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Former CBA chair refused to return fee after damning Apra report – live Former CBA chair refused to return fee after damning Apra report – live
(35 minutes later)
So, we’re told that Hartzer, in his statement to the commission, said the primary cause of the failure to heed ASIC’s changes to unsolicited credit increase offers was “the way in which Westpac’s broader systems and culture addressed regulatory issues”.
He agrees with Hodge that “the culture” - particularly further down the chain - included a lack of appreciation for the significance of respecting the view of the regulator.
He says that’s changed since, but we’re also told that no one from the bank suffered any negative consequences as a result of the credit card increase issue because “there wasn’t a specific error by an individual”.
Hodge: And then when you’re explaining that this is why it wouldn’t be appropriate to take action against any managers or executives, that rather suggests that you’re saying it wouldn’t be fair to punish specific individuals involved in the decision-making and interaction with the regulator because they were acting within their authority in accordance with the culture of Westpac?
Hartzer: In effect, yes.
Hodge: And does that seem problematic to you, if you want to change the culture of the bank, don’t you need to apply remuneration consequences to employees who act in a way that you don’t want them to act?
Hartzer: Yes. Although I think we also have a - an obligation on ourselves as a company to make expectations very clear upfront, and I think that’s part of the issue here.
Hodge: Is your point, it wasn’t clear at the time to employees that there was an expectation that they would respect the view of the regulator and, therefore, it’s unfair to apply remuneration consequences to?
Hartzer: I wouldn’t say it in such a sweeping way.
One of the most striking things about the banking royal commission has been the timeframe we’re talking about.
Remember how commissioner Kenneth Hayne asked the banks to cough up to every act of misconduct and poor behaviour they’d engaged in over the past 10 years?
That took us back to 2010.
Remember the global financial crisis?
That broke out in 2007-2008. That was when the arteries of the global financial system seized up and very nearly collapsed. We were all extremely lucky to avoid another global depression.
Yet here we are this year, hearing evidence about how – a handful of years after the GFC – the banks were ripping off customers, prioritising profits over people, and dismissing regulators
If the GFC wasn’t enough to get them to behave properly, to appreciate how lucky we all are, what is?
Hartzer is telling the commission about improvements at Westpac in engaging with the regulator, including a new agenda item in risk meetings.
Hodge wants to know who at Westpac knew about the Asic letter to the ABA. Hartzer can’t say why senior executives within the business weren’t aware of the letter and admits he hasn’t looked into why nobody at a more senior level in the bank stepped in.
Hodge: And if you haven’t looked into that, does that suggest that you haven’t necessarily fully investigated and understood what the problem was within Westpac at the time?
Hartzer: I don’t think so. I think that the steps that we’ve taken to strengthen the attention and the resourcing and the focus on regulatory matters would address that issue in any event.
Hartzer is telling the commission that Westpac has improved the way it responds to regulators but Hodge challenges him on his view of the unsolicited credit card increase issue.
Hodge: I get the sense that the point that you’re trying to make is you don’t necessarily even now accept that Asic’s view was right?
Hartzer: Right in terms of what?
Hodge: In terms of the application of the responsible lending obligations to credit limit increase offers?
Hartzer: Well, it [is] kind of moot because credit limit increase offers have ceased altogether.
Hodge: Yes. So I think by saying that you’re saying you don’t need to accept it any more because whether it’s right or wrong any more because it just doesn’t matter?
Hartzer: I haven’t spent a lot of time thinking about it because we stopped doing it.
This is from Brian Hartzer, Westpac's CEO: "I think there was clearly a deficiency in understanding the seriousness with which regulatory disagreements needed to be dealt with"Translation: Westpac didn't take regulators seriouslyHow to hide behind jargon 101 #auspol
So, in September 2012, Asic wrote to the Australian Bankers Association setting out its views about responsible lending requirements for credit limit increases. Asic decided that a “base minimum level of inquiry” was asking individual customers whether they are employed and what their income is.But Westpac didn’t make any changes because of, Hartzer said, a difference of opinion about its obligations. Westpac didn’t tell Asic that it didn’t agree with it on its obligations, and continued its practice of offering unsolicited credit increases. While Westpac’s risk team thought the bank should fall into line with Asic’s requirements, in part because it would provide a better customer experience, that position changed after discussions with the bank’s product team.
