round, they win. If not, the candidate with the fewest votes in that round is eliminated and their second preferences (or third preferences if the second choice was for an already eliminated candidate) are reallocated. And so on until someone has 50% of the votes in that round (or there are no more votes to reallocate). | If a candidate now reaches 50% of the vote in this second round, they win. If not, the candidate with the fewest votes in that round is eliminated and their second preferences (or third preferences if the second choice was for an already eliminated candidate) are reallocated. And so on until someone has 50% of the votes in that round (or there are no more votes to reallocate). |
| A voter can choose to vote for only one candidate and not rank the others in order of preference. In this case, any further preference they could have stated will of course not be taken into account if their preferred candidate is eliminated. | A voter can choose to vote for only one candidate and not rank the others in order of preference. In this case, any further preference they could have stated will of course not be taken into account if their preferred candidate is eliminated. |
| Tactical voting under AV | Tactical voting under AV |
| During the UK’s 2011 referendum on whether to adopt AV for general elections, many proponents of the system claimed that it would eliminate tactical voting. | During the UK’s 2011 referendum on whether to adopt AV for general elections, many proponents of the system claimed that it would eliminate tactical voting. |
| But this is not the case. No electoral system (at least not one that isn’t under the control of a dictator) can eliminate the possibility of tactical voting. | But this is not the case. No electoral system (at least not one that isn’t under the control of a dictator) can eliminate the possibility of tactical voting. |
| An example from a paper by Ipsos Mori (pdf) outlines a theoretical scenario where Conservative voters support a Liberal Democrat candidate. With the Tory knocked out after the first round, the Lib Dem then goes on to defeat the Labour candidate in the successive round of voting. | An example from a paper by Ipsos Mori (pdf) outlines a theoretical scenario where Conservative voters support a Liberal Democrat candidate. With the Tory knocked out after the first round, the Lib Dem then goes on to defeat the Labour candidate in the successive round of voting. |
| If all the voters in the example had supported their preferred party, the Lib Dem would have been knocked out after the first round, the Conservative would have made the runoff, but the Labour candidate would have won. | If all the voters in the example had supported their preferred party, the Lib Dem would have been knocked out after the first round, the Conservative would have made the runoff, but the Labour candidate would have won. |
| In many cases, the purpose of tactical voting is not about supporting your preferred option, but about minimising the chances of a worst-case scenario when your preferred outcome is all but impossible. | In many cases, the purpose of tactical voting is not about supporting your preferred option, but about minimising the chances of a worst-case scenario when your preferred outcome is all but impossible. |
| How could tactical voting apply to the Labour leadership election? | How could tactical voting apply to the Labour leadership election? |
| If the polls (and most of the evidence available) are right then Corbyn will win in the first round and no level of tactical voting can change that. | If the polls (and most of the evidence available) are right then Corbyn will win in the first round and no level of tactical voting can change that. |
| However, if the polls are slightly off – and it wouldn’t be the first time – then tactical voting could influence the outcome. | However, if the polls are slightly off – and it wouldn’t be the first time – then tactical voting could influence the outcome. |
| Let’s assume that at least the trend in the polling is accurate: Corbyn is the frontrunner, and Burnham and Cooper are the main challengers, while Kendall stands no chance of winning. It is important to keep in mind that AV is designed to convert a contest from a multi-candidate contest into a two-candidate race. So if we accept that Corbyn is the frontrunner, the contest could play out in a couple of ways. | Let’s assume that at least the trend in the polling is accurate: Corbyn is the frontrunner, and Burnham and Cooper are the main challengers, while Kendall stands no chance of winning. It is important to keep in mind that AV is designed to convert a contest from a multi-candidate contest into a two-candidate race. So if we accept that Corbyn is the frontrunner, the contest could play out in a couple of ways. |
| As a race between him and all of the others, the following tactics could operate. Those who want Corbyn to be the next leader of the Labour party should place him as their first choice. As he stands such little chance of being eliminated, it does not matter much whether first-choice Corbyn voters state alternative preferences. And the number of second preferences transferring to him from the anyone-but-Corbyn camp is likely to be low. | As a race between him and all of the others, the following tactics could operate. Those who want Corbyn to be the next leader of the Labour party should place him as their first choice. As he stands such little chance of being eliminated, it does not matter much whether first-choice Corbyn voters state alternative preferences. And the number of second preferences transferring to him from the anyone-but-Corbyn camp is likely to be low. |
