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| What spawned Russia's 'troll army'? Experts on the red web share their views | What spawned Russia's 'troll army'? Experts on the red web share their views |
| (7 months later) | |
| 2.17pm BST | 2.17pm BST |
| 14:17 | 14:17 |
| That’s all we have time for but thanks for all the questions and here is a parting message from Andrei and Irina: | That’s all we have time for but thanks for all the questions and here is a parting message from Andrei and Irina: |
| So far, Russian trolls are not very effective in the west. True, they can disrupt the debate, but they cannot win over an argument and in many cases they do not try to, after all, they are only trolls. | So far, Russian trolls are not very effective in the west. True, they can disrupt the debate, but they cannot win over an argument and in many cases they do not try to, after all, they are only trolls. |
| We’ve also published an extract of their new book, The Red Web, which you can read by following the link below. | We’ve also published an extract of their new book, The Red Web, which you can read by following the link below. |
| 2.09pm BST | 2.09pm BST |
| 14:09 | 14:09 |
| What about the rest? | What about the rest? |
| I am sorry to ask - Russia is the only country that has paid bloggers? For example Ukranian Ministry of Information Policy gives a link on their official website to internet information troops, inviting to join: http://4.i-army.org/index_en.php | I am sorry to ask - Russia is the only country that has paid bloggers? For example Ukranian Ministry of Information Policy gives a link on their official website to internet information troops, inviting to join: http://4.i-army.org/index_en.php |
| This is not a uniquely Russian approach. Israel has a very sophisticated strategy to manipulate public opinion online. The Ukrainians can try, but they are newcomers in this game. | This is not a uniquely Russian approach. Israel has a very sophisticated strategy to manipulate public opinion online. The Ukrainians can try, but they are newcomers in this game. |
| 2.06pm BST | 2.06pm BST |
| 14:06 | 14:06 |
| Is the Guardian disproportionately targeted? | Is the Guardian disproportionately targeted? |
| Judging by the amount of comments on articles about Russia I see on the Guardian website , it seems to me that it holds more importance over others in being targeted. Is this true ? If so why ? | Judging by the amount of comments on articles about Russia I see on the Guardian website , it seems to me that it holds more importance over others in being targeted. Is this true ? If so why ? |
| Which western news outlets do you believe the Kremlin is most interested in targeting with its campaign ? | Which western news outlets do you believe the Kremlin is most interested in targeting with its campaign ? |
| Yes, of course the Guardian is a prominent target. Mostly because others British papers are not so popular in Russia. Stories from the Guardian are translated on daily basis, and foreign correspondents are well known, especially among Moscow’s liberal intelligentsia. | Yes, of course the Guardian is a prominent target. Mostly because others British papers are not so popular in Russia. Stories from the Guardian are translated on daily basis, and foreign correspondents are well known, especially among Moscow’s liberal intelligentsia. |
| 2.04pm BST | 2.04pm BST |
| 14:04 | 14:04 |
| What do Russian politicians think of their western counterparts? | What do Russian politicians think of their western counterparts? |
| A question for Andrei and Irina: | A question for Andrei and Irina: |
| Putin and his cohorts clearly believe the Russian public are dumb and easily manipulated, and that they as silovki are intellectually and morally superior They also love to promote the idea that foreign politicians, particularly US officials, are stupid and ill-informed. To what extent do you think they actually believe in their intellectual superiority to their Western counterparts? | Putin and his cohorts clearly believe the Russian public are dumb and easily manipulated, and that they as silovki are intellectually and morally superior They also love to promote the idea that foreign politicians, particularly US officials, are stupid and ill-informed. To what extent do you think they actually believe in their intellectual superiority to their Western counterparts? |
| We don’t know what Putin thinks, after all, in the early 2000s he was very fond of former US president [George W] Bush. But it seems that siloviki [Russian politicians] really do believe in the superiority of the political regime they built. | We don’t know what Putin thinks, after all, in the early 2000s he was very fond of former US president [George W] Bush. But it seems that siloviki [Russian politicians] really do believe in the superiority of the political regime they built. |
| They haven’t needed to think about accountability or oversight for many years, and some of them think they can easily trick western leaders. | They haven’t needed to think about accountability or oversight for many years, and some of them think they can easily trick western leaders. |
| 1.58pm BST | 1.58pm BST |
| 13:58 | 13:58 |