Hodge:
Do you think it is a problem that risk had internally formed a view that it should change and alter its position to accord with what Asic wanted, but then after a discussion with product it changed that position?
Hartzer:
Strictly, to the answer to your question, no, because I don’t think that’s – so I do think there is absolutely an issue in the way we handled this with Asic and today we would handle it very differently. So I’m not meaning to argue that point. But I’m just struggling with the suggestion that there was an overruling in this ... you can have different points of view within risk ... It concerns me that we didn’t engage with the regulator when that point of view was pointed out, and that, to me, is where we clearly went wrong in this case.”
Hodge is going to start by looking at Westpac’s approach to credit card limit increases – the practice of sending unsolicited credit card limit increase offers to selected Westpac customers.Hodge is going to start by looking at Westpac’s approach to credit card limit increases – the practice of sending unsolicited credit card limit increase offers to selected Westpac customers.
The commission has previously heard the bank did not comply with the corporate regulator’s position that banks directly ask customers about their employment status and income when offering them credit card limit increases.The commission has previously heard the bank did not comply with the corporate regulator’s position that banks directly ask customers about their employment status and income when offering them credit card limit increases.
We’re back from lunch. Brian Hartzer, Westpac’s chief executive, is in the stand. Senior counsel assisting the commission, Michael Hodge QC will take the reigns in this round of questioning.We’re back from lunch. Brian Hartzer, Westpac’s chief executive, is in the stand. Senior counsel assisting the commission, Michael Hodge QC will take the reigns in this round of questioning.
Hartzer has been the managing director and CEO of Westpac since February 2015.Hartzer has been the managing director and CEO of Westpac since February 2015.
Let me tell you a quick story while we wait for the hearing to resume.Let me tell you a quick story while we wait for the hearing to resume.
In 2016, the Turnbull government was fighting very hard to reintroduce a bill to parliament to force all superannuation funds to appoint an independent chair and fill a third of their board seats with independent directors.In 2016, the Turnbull government was fighting very hard to reintroduce a bill to parliament to force all superannuation funds to appoint an independent chair and fill a third of their board seats with independent directors.
The policy was pushed by the Financial Services Sector, a body that intensely dislikes the idea that industry super funds have strong union representation on their boards. It argues the boards should be opened up.The policy was pushed by the Financial Services Sector, a body that intensely dislikes the idea that industry super funds have strong union representation on their boards. It argues the boards should be opened up.
In late November of 2016, a forum was held in a theatre in Parliament House, and it was attended by representatives from the super industry, particularly industry super funds. Many of them had travelled from overseas for the occasion. Serious people. The type of people that invest billions of dollars in major infrastructure projects globally. They know how to handle money.In late November of 2016, a forum was held in a theatre in Parliament House, and it was attended by representatives from the super industry, particularly industry super funds. Many of them had travelled from overseas for the occasion. Serious people. The type of people that invest billions of dollars in major infrastructure projects globally. They know how to handle money.
Anyway, Liberal MP Kelly O’Dwyer delivered a speech to the audience that had to seen to be believed.Anyway, Liberal MP Kelly O’Dwyer delivered a speech to the audience that had to seen to be believed.
I wish I’d kept a recording of it. It was a textbook example of misreading an audience.I wish I’d kept a recording of it. It was a textbook example of misreading an audience.
She told the audience that superannuation funds – and by that she meant industry funds – were not governed to the same standard as major banks and life insurance companies.She told the audience that superannuation funds – and by that she meant industry funds – were not governed to the same standard as major banks and life insurance companies.
It drew laughter from the audience.It drew laughter from the audience.
“Are you serious?” one audience member said. “She’s got to be joking,” said another.“Are you serious?” one audience member said. “She’s got to be joking,” said another.
Peter Collins, who was a former leader of the NSW Liberal party and who had subsequently worked in the industry fund sector, told Guardian Australia that her comments were laughable.Peter Collins, who was a former leader of the NSW Liberal party and who had subsequently worked in the industry fund sector, told Guardian Australia that her comments were laughable.
He then said this:He then said this:
If super funds had been responsible for systemic failures in financial advice, failure to pass on interest rate cuts, excessive executive remuneration and other forms of profit gouging by banks, there would have been a royal commission into super funds in a flash.If super funds had been responsible for systemic failures in financial advice, failure to pass on interest rate cuts, excessive executive remuneration and other forms of profit gouging by banks, there would have been a royal commission into super funds in a flash.
