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| Manchester attack fire crews 'sent away from arena blast' | Manchester attack fire crews 'sent away from arena blast' |
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| Firefighters who heard the Manchester Arena bomb go off were sent away from the scene despite a paramedic arriving within 11 minutes, a report says. | Firefighters who heard the Manchester Arena bomb go off were sent away from the scene despite a paramedic arriving within 11 minutes, a report says. |
| Fire crews "stuck to the rules" for a suspected active terrorist but it was "fortuitous" paramedics were not kept away, the Kerslake Report said. | Fire crews "stuck to the rules" for a suspected active terrorist but it was "fortuitous" paramedics were not kept away, the Kerslake Report said. |
| It meant "out of the loop" fire crews were delayed by two hours before joining emergency efforts in May 2017. | It meant "out of the loop" fire crews were delayed by two hours before joining emergency efforts in May 2017. |
| The report found "poor communication" after Salman Abedi killed 22 people. | The report found "poor communication" after Salman Abedi killed 22 people. |
| Suicide bomber Abedi detonated a home-made device at 22:31 BST as 14,000 people streamed out of an Ariana Grande concert on 22 May, leaving more than 700 injured. | Suicide bomber Abedi detonated a home-made device at 22:31 BST as 14,000 people streamed out of an Ariana Grande concert on 22 May, leaving more than 700 injured. |
| The first North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) paramedic arrived at 22:42 and was told the incident was a "suicide bomber" by police. | The first North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) paramedic arrived at 22:42 and was told the incident was a "suicide bomber" by police. |
| A Greater Manchester Police (GMP) duty inspector in the force control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan in the face of a suspected marauding armed terrorist, and wrongly assumed others were aware. | A Greater Manchester Police (GMP) duty inspector in the force control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan in the face of a suspected marauding armed terrorist, and wrongly assumed others were aware. |
| Under Operation Plato inspectors can allow paramedics and police to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks. | Under Operation Plato inspectors can allow paramedics and police to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks. |
| However, a senior Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) officer "stuck to rules", keeping emergency responders 500m (1,600ft) away from any suspected zone of danger. | However, a senior Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) officer "stuck to rules", keeping emergency responders 500m (1,600ft) away from any suspected zone of danger. |
| The 226-page report said it was "fortuitous" the ambulance service was not informed, otherwise it may have pulled out paramedics who instead stayed and "lives were saved". | The 226-page report said it was "fortuitous" the ambulance service was not informed, otherwise it may have pulled out paramedics who instead stayed and "lives were saved". |
| As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer, the response of the fire service was "brought to the point of paralysis" to the "immense frustration on the firefighters' faces". | As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer, the response of the fire service was "brought to the point of paralysis" to the "immense frustration on the firefighters' faces". |
| The fire service and the control room "felt they had let down the people of Greater Manchester" on the night of the blast. | The fire service and the control room "felt they had let down the people of Greater Manchester" on the night of the blast. |
| An early decision was taken to base crews at Philips Park Fire Station - about two miles away from the arena - rather than with police at the city's cathedral car park. | An early decision was taken to base crews at Philips Park Fire Station - about two miles away from the arena - rather than with police at the city's cathedral car park. |
| The move hampered communication and awareness of what was happening at the scene, the report found. | The move hampered communication and awareness of what was happening at the scene, the report found. |
| "The fire service was effectively outside the loop [and had] little awareness of what was happening at the arena," it said. | "The fire service was effectively outside the loop [and had] little awareness of what was happening at the arena," it said. |
| The Kerslake Report into the emergency service response found "strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose. | The Kerslake Report into the emergency service response found "strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose. |
| It said "poor communications" between police and fire commanders meant crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing. Its average response time is under six minutes. | It said "poor communications" between police and fire commanders meant crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing. Its average response time is under six minutes. |
| The report made more than 50 recommendations but states its panel of experts was not there to answer the question of: "Would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?" | The report made more than 50 recommendations but states its panel of experts was not there to answer the question of: "Would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?" |
| "This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide," the report said. | "This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide," the report said. |