| Why bother arguing with the Guardian’s commenters? | Why bother arguing with the Guardian’s commenters? |
| Aside from muddying debate and diverting criticism away from Putin, what are the Kremlin propagandists trying to achieve? Most are so transparent and aggressive that they damage Russia's reputation rather than enhance it. So who are they targeting and whose opinion - if any- are they trying to change on a newspaper like this? | Aside from muddying debate and diverting criticism away from Putin, what are the Kremlin propagandists trying to achieve? Most are so transparent and aggressive that they damage Russia's reputation rather than enhance it. So who are they targeting and whose opinion - if any- are they trying to change on a newspaper like this? |
| Trolls do not need to be that sophisticated, they are are tasked with conveying an emotional message. That something is not right with the Guardian coverage or that that there is something the west is hiding. | Trolls do not need to be that sophisticated, they are are tasked with conveying an emotional message. That something is not right with the Guardian coverage or that that there is something the west is hiding. |
| If some readers get this message, the trolls succeed. | If some readers get this message, the trolls succeed. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 2.10pm BST | at 2.10pm BST |
| 1.54pm BST | 1.54pm BST |
| 13:54 | 13:54 |
| Can we learn anything about Russian foreign policy? | Can we learn anything about Russian foreign policy? |
| A question: Do you think that by watching trends in coordinated comments, you can gain insights into what is sometimes a very hard to judge Russian foreign policy? | A question: Do you think that by watching trends in coordinated comments, you can gain insights into what is sometimes a very hard to judge Russian foreign policy? |
| You might understand what is trending right now, but you can’t predict the next one. Russian foreign policy is notorious for sudden turns, and trolls would be told afterwards, not in advance. | You might understand what is trending right now, but you can’t predict the next one. Russian foreign policy is notorious for sudden turns, and trolls would be told afterwards, not in advance. |
| They are not spin-doctors, close to the Kremlin, Putin or his advisers. They are given very simple directives by people who have no real access to the Kremlin decision-makers. | They are not spin-doctors, close to the Kremlin, Putin or his advisers. They are given very simple directives by people who have no real access to the Kremlin decision-makers. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 2.10pm BST | at 2.10pm BST |
| 1.50pm BST | 1.50pm BST |
| 13:50 | 13:50 |
| ‘Troll’ training | ‘Troll’ training |
| Q: Why is the troll army so badly trained? Frequently their English is terrible as they pretend to be "Mary Jones from Sussex" for example, allegedly an Englishwoman but passionately supportive of Vladimir Putin for some strange reason? Why do they not realise what obvious dishonest frauds they are, operating in bad faith with such impersonations? Why are they so gratingly abrasive, and robotically repeating the same talking points of the day, parroting and giving each other fifty recommends within five minutes? Why do they think this is at all persuasive to their cause? Because it seems to backfire, and only hardens widespread negative opinions of Putin. Finally, isn't it a desperately pathetic penny-ante operation, that they think opinions will be swayed by their clumsy mere comments on a UK website? I've read the theory that their job is to distract and obscure any real discussion of what's going on in Russia and Ukraine today, but they don't even seem able to do that very well. Rather, they draw attention to themselves and the fraudulence behind their relentless posting on Russian topics. Thanks! | Q: Why is the troll army so badly trained? Frequently their English is terrible as they pretend to be "Mary Jones from Sussex" for example, allegedly an Englishwoman but passionately supportive of Vladimir Putin for some strange reason? Why do they not realise what obvious dishonest frauds they are, operating in bad faith with such impersonations? Why are they so gratingly abrasive, and robotically repeating the same talking points of the day, parroting and giving each other fifty recommends within five minutes? Why do they think this is at all persuasive to their cause? Because it seems to backfire, and only hardens widespread negative opinions of Putin. Finally, isn't it a desperately pathetic penny-ante operation, that they think opinions will be swayed by their clumsy mere comments on a UK website? I've read the theory that their job is to distract and obscure any real discussion of what's going on in Russia and Ukraine today, but they don't even seem able to do that very well. Rather, they draw attention to themselves and the fraudulence behind their relentless posting on Russian topics. Thanks! |