It is abhorrent and unacceptable in the minds of most Australians that the standards for super funds should be the same as those tolerated for the banks.It is abhorrent and unacceptable in the minds of most Australians that the standards for super funds should be the same as those tolerated for the banks.
That was in 2016.That was in 2016.
This really is extraordinary.This really is extraordinary.
So CBA’s board received a highly critical report from the prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Apra), which identified egregious shortcomings at the bank, and which pointed to serious problems with CBA’s board.So CBA’s board received a highly critical report from the prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Apra), which identified egregious shortcomings at the bank, and which pointed to serious problems with CBA’s board.
The board was overhauled, and the bank got a new CEO. The new board then asked the former chairman David Turner to return 40% of his fees and he ... refused. He didn’t feel like it.The board was overhauled, and the bank got a new CEO. The new board then asked the former chairman David Turner to return 40% of his fees and he ... refused. He didn’t feel like it.
And that’s that?And that’s that?
What’s more, CBA did not disclose any of this in their final-year report, so shareholders were left uninformed.What’s more, CBA did not disclose any of this in their final-year report, so shareholders were left uninformed.
Orr asked Livingstone: “Do you think it was important for you to publish that the board had made that request of the former former chair?”Orr asked Livingstone: “Do you think it was important for you to publish that the board had made that request of the former former chair?”
Livingstone replied: “Well, I suppose I didn’t consider at the time including it, and maybe I should have.”Livingstone replied: “Well, I suppose I didn’t consider at the time including it, and maybe I should have.”
Orr continued: “Well, could I ask you to consider now whether that’s a message that you think should be sent publicly, that you made a decision as a board to request the former chair to return 40% of his fees?”Orr continued: “Well, could I ask you to consider now whether that’s a message that you think should be sent publicly, that you made a decision as a board to request the former chair to return 40% of his fees?”
Livingstone replied: “In – in retrospect, yes, perhaps we should have made that public.”Livingstone replied: “In – in retrospect, yes, perhaps we should have made that public.”
This is from the chairwoman of the board of Australia’s biggest bank.This is from the chairwoman of the board of Australia’s biggest bank.
Let me editorialise for a moment.Let me editorialise for a moment.
Before the royal commission began, we had to endure a drawn-out public argument from the Financial Services Council – pushed inside parliament by Liberal MP Kelly O’Dwyer – about the desperate need to get more non-union representatives on the boards of Australia’s industry superannuation funds.Before the royal commission began, we had to endure a drawn-out public argument from the Financial Services Council – pushed inside parliament by Liberal MP Kelly O’Dwyer – about the desperate need to get more non-union representatives on the boards of Australia’s industry superannuation funds.
But then the royal commission discovered that the most egregious behaviour by super funds in Australia has been occurring inside “retail” super funds – the funds run by Australia’s major banks – not the industry funds who represent workers and who have a mixture of worker and union representatives and independent board members on their boards.But then the royal commission discovered that the most egregious behaviour by super funds in Australia has been occurring inside “retail” super funds – the funds run by Australia’s major banks – not the industry funds who represent workers and who have a mixture of worker and union representatives and independent board members on their boards.
Perhaps it’s time we consider changing the board formation of our major banks so they look more like the boards of industry super funds.Perhaps it’s time we consider changing the board formation of our major banks so they look more like the boards of industry super funds.
And with that CBA chair Catherine Livingstone is done with her evidence. We’ll break for lunch in a moment before the Westpac chief executive, Brian Hartzer, takes the stand at 2pm AEST.And with that CBA chair Catherine Livingstone is done with her evidence. We’ll break for lunch in a moment before the Westpac chief executive, Brian Hartzer, takes the stand at 2pm AEST.
First though, here’s a quick wrap-up of what we’ve learned this morning:First though, here’s a quick wrap-up of what we’ve learned this morning:
The former CBA chair David Turner was asked to give back 40% of his pay from the final year on the board after a string of scandals and a damning Apra report.The former CBA chair David Turner was asked to give back 40% of his pay from the final year on the board after a string of scandals and a damning Apra report.
