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MoD left UK forces in Iraq lacking equipment and a plan, Chilcot says MoD left UK forces in Iraq lacking equipment and a plan, Chilcot says
(about 7 hours later)
The UK’s military involvement in Iraq ended with the “humiliating” decision to strike deals with enemy militias because British forces were seriously ill-equipped and there was “wholly inadequate” planning and preparation for life after Saddam Hussein, the Chilcot report finds. Britain’s armed forces ended up being humiliated in Iraq because of a lack of planning before and after the invasion, serious shortages of vital equipment that affected troop safety, and a determination to run a parallel operation in Afghanistan even though the military was already overstretched, the Chilcot report concludes.
In a withering assessment that will confirm the worst fears of the families of personnel who died, the inquiry has found British forces lacked essential equipment such as armoured patrol vehicles and helicopters – and yet nobody at the Ministry of Defence appeared to be taking responsibility for the problems. Despite obvious and serious shortcomings that resulted from “wholly inadequate” preparation for life after Saddam Hussein, the military was slow to address these problems, in part because nobody appeared to be taking responsibility for them, the inquiry states.
The MoD planned the invasion in a rush and was slow to react to the security threats on the ground, particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that killed so many troops, the report says. “It was not clear which person or department in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.”
But instead of quickly addressing serious equipment shortfalls such as the use of poorly protected Snatch Land Rovers when the conflict began, the MoD allowed delays to develop that “should not have been tolerated”. The report says it could find “no evidence that any department or individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility” for what might happen after the invasion.
Instead of concentrating on Iraq, the MoD began to focus on Afghanistan, compounding the problems. The risks of running parallel operations had not been properly thought through, the report says. Related: Basra after the British: division and despair in Iraq's oil boomtown
The Chilcot report says the military was already overstretched in 2002 and had expected to be able to draw down troops from Iraq within four months of the invasion because it potentially faced an “unsustainable commitment”. In addition, senior military commanders, including the then chief of the defence staff, Adm Lord Boyce, had seemingly failed to properly explain to officers on the ground what they should be doing in the four southern provinces where British troops were based, the report says.
Yet British involvement in Iraq continued for six years, with 179 military personnel killed and hundreds more seriously wounded. “It was the responsibility of the Chiefs of the Defence staff and the Chief of Joint Operations to ensure that appropriate rules of engagement were set, and preparations made to equip commanders on the ground to deal with it effectively. They should have ensured that those steps were taken.”
The Chilcot report praises the courage of the UK forces involved in the invasion that led to Saddam’s removal but is highly critical of the decision-making process beforehand, and the lack of any preparation for what might follow. The lack of clarity caused immediate problems – which endured for another six years. In that time, 179 British military personnel were killed and hundreds of others were injured.
Faced with widespread looting immediately after the invasion and without clear instructions about how to deal with it, Brig Graham Binns, commanding the 7th Armoured Brigade, told the inquiry “the best way to stop the looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing to loot”.
Chilcot says the chaos can be partly explained by the fact the MoD planned the invasion in a rush and had been unable to discuss buying new equipment from the defence industry until weeks before the conflict because of the need to maintain secrecy.
The MoD had been discreetly working on a plan to invade Iraq from the north but had to switch to the south on 8 January 2003, just two months before the invasion, when it became clear Turkey would not permit British troops to be based there.The MoD had been discreetly working on a plan to invade Iraq from the north but had to switch to the south on 8 January 2003, just two months before the invasion, when it became clear Turkey would not permit British troops to be based there.
“There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers,” Chilcot says.“There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers,” Chilcot says.
By then, commanders already knew that there were shortfalls in certain types of equipment, but their advice to ministers was that the risk was “considered acceptable.”
Once British forces were in Iraq, it quickly became clear the army didn’t have enough helicopters, armoured vehicles, or equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection.
Yet the Ministry of Defence was slow to react to the threats posed by insurgents using roadside bombs (Improvised Explosive Devices) that could easily pierce the armour on the army’s Snatch Land Rovers.
“We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated.”
The report says the UK’s efforts were hampered by an assumption that the US had a robust post-invasion plan, when it didn’t.
Without one of our own, British commanders continued to write unachievable strategies and provide over-optimistic assessments of what was really happening on the ground, the report says.
Related: Chilcot report live: families call for Tony Blair to face trial over Iraq warRelated: Chilcot report live: families call for Tony Blair to face trial over Iraq war
He says the cabinet did not discuss the military options or their implications and that “planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam were wholly inadequate”. The military’s laudable “can-do attitude” meant, however, the truth was not being heard by military chiefs or ministers.
The report says it could find “no evidence that any department or individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility for analysis or mitigation” about what might happen after the invasion.
Once Saddam had been defeated, the UK had wrongly assumed that the US had a post-invasion plan. It meant that British forces held four provinces in southern Iraq “without a robust analysis … of the military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in the region”.
As the security situation began to deteriorate, the British military was slow to respond and nobody appeared to be taking responsibility, the report says.
“We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat of improvised explosive devices and that delays in providing adequate medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated.
“It was not clear which person or department in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.”
The report says the UK’s efforts were also hampered by overoptimistic assessments by commanders on the ground, whose “can-do attitude” meant the truth was not being heard by military chiefs or ministers.
“At times in Iraq the bearers of bad tidings were not heard,” Chilcot concludes. “The MoD was not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.”“At times in Iraq the bearers of bad tidings were not heard,” Chilcot concludes. “The MoD was not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.”
Related: The view of Chilcot from Iraq: 'Only those with the wounds feel the pain' But instead of concentrating on Iraq as the situation deteriorated, the MoD began to turn its attention to Afghanistan – further compounding the military’s problems. The risks of running parallel operations had not been properly thought through, the report says.
Faced with widespread looting after the invasion and without instructions about how to deal with the deteriorating situation, one British commander told the inquiry “the best way to stop the looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing to loot”.
In his most damning conclusion, Chilcot says: “By 2007, militia dominance in Basra … led to the UK exchanging detainees released for an end to the targeting of its forces.
“It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.”
The difficulties the UK faced in Iraq were exacerbated by senior commanders writing unachievable strategies and then turning their attention to Afghanistan, the report states.
“Throughout 2004 and 2005 it appears that senior members of the armed forces reached the view that little more could be achieved [in Iraq] … and it would make more sense to concentrate on Afghanistan.”“Throughout 2004 and 2005 it appears that senior members of the armed forces reached the view that little more could be achieved [in Iraq] … and it would make more sense to concentrate on Afghanistan.”
This meant the armed forces were even more stretched – and vital equipment was diverted from Iraq at the time it was most needed. Related: The view of Chilcot from Iraq: 'Only those with the wounds feel the pain'
This meant the armed forces were even more stretched and vital equipment needed in Iraq was diverted to Afghanistan.
“From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so … decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.”“From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so … decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.”
The decision to run both operations “had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection”.The decision to run both operations “had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection”.
The report states: “Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in key capability areas.”The report states: “Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in key capability areas.”
In his most damning conclusion, Chilcot says: “By 2007, militia dominance in Basra … led to the UK exchanging detainees released for an end to the targeting of its forces. It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.”
The report says the lack of proper analysis and preparation, the decision to run unsustainable operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shortage of proper equipment meant British efforts in Basra were doomed to fail.The report says the lack of proper analysis and preparation, the decision to run unsustainable operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shortage of proper equipment meant British efforts in Basra were doomed to fail.
Chilcot says: “The UK did not achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance of risk in a dangerous environment by military and civilian personnel.”Chilcot says: “The UK did not achieve its objectives, despite the best efforts and acceptance of risk in a dangerous environment by military and civilian personnel.”