| Many of trolls are recruited from pro-Kremlin youth movements, and they lack good education. Many are not driven by ideology but by money and hopes for promotion which means, they are stuck. It’s difficult to pretend to be native English speaker living in Russia, you need to get some education in the west, and who would sent you to London to become a good troll? | Many of trolls are recruited from pro-Kremlin youth movements, and they lack good education. Many are not driven by ideology but by money and hopes for promotion which means, they are stuck. It’s difficult to pretend to be native English speaker living in Russia, you need to get some education in the west, and who would sent you to London to become a good troll? |
| 1.46pm BST | 1.46pm BST |
| 13:46 | 13:46 |
| What does the Kremlin stand to gain? | What does the Kremlin stand to gain? |
| With all the energy and money the Kremlin puts into this project, what do you think the ultimate gain for them is? I can't imagine it cares much about it's image in the West, so the only other purpose I can see is to try and undermine Western institutions. Thus all journalism is biased/Russophobic, Russia's corrupt but so is everyone (the ultimate excuse of the corrupt), the EU, US, NATO are all to get Russia. Would this idea, of attacking institutions, be born out from the comments you've seen, particularly from those you've considered paid trolls? | With all the energy and money the Kremlin puts into this project, what do you think the ultimate gain for them is? I can't imagine it cares much about it's image in the West, so the only other purpose I can see is to try and undermine Western institutions. Thus all journalism is biased/Russophobic, Russia's corrupt but so is everyone (the ultimate excuse of the corrupt), the EU, US, NATO are all to get Russia. Would this idea, of attacking institutions, be born out from the comments you've seen, particularly from those you've considered paid trolls? |
| Don’t expect a thought-out strategy on trolls, they act on a day-to-day basis, tasked with very simple objectives: to compromise the investigation into MH17, shot down [over eastern Ukraine], or to personally attack Obama. | Don’t expect a thought-out strategy on trolls, they act on a day-to-day basis, tasked with very simple objectives: to compromise the investigation into MH17, shot down [over eastern Ukraine], or to personally attack Obama. |
| The main goal is to present the Kremlin as the only alternative to the morally corrupt west. | The main goal is to present the Kremlin as the only alternative to the morally corrupt west. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.51pm BST | at 1.51pm BST |
| 1.38pm BST | 1.38pm BST |
| 13:38 | 13:38 |
| What makes you a Putinbot? | What makes you a Putinbot? |
| Can you be a Putinbot without being paid by the Kremlin? I love Putin and hate the Guardian with a passion, but my views aren't paid for. Am I still a troll? Can I expect Martin Brunt from Sky news to be knocking on my door soon, simply because we disagree? | Can you be a Putinbot without being paid by the Kremlin? I love Putin and hate the Guardian with a passion, but my views aren't paid for. Am I still a troll? Can I expect Martin Brunt from Sky news to be knocking on my door soon, simply because we disagree? |
| When you retweet the pictures of atrocities in Syria, for example, using the hashtag “SaveDonbassPeople” you are obviously helping trolls to convey the message. But you should be paid to become a true Putinbot. | When you retweet the pictures of atrocities in Syria, for example, using the hashtag “SaveDonbassPeople” you are obviously helping trolls to convey the message. But you should be paid to become a true Putinbot. |
| Putinbots have no convictions, they don’t have their own opinions, they are not even pro-Kremlin. They just tasked with a very particular job. | Putinbots have no convictions, they don’t have their own opinions, they are not even pro-Kremlin. They just tasked with a very particular job. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.38pm BST | at 1.38pm BST |
| 1.36pm BST | 1.36pm BST |
| 13:36 | 13:36 |
| Defining trolling | Defining trolling |
| wombat123 asked: | wombat123 asked: |
| It seems more of a PR campaign then trolling. Trolling is just making comments to upset people. Trolls do not seek to win anyone over to their point of view. Paying a whole lot of people just to upset people online would be a waste of money. Somebody or some government paying a lot of people to flood blogs with comments supporting their point of view may be dishonest but it is not the same as trolling. It is really a form of propaganda. | It seems more of a PR campaign then trolling. Trolling is just making comments to upset people. Trolls do not seek to win anyone over to their point of view. Paying a whole lot of people just to upset people online would be a waste of money. Somebody or some government paying a lot of people to flood blogs with comments supporting their point of view may be dishonest but it is not the same as trolling. It is really a form of propaganda. |
| colunaprestes added: | colunaprestes added: |
| The Russian troll army, like the Chinese wumao dang, is instantly identifiable in the way that you point out. | The Russian troll army, like the Chinese wumao dang, is instantly identifiable in the way that you point out. |
| They need to be distinguished from genuine commentators from the West who are genuinely able to critically observe US/UK/NATO actions around Russia in the context of international relations between Russia and the US. | They need to be distinguished from genuine commentators from the West who are genuinely able to critically observe US/UK/NATO actions around Russia in the context of international relations between Russia and the US. |
