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Grenfell firefighters unable to get water to top floors, inquiry told Grenfell blaze behaved in way I did not expect, says fire commander
(about 5 hours later)
Firefighters were unable to get water to the top floors of Grenfell Tower, where many of the victims of last year’s fire died, because the building was designed with firefighting infrastructure that would not support it, the public inquiry has heard. The fire brigade commander in charge of the initial response to the Grenfell Tower disaster has admitted he was out of his comfort zone and that he was “consumed by sensory overload” as he saw the fire rage out of control.
Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station, who was the first incident commander on the scene, said that above 50 metres the “water supply would be almost non-existent”. Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station in west London, told the public inquiry he could not understand why the facade of the tower was catching fire, partly because he had no idea it was covered with combustible cladding.
Giving evidence for a second day, he described how the system of pipes running up the building to fight fires – known as dry risers – were unable to cope with the multi-storey fire he and his colleagues faced. In a gruelling evidence session, during which Dowden asked for proceedings to be suspended after he became visibly upset at video footage of the fire, he said he noticed it was behaving in a way he had not expected, “sparking and spitting in a similar way to when magnesium burns”.
Throughout the night of 14 June 2017 the firefighters tackled the blaze, which spread rapidly from the kitchen of flat 16 on the fourth floor up to the 24th floor, eventually claiming 72 lives. Referring to flat 16 where the fire started, he said: “I knew there was a BA team [firefighters in breathing apparatus] within that compartment and I couldn’t understand why that fire wasn’t being suppressed. They were tackling a compartment fire which they were making good progress on and from what I would see on the outside it was a different story.”
Dowden and his team plugged their hoses into two dry risers – one on the fourth floor and another on the third floor. This allowed them to blast 230 litres of water per minute with each hose, well within the fire brigade’s capability of providing 1,500 litres per minute to the fire. The inquiry was shown footage taken at around 1:12am on 14 June last year in which another firefighter could be heard shouting to Dowden: “Mike, Mike, make it six now, make it six now”, referring to the need for more fire engines.
The blaze quickly spread up and around the facades. Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, asked Dowden if he could have plugged hoses into every outlet to battle fires as they spread to other flats. Dowden told the inquiry: “I had no previous knowledge of how that building was reacting … I did feel uncomfortable, out of my comfort zone because I didn’t have any previous experience to fall back on in terms of … the way it was behaving and reacting.”
By around 1.16am, he sent a message to the control room saying that 75% of flat 16 was on fire and that the tactical stance was “Oscar”, the codename for offensive.
The fire was moving so fast that by 1:19am he had ordered a further two fire engines, but at that point did not order evacuation.
Asked why he did not do that by the counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett QC, Dowden said: “I started to become very consumed in terms of what was happening in front of me. I think the way it was increasing and developing that I’ve never seen anything like that before and it was almost that I was consumed by that in terms of the sensory overload.”
Dowden said he still thought the firefighters might be able to put the fire out and that he did not give any thought to the possibility it could break out into other flats. He said he asked one crew to try and get to the top of Grenfell to douse the flames from above, which never proved possible.
“I was trying to make the best decisions I could in terms of my previous experience and what I was seeing in front of me. I had never experienced anything like this before.”
Dowden was the incident commander until around 1.50am. Fire officers of his rank are normally only in charge of fires requiring four pumps, the inquiry heard.
“I wouldn’t generally be in charge of a six-pump fire or an eight=pump fire if a more senior officer was in attendance … The way that fire developed meant I was in charge for longer than usual.”
Earlier Dowden described how firefighters were unable to get water to the top floors of the tower, where many of the victims died, because the building was designed with an firefighting infrastructure that would not support it.
He said that above 50 metres the “water supply would be almost non-existent”.
He described how the system of pipes running up the building to fight fires – known as dry risers – were unable to cope with the multistorey fire he and his colleagues faced.
Throughout the earlier hours of 14 June 2017 the firefighters tackled the blaze, which spread rapidly from the kitchen of flat 16 on the fourth floor up to the 24th floor, eventually claiming 72 lives.
Dowden and his team plugged their hoses into two dry risers – one on the fourth floor and another on the third. This allowed them to blast 230 litres of water a minute with each hose, well within the fire brigade’s capability of providing 1,500 litres a minute to the fire.
The blaze quickly spread up and around the facades. Millett asked Dowden if he could have plugged hoses into every outlet to battle fires as they spread to other flats.
“That’s an almost impossible task … the dry riser is not designed to do that,” he said, adding that they had expected the building to be designed to limit the fire to the compartment where it began.“That’s an almost impossible task … the dry riser is not designed to do that,” he said, adding that they had expected the building to be designed to limit the fire to the compartment where it began.
“We’d only really be fighting one floor. It would be extremely difficult and the further you go up the building the water pressure would lessen the output.”“We’d only really be fighting one floor. It would be extremely difficult and the further you go up the building the water pressure would lessen the output.”
Grenfell Tower was 67 metres high. The plug-in points for the dry risers were located in the flat lobbies,, which meant that running hoses up the stairs to tackle fires in flats required leaving fire doors ajar, which allowed smoke to penetrate the single evacuation staircase. Earlier, Dowden said that when he arrived at the building he did not know it was covered in cladding, which experts to the inquiry have said spread the flames.
Dowden and Millett agreed that the general principle is that the dry riser should be in a protected stairwell.
Millett asked: “Did you take any steps to ensure that the obstruction was minimised?”
Dowden replied: “We can only work with what we’re given on the night in terms of what that building presents to us. We have to have a water supply. We have to put water on to that fire. We can only work with the facilities that are given to us at that moment in time.”
Earlier, Dowden admitted that when he arrived at the building he didn’t know it was covered in cladding, which experts to the inquiry have said spread the flames.
“I wasn’t aware it was cladding,” he said. “At that point I just thought it was the external part of Grenfell Tower.”“I wasn’t aware it was cladding,” he said. “At that point I just thought it was the external part of Grenfell Tower.”
At the opening of his second day of evidence, Millett thanked Dowden, saying: “I want you to know that you’re doing a public service and we are extremely thankful to you for it.”At the opening of his second day of evidence, Millett thanked Dowden, saying: “I want you to know that you’re doing a public service and we are extremely thankful to you for it.”
The inquiry continues.The inquiry continues.
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