| The choice is more difficult for those who prefer an anyone-but-Corbyn scenario. | The choice is more difficult for those who prefer an anyone-but-Corbyn scenario. |
| To reduce the chances of Corbyn clinching the leadership, a rational voter would choose Cooper or Burnham as their top preference, with the other second. | To reduce the chances of Corbyn clinching the leadership, a rational voter would choose Cooper or Burnham as their top preference, with the other second. |
| Those inclined to vote Kendall should accept that she has an extremely low chance of winning, and should abandon her. Instead, they should place Cooper and Burnham first and second (the order does not matter). It is not necessary to indicate third and fourth choices, but if it makes Kendall supporters feel better, they should put her third. For this group Corbyn, if he goes anywhere, should be placed last. | Those inclined to vote Kendall should accept that she has an extremely low chance of winning, and should abandon her. Instead, they should place Cooper and Burnham first and second (the order does not matter). It is not necessary to indicate third and fourth choices, but if it makes Kendall supporters feel better, they should put her third. For this group Corbyn, if he goes anywhere, should be placed last. |
| If Kendall’s supporters were to place her first and to indicate Burnham or Cooper as their second preference, they would risk splitting the anti-Corbyn vote. This could be enough to push Corbyn across the line. Such an outcome could only be avoided if this effort was coordinated and concentrated on one candidate – for example with all second preferences going to Cooper. | If Kendall’s supporters were to place her first and to indicate Burnham or Cooper as their second preference, they would risk splitting the anti-Corbyn vote. This could be enough to push Corbyn across the line. Such an outcome could only be avoided if this effort was coordinated and concentrated on one candidate – for example with all second preferences going to Cooper. |
| But not all voters will view the leadership election as a “Corbyn v anyone-but-Corbyn” contest. Supporters of Cooper or Burnham who view the choice as between “left” and “right”, and are worried – improbably – that Kendall might emerge as the winner of an anyone-but-Corbyn drive, should consider giving their second preference to Corbyn. With enough second preferences, he would most probably win the leadership. | But not all voters will view the leadership election as a “Corbyn v anyone-but-Corbyn” contest. Supporters of Cooper or Burnham who view the choice as between “left” and “right”, and are worried – improbably – that Kendall might emerge as the winner of an anyone-but-Corbyn drive, should consider giving their second preference to Corbyn. With enough second preferences, he would most probably win the leadership. |
| Ultimately, the choice in tactical voting is about assigning a probability to the possible outcomes. But if the polls are right, the election will look like a first-past-the-post contest in a safe constituency seat. No amount of tactical voting can change the outcome then. | Ultimately, the choice in tactical voting is about assigning a probability to the possible outcomes. But if the polls are right, the election will look like a first-past-the-post contest in a safe constituency seat. No amount of tactical voting can change the outcome then. |
| These of course are all theoretical examples and in reality voting behaviour is far more complicated, distributed among the different possible combinations (including invalid and blank ballots) and uncoordinated. | These of course are all theoretical examples and in reality voting behaviour is far more complicated, distributed among the different possible combinations (including invalid and blank ballots) and uncoordinated. |
| In the 2013 election to the state parliament in Lower Saxony, Germany, the liberal FDP party was polling around the 5% threshold needed to enter the legislature. Some supporters of its senior coalition partner, the centre-right CDU, voted tactically for the FDP to ensure that it would pass the threshold and consequently boost the chances of a CDU-FDP coalition continuing in office. | In the 2013 election to the state parliament in Lower Saxony, Germany, the liberal FDP party was polling around the 5% threshold needed to enter the legislature. Some supporters of its senior coalition partner, the centre-right CDU, voted tactically for the FDP to ensure that it would pass the threshold and consequently boost the chances of a CDU-FDP coalition continuing in office. |
| The FDP won nearly 10% of the vote. The CDU, which had been polling at around 40% before the election, got 36%. The two parties combined fell short of a majority by one seat and the centre-left SPD and the Greens went on to form the state government. | The FDP won nearly 10% of the vote. The CDU, which had been polling at around 40% before the election, got 36%. The two parties combined fell short of a majority by one seat and the centre-left SPD and the Greens went on to form the state government. |