| This can be done in two ways: a) look at their English, as you say and b) analyse their arguments. | This can be done in two ways: a) look at their English, as you say and b) analyse their arguments. |
| As for distracting and obscuring real discussion, Western intelligence agencies embedded in the Western media are well able to do that themselves. If they were not doing this, they would not be very good at their jobs, would they? | As for distracting and obscuring real discussion, Western intelligence agencies embedded in the Western media are well able to do that themselves. If they were not doing this, they would not be very good at their jobs, would they? |
| Sometimes it’s hard to make a line between PR and trolls. As sometimes trolls are tasked to help PR – for example, to promote some hashtags on Twitter. | Sometimes it’s hard to make a line between PR and trolls. As sometimes trolls are tasked to help PR – for example, to promote some hashtags on Twitter. |
| For example, right now one of the leading hashtags is #ДеньОсвобожденияДонбасса – meaning, the “Day of liberation of Donbass”, obviously promoted by trolls. | For example, right now one of the leading hashtags is #ДеньОсвобожденияДонбасса – meaning, the “Day of liberation of Donbass”, obviously promoted by trolls. |
| The idea is to confuse the real day of liberation of the region from the German Army during the second world war with the present situation, and the separatists are conveyed as descendants of the Soviet Army, who will defend the people against fascists. | The idea is to confuse the real day of liberation of the region from the German Army during the second world war with the present situation, and the separatists are conveyed as descendants of the Soviet Army, who will defend the people against fascists. |
| Trolls are incapable of taking part in a debate. Their task is to convey a message and that message should be emotional – a picture or direct and personal abuse. | Trolls are incapable of taking part in a debate. Their task is to convey a message and that message should be emotional – a picture or direct and personal abuse. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.39pm BST | at 1.39pm BST |
| 1.13pm BST | 1.13pm BST |
| 13:13 | 13:13 |
| What is the ‘troll army’ trying to achieve? | What is the ‘troll army’ trying to achieve? |
| I only became aware of the infestation of 'Putin bots' on this newspaper early last year. At first the virulence and volume of toxic and incoherent comments was shocking, mostly on Russia themed articles a from commenters with 'western sounding names' who professed a decidedly un-western adoration for Putin and contempt for their 'own' western country. it is no longer shocking just annoying. Most are so toxic and transparent (their English is poor and their world view untethered from reality) that they degrade most neutrals' view of Russia, not improve it. So my question: Aside from trying to pollute debate and undermine the clarity and legitimacy of the stories being reported, what is their objective? What are they trying to achieve and who are they targeting? | I only became aware of the infestation of 'Putin bots' on this newspaper early last year. At first the virulence and volume of toxic and incoherent comments was shocking, mostly on Russia themed articles a from commenters with 'western sounding names' who professed a decidedly un-western adoration for Putin and contempt for their 'own' western country. it is no longer shocking just annoying. Most are so toxic and transparent (their English is poor and their world view untethered from reality) that they degrade most neutrals' view of Russia, not improve it. So my question: Aside from trying to pollute debate and undermine the clarity and legitimacy of the stories being reported, what is their objective? What are they trying to achieve and who are they targeting? |
| There is a widespread feeling of grievance against the US, of anti-Americanism, and the main goal is to channel this feeling in favour of the Russian authorities. The aim being to present Putin as the only global alternative brave enough to challenge US supremacy. Discussion of US foreign policy mistakes, like the war in Iraq for example, is distorted in a way to benefit the Kremlin. | There is a widespread feeling of grievance against the US, of anti-Americanism, and the main goal is to channel this feeling in favour of the Russian authorities. The aim being to present Putin as the only global alternative brave enough to challenge US supremacy. Discussion of US foreign policy mistakes, like the war in Iraq for example, is distorted in a way to benefit the Kremlin. |
| In short, the goal is to promote Putin’s personal image among western audiences already critical of the US government and its allies. | In short, the goal is to promote Putin’s personal image among western audiences already critical of the US government and its allies. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.32pm BST | at 1.32pm BST |
| 1.09pm BST | 1.09pm BST |
| 13:09 | 13:09 |
