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| MoD left UK forces in Iraq lacking equipment and a plan, Chilcot says | |
| (about 1 hour later) | |
| The UK’s military involvement in Iraq ended with the “humiliating” decision to strike deals with enemy militias because British forces were seriously ill-equipped and there was “wholly inadequate” planning and preparation for life after Saddam Hussein, the Chilcot report finds. | The UK’s military involvement in Iraq ended with the “humiliating” decision to strike deals with enemy militias because British forces were seriously ill-equipped and there was “wholly inadequate” planning and preparation for life after Saddam Hussein, the Chilcot report finds. |
| In a withering assessment that will confirm the worst fears of the families of personnel who died, the inquiry has found British forces lacked essential equipment such as armoured patrol vehicles and helicopters – and yet nobody at the Ministry of Defence appeared to be taking responsibility for the problems. | In a withering assessment that will confirm the worst fears of the families of personnel who died, the inquiry has found British forces lacked essential equipment such as armoured patrol vehicles and helicopters – and yet nobody at the Ministry of Defence appeared to be taking responsibility for the problems. |
| The MoD planned the invasion in a rush and was slow to react to the security threats on the ground, particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that killed so many troops, the report says. | The MoD planned the invasion in a rush and was slow to react to the security threats on the ground, particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that killed so many troops, the report says. |
| But instead of quickly addressing serious equipment shortfalls such as the use of poorly protected Snatch Land Rovers when the conflict began, the MoD allowed delays to develop that “should not have been tolerated”. | But instead of quickly addressing serious equipment shortfalls such as the use of poorly protected Snatch Land Rovers when the conflict began, the MoD allowed delays to develop that “should not have been tolerated”. |
| Instead of concentrating on Iraq, the MoD began to focus on Afghanistan, compounding the problems. The risks of running parallel operations had not been properly thought through, the report says. | Instead of concentrating on Iraq, the MoD began to focus on Afghanistan, compounding the problems. The risks of running parallel operations had not been properly thought through, the report says. |
| The Chilcot report says the military was already overstretched in 2002 and had expected to be able to draw down troops from Iraq within four months of the invasion because it potentially faced an “unsustainable commitment”. | The Chilcot report says the military was already overstretched in 2002 and had expected to be able to draw down troops from Iraq within four months of the invasion because it potentially faced an “unsustainable commitment”. |
| Yet British involvement in Iraq continued for six years, with 179 military personnel killed and hundreds more seriously wounded. | Yet British involvement in Iraq continued for six years, with 179 military personnel killed and hundreds more seriously wounded. |
| The Chilcot report praises the courage of the UK forces involved in the invasion that led to Saddam’s removal but is highly critical of the decision-making process beforehand, and the lack of any preparation for what might follow. | The Chilcot report praises the courage of the UK forces involved in the invasion that led to Saddam’s removal but is highly critical of the decision-making process beforehand, and the lack of any preparation for what might follow. |
| The MoD had been discreetly working on a plan to invade Iraq from the north but had to switch to the south on 8 January 2003, just two months before the invasion, when it became clear Turkey would not permit British troops to be based there. | The MoD had been discreetly working on a plan to invade Iraq from the north but had to switch to the south on 8 January 2003, just two months before the invasion, when it became clear Turkey would not permit British troops to be based there. |
| “There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers,” Chilcot says. | “There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers,” Chilcot says. |
| Related: Chilcot report live: families call for Tony Blair to face trial over Iraq war | Related: Chilcot report live: families call for Tony Blair to face trial over Iraq war |
| He says the cabinet did not discuss the military options or their implications and that “planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam were wholly inadequate”. | He says the cabinet did not discuss the military options or their implications and that “planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam were wholly inadequate”. |
| The report says it could find “no evidence that any department or individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility for analysis or mitigation” about what might happen after the invasion. | The report says it could find “no evidence that any department or individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility for analysis or mitigation” about what might happen after the invasion. |
| Once Saddam had been defeated, the UK had wrongly assumed that the US had a post-invasion plan. It meant that British forces held four provinces in southern Iraq “without a robust analysis … of the military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region”. | Once Saddam had been defeated, the UK had wrongly assumed that the US had a post-invasion plan. It meant that British forces held four provinces in southern Iraq “without a robust analysis … of the military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region”. |
| As the security situation began to deteriorate, the British military was slow to respond and nobody appeared to be taking responsibility, the report says. | As the security situation began to deteriorate, the British military was slow to respond and nobody appeared to be taking responsibility, the report says. |
| “We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. | “We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated. |
| “It was not clear which person or department in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.” | “It was not clear which person or department in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.” |
| The report says the UK’s efforts were also hampered by overoptimistic assessments by commanders on the ground, whose “can-do attitude” meant the truth was not being heard by military chiefs or ministers. | The report says the UK’s efforts were also hampered by overoptimistic assessments by commanders on the ground, whose “can-do attitude” meant the truth was not being heard by military chiefs or ministers. |
| “At times in Iraq the bearers of bad tidings were not heard,” Chilcot concludes. “The MoD was not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.” | “At times in Iraq the bearers of bad tidings were not heard,” Chilcot concludes. “The MoD was not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.” |
| Related: The view of Chilcot from Iraq: 'Only those with the wounds feel the pain' | Related: The view of Chilcot from Iraq: 'Only those with the wounds feel the pain' |
| Faced with widespread looting after the invasion and without instructions about how to deal with the deteriorating situation, one British commander told the inquiry “the best way to stop the looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing to loot”. | Faced with widespread looting after the invasion and without instructions about how to deal with the deteriorating situation, one British commander told the inquiry “the best way to stop the looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing to loot”. |
| In his most damning conclusion, Chilcot says: “By 2007, militia dominance in Basra … led to the UK exchanging detainees released for an end to the targeting of its forces. | In his most damning conclusion, Chilcot says: “By 2007, militia dominance in Basra … led to the UK exchanging detainees released for an end to the targeting of its forces. |
| “It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.” | “It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.” |
| The difficulties the UK faced in Iraq were exacerbated by senior commanders writing unachievable strategies and then turning their attention to Afghanistan, the report states. | The difficulties the UK faced in Iraq were exacerbated by senior commanders writing unachievable strategies and then turning their attention to Afghanistan, the report states. |
| “Throughout 2004 and 2005 it appears that senior members of the armed forces reached the view that little more could be achieved [in Iraq] … and it would make more sense to concentrate on Afghanistan.” | “Throughout 2004 and 2005 it appears that senior members of the armed forces reached the view that little more could be achieved [in Iraq] … and it would make more sense to concentrate on Afghanistan.” |
| This meant the armed forces were even more stretched – and vital equipment was diverted from Iraq at the time it was most needed. | This meant the armed forces were even more stretched – and vital equipment was diverted from Iraq at the time it was most needed. |
| “From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so … decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.” | “From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so … decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.” |
| The decision to run both operations “had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection”. | The decision to run both operations “had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection”. |
| The report states: “Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in key capability areas.” | The report states: “Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in key capability areas.” |
| The report says the lack of proper analysis and preparation, the decision to run unsustainable operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shortage of proper equipment meant British efforts in Basra were doomed to fail. | The report says the lack of proper analysis and preparation, the decision to run unsustainable operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shortage of proper equipment meant British efforts in Basra were doomed to fail. |
| Chilcot says: “The UK did not achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance of risk in a dangerous environment by military and civilian personnel.” | Chilcot says: “The UK did not achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance of risk in a dangerous environment by military and civilian personnel.” |