| Speaking at a press conference after the report's publication, Lord Kerslake said the "unspeakable attack" had been a "brutal and real-world test" of the emergency services' response. | Speaking at a press conference after the report's publication, Lord Kerslake said the "unspeakable attack" had been a "brutal and real-world test" of the emergency services' response. |
| The willingness of victims' families and survivors of the attack to recount their experiences for the report had been "truly humbling", he said. | The willingness of victims' families and survivors of the attack to recount their experiences for the report had been "truly humbling", he said. |
| Lord Kerslake said there had been "hundreds and thousands of acts of individual bravery" on the night and many praise-worthy aspects of the response. | Lord Kerslake said there had been "hundreds and thousands of acts of individual bravery" on the night and many praise-worthy aspects of the response. |
| He said "not one single reason or one individual" was to blame for the errors, but a "most unfortunate combination" of "poor communications and poor procedures". | He said "not one single reason or one individual" was to blame for the errors, but a "most unfortunate combination" of "poor communications and poor procedures". |
| Lord Kerslake said that "deep down" the errors were prompted by failings in "operational culture". | Lord Kerslake said that "deep down" the errors were prompted by failings in "operational culture". |
| But he conceded that it was "quite extraordinary that [the fire service] did not pick up what was happening." | But he conceded that it was "quite extraordinary that [the fire service] did not pick up what was happening." |
| "They should have gone forward not back," he said. | "They should have gone forward not back," he said. |
| "The firefighters wanted to go forward but they were not able to. The discipline of the fire service meant that they could not self-deploy." | "The firefighters wanted to go forward but they were not able to. The discipline of the fire service meant that they could not self-deploy." |
| Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham also praised the emergency services' response but said it was important to "challenge ourselves where things didn't go so well." | Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham also praised the emergency services' response but said it was important to "challenge ourselves where things didn't go so well." |
| He said the fire service "fell well short" of the standards it sets for itself. | He said the fire service "fell well short" of the standards it sets for itself. |
| The report was not designed to criticise firefighters themselves, he said, but to "ensure they are supported" by the "best possible leadership and culture". | The report was not designed to criticise firefighters themselves, he said, but to "ensure they are supported" by the "best possible leadership and culture". |
| Mr Burnham said he would now ask for a further detailed review into how the service works with other agencies. | Mr Burnham said he would now ask for a further detailed review into how the service works with other agencies. |
| He said he would also ask the prime minister and Home Office to "consider national guidance" over how to respond to further attacks. | He said he would also ask the prime minister and Home Office to "consider national guidance" over how to respond to further attacks. |
| The mayor said he would also like to see more focus on how survivors and families are supported in the aftermath of terror attacks, including financially and in terms of mental health support. | The mayor said he would also like to see more focus on how survivors and families are supported in the aftermath of terror attacks, including financially and in terms of mental health support. |
| Baroness Beverley Hughes, Mr Burnham's deputy, said the findings would "undoubtedly damage the reputation" of the fire service as an organisation. | |
| "However, it should not tarnish the reputation of firefighters on the front line," she added. | |
| Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service's interim chief fire officer Dawn Docx apologised "unreservedly" for her service's failures. | |
| She said: "Firefighters were desperate on the night to help and they were let down by some of their senior colleagues." | |
| Asked if any disciplinary action had been taken, she said: "We are very much a learning organisation. | |
| "We are not seeking to go down the disciplining route. We are working to make sure this never happens again." | |
| When asked whether former fire chief Peter O'Reilly - who announced his retirement last year - would have faced disciplinary action, Mr Burnham said it was not about scapegoating individuals. | |
| The panel, chaired by former head of the civil service Lord Kerslake, also found: | The panel, chaired by former head of the civil service Lord Kerslake, also found: |
| Lord Kerslake said there was "a lot to be proud of" in the response to the attack. | Lord Kerslake said there was "a lot to be proud of" in the response to the attack. |
| "But it's also vital to learn the lessons around things that did not go so well," he added. | "But it's also vital to learn the lessons around things that did not go so well," he added. |
| "It matters not just for the people of Greater Manchester and beyond who were caught up in the terrible events of that night, but also for places that might be caught up in such an attack in the future." | "It matters not just for the people of Greater Manchester and beyond who were caught up in the terrible events of that night, but also for places that might be caught up in such an attack in the future." |