| In the context of history | In the context of history |
| How would you describe the differences between "opinion-building mechanisms" during the Cold War, the Crazy 90s and contemporary Russia? | How would you describe the differences between "opinion-building mechanisms" during the Cold War, the Crazy 90s and contemporary Russia? |
| In the Soviet Union, a totalitarian state, it was a one-way stream of propaganda, there was no debate in the society, no alternative view allowed in the media – apart from samizdat, which was limited to few hundred people. | In the Soviet Union, a totalitarian state, it was a one-way stream of propaganda, there was no debate in the society, no alternative view allowed in the media – apart from samizdat, which was limited to few hundred people. |
| The main newspaper was called Pravda (Truth). There was no doubt, only truth. | The main newspaper was called Pravda (Truth). There was no doubt, only truth. |
| In the 1990s it was a clash of different opinions, between the opposition and the government, between different oligarchs, even between different security services. Now, all major media, first of all, TV, is controlled by the state and involved in propaganda. | In the 1990s it was a clash of different opinions, between the opposition and the government, between different oligarchs, even between different security services. Now, all major media, first of all, TV, is controlled by the state and involved in propaganda. |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.31pm BST | at 1.31pm BST |
| 1.02pm BST | 1.02pm BST |
| 13:02 | 13:02 |
| Maeve Shearlaw | Maeve Shearlaw |
| The Q&A is about to start. Please continue to leave your questions in the comments and Andrei and Irina will do their best to answer as many as possible in the next hour. We will also be feeding in questions from Twitter @GuardianNewEast, or you can email maeve.shearlaw@theguardian.com | The Q&A is about to start. Please continue to leave your questions in the comments and Andrei and Irina will do their best to answer as many as possible in the next hour. We will also be feeding in questions from Twitter @GuardianNewEast, or you can email maeve.shearlaw@theguardian.com |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 1.29pm BST | at 1.29pm BST |
| 12.37pm BST | 12.37pm BST |
| 12:37 | 12:37 |
| Trolls were the solution for a very particular problem: online critics of the Kremlin | Trolls were the solution for a very particular problem: online critics of the Kremlin |
| Trolls were the solution for a very particular problem the Kremlin faced in the mid-2000s: an internet dominated by critics. | Trolls were the solution for a very particular problem the Kremlin faced in the mid-2000s: an internet dominated by critics. |
| By 2005, more and more Russian journalists were losing their jobs, squeezed from TV channels and the press as part of Putin’s offensive against independent media. | By 2005, more and more Russian journalists were losing their jobs, squeezed from TV channels and the press as part of Putin’s offensive against independent media. |
| For many of these journalists, the internet was the only place to express their opinions, and many reporters turned to writing columns on blogging platforms such as LiveJournal.com. | For many of these journalists, the internet was the only place to express their opinions, and many reporters turned to writing columns on blogging platforms such as LiveJournal.com. |
| A phenomenon was born: highly opinionated, sometimes brilliantly written journalism that was highly critical of the Kremlin, spurring the government to find new methods to drown them out. | A phenomenon was born: highly opinionated, sometimes brilliantly written journalism that was highly critical of the Kremlin, spurring the government to find new methods to drown them out. |
| Trolling became the answer, and the pro-Kremlin youth movements proved their worth. Many trolls were recruited from among their ranks, some were paid, others inspired and encouraged by government propaganda. | Trolling became the answer, and the pro-Kremlin youth movements proved their worth. Many trolls were recruited from among their ranks, some were paid, others inspired and encouraged by government propaganda. |
| Users can post anonymous posts on LiveJournal, an option exploited by the ‘trolls’, who often launched personal attacks on writers, provoking a fierce response. | Users can post anonymous posts on LiveJournal, an option exploited by the ‘trolls’, who often launched personal attacks on writers, provoking a fierce response. |
| Then came the Moscow protests of 2011, and it was immediately clear that the trolls had largely failed in their objective: to silence the opposition and liberal opinion leaders. | Then came the Moscow protests of 2011, and it was immediately clear that the trolls had largely failed in their objective: to silence the opposition and liberal opinion leaders. |
| Then came Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – a strategic win for the Kremlin in the eastern Ukraine crisis – and hundreds of trolls were mobilised to defend the government both at home and abroad . | Then came Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – a strategic win for the Kremlin in the eastern Ukraine crisis – and hundreds of trolls were mobilised to defend the government both at home and abroad . |
