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Grenfell blaze behaved in way I did not expect, says fire commander Evacuating Grenfell Tower was 'impossible because of lack of resources'
(35 minutes later)
The fire brigade commander in charge of the initial response to the Grenfell Tower disaster has admitted he was out of his comfort zone and that he was “consumed by sensory overload” as he saw the fire rage out of control. Evacuating Grenfell Tower was “impossible” because insufficient firefighters and equipment had been deployed by the time the flames were at the top of the building, the first fire brigade commander on the scene has told the public inquiry into the disaster.
Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station in west London, told the public inquiry he could not understand why the facade of the tower was catching fire, partly because he had no idea it was covered with combustible cladding. Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station, said that although the flames had risen to the top of the 24-storey tower by just before 1.30am on 14 June 2017, the instruction to residents to stay put could not be reversed as there were just six fire engines on the scene and limited breathing apparatus kits.
In a gruelling evidence session, during which Dowden asked for proceedings to be suspended after he became visibly upset at video footage of the fire, he said he noticed it was behaving in a way he had not expected, “sparking and spitting in a similar way to when magnesium burns”. He said he did not give any thought to changing the stay put instruction at the time of the fire, which killed 72 people, but has since reflected it could not have been done.
Referring to flat 16 where the fire started, he said: “I knew there was a BA team [firefighters in breathing apparatus] within that compartment and I couldn’t understand why that fire wasn’t being suppressed. They were tackling a compartment fire which they were making good progress on and from what I would see on the outside it was a different story.” The stay put policy was based around the building being constructed in a way to keep fires from breaking out of individual flats. It failed at Grenfell by 1.26am, the inquiry heard previously from expert fire engineer, Dr Barbara Lane. Residents were only told to try to evacuate after 2.47am. Many who were told to stay in their flats never got out.
The inquiry was shown footage taken at around 1:12am on 14 June last year in which another firefighter could be heard shouting to Dowden: “Mike, Mike, make it six now, make it six now”, referring to the need for more fire engines. “For me to facilitate and change a stay-put policy to a full evacuation was impossible,” Dowden said. “I didn’t have the resource at that time. We’re looking at 20 floors above the fire floor with just six fire engines in attendance, one central staircase. I just don’t know how that could be done with the resources we had in attendance at that moment in time.”
Dowden told the inquiry: “I had no previous knowledge of how that building was reacting … I did feel uncomfortable, out of my comfort zone because I didn’t have any previous experience to fall back on in terms of … the way it was behaving and reacting.” Dowden also told the inquiry that under London Fire Brigade guidance he was too junior to be left in charge of the fire as it raged out of control, that he felt out of his depth and was “consumed by sensory overload”.
By around 1.16am, he sent a message to the control room saying that 75% of flat 16 was on fire and that the tactical stance was “Oscar”, the codename for offensive. He was the incident commander until around 1.50am, and by 1.28am he had ordered 15 fire engines to the scene. Fire officers of his rank are normally only in charge of fires requiring four pumps, the inquiry heard.
The fire was moving so fast that by 1:19am he had ordered a further two fire engines, but at that point did not order evacuation. “I wouldn’t generally be in charge of a six-pump fire or an eight pump fire if a more senior officer was in attendance … The way that fire developed meant I was in charge for longer than usual.”
Asked why he did not do that by the counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett QC, Dowden said: “I started to become very consumed in terms of what was happening in front of me. I think the way it was increasing and developing that I’ve never seen anything like that before and it was almost that I was consumed by that in terms of the sensory overload.” During his second day of evidence, Dowden had to take frequent breaks as he was asked to recall taking charge of a fire, the scale of which he had never seen before. At one point, having seen a video of the tower and onlookers shouting at the residents to get out, he had to ask for the hearing to be paused and wiped tears from his eyes.