| Trolls began to appear in the comments sections of traditional news outlets and on social media in the UK and the US. French and Italian journalists told us that they were attacked too. | Trolls began to appear in the comments sections of traditional news outlets and on social media in the UK and the US. French and Italian journalists told us that they were attacked too. |
| The objective now was to enforce a Russian-dominated narrative of the Ukraine conflict worldwide. This may have failed in the US and the UK, but in Ukraine and eastern Europe, it was a different story. | The objective now was to enforce a Russian-dominated narrative of the Ukraine conflict worldwide. This may have failed in the US and the UK, but in Ukraine and eastern Europe, it was a different story. |
| Faked reports and photos from eastern Ukraine flooded the internet. Trolls were paid to claim the violence was caused by Ukrainian “fascists”, borrowing images from war films to illustrate their argument. | Faked reports and photos from eastern Ukraine flooded the internet. Trolls were paid to claim the violence was caused by Ukrainian “fascists”, borrowing images from war films to illustrate their argument. |
| Although many of these claims were later proved false, they struck a nerve. | Although many of these claims were later proved false, they struck a nerve. |
| The images appealed to the historical memory of the Soviet Union – where an estimated 30 million lives were lost in the second world war – and carried a highly emotional message to the internet audience in eastern Europe: the fascists were coming again. | The images appealed to the historical memory of the Soviet Union – where an estimated 30 million lives were lost in the second world war – and carried a highly emotional message to the internet audience in eastern Europe: the fascists were coming again. |
| Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web authors | Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web authors |
| 8.07am BST | 8.07am BST |
| 08:07 | 08:07 |
| 'That troll factories exist was not a surprise to most Moscow correspondents' | 'That troll factories exist was not a surprise to most Moscow correspondents' |
| Shaun Walker | Shaun Walker |
| The discovery that Russian “troll factories” exist was not a surprise to most Moscow correspondents. For some time we had noticed the long list of comments under almost everything we wrote, often in semi-coherent English claiming to be from people with traditional British names. | The discovery that Russian “troll factories” exist was not a surprise to most Moscow correspondents. For some time we had noticed the long list of comments under almost everything we wrote, often in semi-coherent English claiming to be from people with traditional British names. |
| This is not to say that all the angry comments below the line are from paid trolls, far from it. Over the past two years, the Ukraine crisis and Russia more generally has become one of those polarised issues, such as Israel/Palestine. | This is not to say that all the angry comments below the line are from paid trolls, far from it. Over the past two years, the Ukraine crisis and Russia more generally has become one of those polarised issues, such as Israel/Palestine. |
| One story can simultaneously be denounced as disgusting Russophobic slander ordered up by the CIA and pro-Putin filth written by a Kremlin shill. Both sides never tire of comparing the other to the Nazis. Angry “pro-Russian” feedback is significantly higher than the level of angry “pro-Ukrainian” feedback, but both can be equally baffling. | One story can simultaneously be denounced as disgusting Russophobic slander ordered up by the CIA and pro-Putin filth written by a Kremlin shill. Both sides never tire of comparing the other to the Nazis. Angry “pro-Russian” feedback is significantly higher than the level of angry “pro-Ukrainian” feedback, but both can be equally baffling. |
| Good journalism points out problems, abuses and painful moments, and this will always be controversial. But due to a lack of strong, independent media in Russia, the immediate assumption is that coverage of difficult issues in Russia in the Guardian, for example, is part of a nefarious geo-political conspiracy. | Good journalism points out problems, abuses and painful moments, and this will always be controversial. But due to a lack of strong, independent media in Russia, the immediate assumption is that coverage of difficult issues in Russia in the Guardian, for example, is part of a nefarious geo-political conspiracy. |
| The worst part about trolling is it makes it hard to be open to genuine criticism. Journalists’ articles are by definition a selective compilation of relevant facts and opinions; and there’s almost always room for constructive feedback. But when every genuine engagement is buried between 100 semi-literate insults from paid trolls or partisan readers selectively processing information, the easiest thing to do is ignore it , which is a shame. | The worst part about trolling is it makes it hard to be open to genuine criticism. Journalists’ articles are by definition a selective compilation of relevant facts and opinions; and there’s almost always room for constructive feedback. But when every genuine engagement is buried between 100 semi-literate insults from paid trolls or partisan readers selectively processing information, the easiest thing to do is ignore it , which is a shame. |
| Shaun Walker, Moscow correspondent, the Guardian | Shaun Walker, Moscow correspondent, the Guardian |
| 8.06am BST | 8.06am BST |
| 08:06 | 08:06 |
| 'It’s hard to know who to trust and what is real' | 'It’s hard to know who to trust and what is real' |
| Marc Burrows | Marc Burrows |
| Russian propaganda posted in the comment section is a constant issue for our team: steering threads off topic, undermining genuine conversation and preventing regular readers from enjoying a focused and informed discussion. | Russian propaganda posted in the comment section is a constant issue for our team: steering threads off topic, undermining genuine conversation and preventing regular readers from enjoying a focused and informed discussion. |
| We know it happens, but stamping down on it is difficult. Unlike other coordinated trolling and spam we see on the site, which is relatively easy to spot, the Russian contingent is fairly sophisticated.They mask IP addresses, use false locations and create accounts that seem legitimate. We know to look for specific tropes in language but these change regularly, making the false posts tricky to weed out. | We know it happens, but stamping down on it is difficult. Unlike other coordinated trolling and spam we see on the site, which is relatively easy to spot, the Russian contingent is fairly sophisticated.They mask IP addresses, use false locations and create accounts that seem legitimate. We know to look for specific tropes in language but these change regularly, making the false posts tricky to weed out. |
| The most difficult challenge is that the “trolls” aren’t the only voices expressing these opinions. The propaganda of Russian state media is very effective and many commenters legitimately seem to post the same comments as the teams of paid online commenters.. | The most difficult challenge is that the “trolls” aren’t the only voices expressing these opinions. The propaganda of Russian state media is very effective and many commenters legitimately seem to post the same comments as the teams of paid online commenters.. |
| The most frustrating consequence of this is the atmosphere of distrust it fosters below the line. The most toxic conversations become bad parodies of a 70s cold war thriller, where everyone is a double agent. It’s hard to know who to trust and what is real – which, of course, is the point. | The most frustrating consequence of this is the atmosphere of distrust it fosters below the line. The most toxic conversations become bad parodies of a 70s cold war thriller, where everyone is a double agent. It’s hard to know who to trust and what is real – which, of course, is the point. |
| Marc Burrows, the Guardian’s senior community moderator | Marc Burrows, the Guardian’s senior community moderator |
| 8.03am BST | 8.03am BST |
| 08:03 | 08:03 |
| 'Venture below the line at your peril' | 'Venture below the line at your peril' |
| Luke Harding | Luke Harding |
| Like everyone writing regularly about Russia, I have found myself on the receiving end of some heavy trolling. Perhaps this is understandable. I spent four years in Russia as the Guardian’s Moscow correspondentwhere I reported on themes the Kremlin considers taboo: Putin’s wealth, top-level government corruption and Alexander Litvinenko, amongst other things. | Like everyone writing regularly about Russia, I have found myself on the receiving end of some heavy trolling. Perhaps this is understandable. I spent four years in Russia as the Guardian’s Moscow correspondentwhere I reported on themes the Kremlin considers taboo: Putin’s wealth, top-level government corruption and Alexander Litvinenko, amongst other things. |
| In February 2011 the FSB put me on a blacklist and I was thrown out of the country. | In February 2011 the FSB put me on a blacklist and I was thrown out of the country. |
| Even so, I’ve been taken aback by the remorseless and ingenious methods of paid Russian trolls. | Even so, I’ve been taken aback by the remorseless and ingenious methods of paid Russian trolls. |
| In 2011, I noticed that someone had set up a fake twitter account in my name. I’m @lukeharding1968. My Twitter clone was @Iukeharding1968 – with an upper case “i” at the beginning instead – had taken my Twitter photograph and bio, tweeting Kremlin press releases at a furious rate. | In 2011, I noticed that someone had set up a fake twitter account in my name. I’m @lukeharding1968. My Twitter clone was @Iukeharding1968 – with an upper case “i” at the beginning instead – had taken my Twitter photograph and bio, tweeting Kremlin press releases at a furious rate. |
| I contacted Twitter in San Francisco and they killed my clone. Then, like an army of zombies rising from the dead, I gained 21 more – each with my face – ranging from @lukeharding1960 upwards. | I contacted Twitter in San Francisco and they killed my clone. Then, like an army of zombies rising from the dead, I gained 21 more – each with my face – ranging from @lukeharding1960 upwards. |