Dowden said he still thought the firefighters might be able to put the fire out and that he did not give any thought to the possibility it could break out into other flats. He said he asked one crew to try and get to the top of Grenfell to douse the flames from above, which never proved possible. “I started to become very consumed in terms of what was happening in front of me,” he said under questioning from Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry. “I think the way it was increasing and developing, that I’ve never seen anything like that before.”
“I was trying to make the best decisions I could in terms of my previous experience and what I was seeing in front of me. I had never experienced anything like this before.” He said he didn’t know the tower was wrapped in combustible cladding and could not understand why it was “sparking and spitting” as it burned.
Dowden was the incident commander until around 1.50am. Fire officers of his rank are normally only in charge of fires requiring four pumps, the inquiry heard. “I knew there was a BA team (firefighters in breathing apparatus) within [flat 16] and I couldn’t understand why that fire wasn’t being suppressed,” Dowden said. “They were tackling a compartment fire which they were making good progress on and from what I would see on the outside it was a different story.”
“I wouldn’t generally be in charge of a six-pump fire or an eight=pump fire if a more senior officer was in attendance … The way that fire developed meant I was in charge for longer than usual.” “I did feel uncomfortable, out of my comfort zone because I didn’t have any previous experience to fall back on in terms of ... the way it was behaving and reacting.”
Earlier Dowden described how firefighters were unable to get water to the top floors of the tower, where many of the victims died, because the building was designed with an firefighting infrastructure that would not support it. The inquiry heard that other firefighters repeatedly used their radios to urge Dowden to call for extra resources.
He said that above 50 metres the “water supply would be almost non-existent”. The inquiry was shown footage taken at around 1.12am on 14 June last year in which another firefighter could be heard shouting to Dowden: “Mike, Mike, make it six now, make it six now,” referring to the need for more fire engines.
He described how the system of pipes running up the building to fight fires – known as dry risers – were unable to cope with the multistorey fire he and his colleagues faced. By 1.28am fire fighters inside the building were also demanding reinforcements with breathing apparatus “because there were now numerous calls for rescues on many floors.”
Throughout the earlier hours of 14 June 2017 the firefighters tackled the blaze, which spread rapidly from the kitchen of flat 16 on the fourth floor up to the 24th floor, eventually claiming 72 lives. Dowden repeatedly said he did not recall these interventions, but said parts of his memory from the night were missingt.
Dowden and his team plugged their hoses into two dry risers – one on the fourth floor and another on the third. This allowed them to blast 230 litres of water a minute with each hose, well within the fire brigade’s capability of providing 1,500 litres a minute to the fire. He also described how firefighters were unable to get water to the top floors of the tower, because the building was designed with an firefighting infrastructure that
The blaze quickly spread up and around the facades. Millett asked Dowden if he could have plugged hoses into every outlet to battle fires as they spread to other flats. meant that above 50 metres the “water supply would be almost non-existent”.
“That’s an almost impossible task … the dry riser is not designed to do that,” he said, adding that they had expected the building to be designed to limit the fire to the compartment where it began. He described how the system of pipes running up the building to fight fires – known as dry risers – were unable to cope with the multi-storey fire.
“We’d only really be fighting one floor. It would be extremely difficult and the further you go up the building the water pressure would lessen the output.” Dowden and his team plugged their hoses into two dry risers – one on the fourth floor and another on the third floor. This allowed them to blast 230 litres of water a minute with each hose, well within the fire brigade’s capability of providing 1,500 litres a minute to the fire.
Earlier, Dowden said that when he arrived at the building he did not know it was covered in cladding, which experts to the inquiry have said spread the flames. But the fire quickly spread up and around the facades. Millett asked Dowden if he could have plugged hoses into every outlet to battle fires as they spread to other flats.
“I wasn’t aware it was cladding,” he said. “At that point I just thought it was the external part of Grenfell Tower.” “That’s an almost impossible task … the dry riser is not designed to do that,” he said.
At the opening of his second day of evidence, Millett thanked Dowden, saying: “I want you to know that you’re doing a public service and we are extremely thankful to you for it.”
The inquiry continues.The inquiry continues.
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