| Then there is “below the line”, a place you only venture at your peril. Last year, while reporting on the conflict in eastern Ukraine, my dispatches attracted over 2,000 reader comments a day. | Then there is “below the line”, a place you only venture at your peril. Last year, while reporting on the conflict in eastern Ukraine, my dispatches attracted over 2,000 reader comments a day. |
| Of these, I would estimate 1,200 were vehemently pro-Putin and about 400 were personal abuse. The same pattern each time: I was a pathological Russophobe, a CIA spy or an MI6 operative. Sometimes all three. | Of these, I would estimate 1,200 were vehemently pro-Putin and about 400 were personal abuse. The same pattern each time: I was a pathological Russophobe, a CIA spy or an MI6 operative. Sometimes all three. |
| I believe in different viewpoints, rational debate, evidence-led argument. What I find depressing about trolling is there is no point in engaging with your critics, since trolls are not real their opinions are fake. | I believe in different viewpoints, rational debate, evidence-led argument. What I find depressing about trolling is there is no point in engaging with your critics, since trolls are not real their opinions are fake. |
| These opinions may be sincerely held, or the product of a daily briefing sheet either way, they originate with a state not an individual. | These opinions may be sincerely held, or the product of a daily briefing sheet either way, they originate with a state not an individual. |
| Luke Harding, foreign correspondent, the Guardian | Luke Harding, foreign correspondent, the Guardian |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 11.25am BST | at 11.25am BST |
| 4.39pm BST | 4.39pm BST |
| 16:39 | 16:39 |
| The rise of Russia's 'troll army' | The rise of Russia's 'troll army' |
| Maeve Shearlaw | Maeve Shearlaw |
| Reports on the workings of Russian ‘troll factories’ – formerly only on the radar of journalists critical of the regime – have become commonplace in recent months. | Reports on the workings of Russian ‘troll factories’ – formerly only on the radar of journalists critical of the regime – have become commonplace in recent months. |
| Evidence has emerged suggesting companies deploy workforces to post pro-government comments over the internet. Western media outlets have reported a huge increase in the volume and viciousness of comments under articles about Russia, and activist Lyudmila Savchuk – once on the payroll of the The Agency for Internet Studies – recently took her former employer to court in an attempt to “prove that trolls exist”. | Evidence has emerged suggesting companies deploy workforces to post pro-government comments over the internet. Western media outlets have reported a huge increase in the volume and viciousness of comments under articles about Russia, and activist Lyudmila Savchuk – once on the payroll of the The Agency for Internet Studies – recently took her former employer to court in an attempt to “prove that trolls exist”. |
| Testimonies from the Guardian’s Moscow correspondent, a former Moscow correspondent and the head of our moderation team paint a picture of what it’s like to be on the receiving end of abuse, which they all agree has intensified since the conflict in eastern Ukraine began. | Testimonies from the Guardian’s Moscow correspondent, a former Moscow correspondent and the head of our moderation team paint a picture of what it’s like to be on the receiving end of abuse, which they all agree has intensified since the conflict in eastern Ukraine began. |
| Their experiences will put in to context for us by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two Russian journalists who have followed their government’s behaviour in the online space since the early days of digital media. | Their experiences will put in to context for us by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, two Russian journalists who have followed their government’s behaviour in the online space since the early days of digital media. |
| The pair have recently released the Red Web, a book that examines everything from Edward Snowden – who they say inadvertently helped Putin’s crackdown on internet freedoms – to the details about the spying tools the government use. | The pair have recently released the Red Web, a book that examines everything from Edward Snowden – who they say inadvertently helped Putin’s crackdown on internet freedoms – to the details about the spying tools the government use. |
| Any questions? | Any questions? |
| Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan will join us for a live Q&A today, Tuesday 8 September, between 1-2pm London (3pm-4pm Moscow) to answer your questions about trolls and the Russian internet. | Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan will join us for a live Q&A today, Tuesday 8 September, between 1-2pm London (3pm-4pm Moscow) to answer your questions about trolls and the Russian internet. |
| Use the comment section below to post your questions, tweet them at @GuardianNewEast or email maeve.shearlaw@theguardian.com | Use the comment section below to post your questions, tweet them at @GuardianNewEast or email maeve.shearlaw@theguardian.com |
| Updated | Updated |
| at 4.41pm BST | at 4.41pm BST |