He said no, because he didn’t recognise in the Apra report the CBA board that he knew.He said no, because he didn’t recognise in the Apra report the CBA board that he knew.
Since the 2011 financial year, the CBA has never reduced an executive’s short-term remuneration as a result of a risk-related issue that had not yet been made public.Since the 2011 financial year, the CBA has never reduced an executive’s short-term remuneration as a result of a risk-related issue that had not yet been made public.
The head of CBA’s wealth division had their executive bonus reduced by only 5% as a result of the Comminsure scandal.The head of CBA’s wealth division had their executive bonus reduced by only 5% as a result of the Comminsure scandal.
In the same year, the former CEO Ian Narev received 108% of his short-term target bonus, or $2.862m.In the same year, the former CEO Ian Narev received 108% of his short-term target bonus, or $2.862m.
At the beginning of the day, Livingstone told the commission she had put her “reputation on the line” by taking the CBA job.At the beginning of the day, Livingstone told the commission she had put her “reputation on the line” by taking the CBA job.
Catherine Livingstone is being asked why Matt Comyn – who was head of the bank’s retail banking service at the time of both the mis-selling of consumer credit insurance and its anti-money laundering failings – was appointed chief executive.Catherine Livingstone is being asked why Matt Comyn – who was head of the bank’s retail banking service at the time of both the mis-selling of consumer credit insurance and its anti-money laundering failings – was appointed chief executive.
What kind of message does that send, Rowena Orr asks.What kind of message does that send, Rowena Orr asks.
The biggest reason he was given the job, the chair says, “is the way he stepped up at the time the Austrac proceedings were lodged”.The biggest reason he was given the job, the chair says, “is the way he stepped up at the time the Austrac proceedings were lodged”.
In fact, for me, the most telling thing was after the proceedings had been lodged, and I met individually with each group executive, and variously they came in either not having informed themselves or blaming other people. Mr Comyn came in and the first thing he did was apologise. Apologised to me, apologised to the board for what had happened, and his failings in that.In fact, for me, the most telling thing was after the proceedings had been lodged, and I met individually with each group executive, and variously they came in either not having informed themselves or blaming other people. Mr Comyn came in and the first thing he did was apologise. Apologised to me, apologised to the board for what had happened, and his failings in that.
That sounds nice, but Orr reminds Livingstone that it isn’t an answer to her question.That sounds nice, but Orr reminds Livingstone that it isn’t an answer to her question.
She wants to know what kind of message it sent internally and to the community.She wants to know what kind of message it sent internally and to the community.
Livingstone says “the easy answer” would have been to appoint an external person.Livingstone says “the easy answer” would have been to appoint an external person.
But, perhaps distressingly, she tells the commission that “to find an external person globally at that level who has not been involved in some regulatory event is almost impossible”.But, perhaps distressingly, she tells the commission that “to find an external person globally at that level who has not been involved in some regulatory event is almost impossible”.
And I don’t mean that as a joke. So the message that it actually sent inside the organisation is one that these issues are unacceptable and we’re determined to fix them. That was the message it sent.And I don’t mean that as a joke. So the message that it actually sent inside the organisation is one that these issues are unacceptable and we’re determined to fix them. That was the message it sent.
And what about the external message?And what about the external message?
Well, the – the external message, in my view, was the same, in terms of what – the feedback I have had, that here is someone who is committed to dealing with the issues that have arisen. And I think, I would hope, that you’ve seen that in his evidence over the last two days.Well, the – the external message, in my view, was the same, in terms of what – the feedback I have had, that here is someone who is committed to dealing with the issues that have arisen. And I think, I would hope, that you’ve seen that in his evidence over the last two days.
Orr is hammering Livingstone over the CBA’s remuneration report, which she says does not make obvious how executive bonuses are adjusted for matters like poor risk management.Orr is hammering Livingstone over the CBA’s remuneration report, which she says does not make obvious how executive bonuses are adjusted for matters like poor risk management.
“I accept that that is not obvious and that is something that we should consider for next year’s report,” Livingstone says.“I accept that that is not obvious and that is something that we should consider for next year’s report,” Livingstone says.
Yikes. So, we’ve just been told that the former CBA chair, David Turner, was asked to give back 40% of his pay from the final year on the board.
He, uh, said no.
Here’s what happened: after Apra’s damning report, the board members all accepted a 20% reduction in their pay. They also requested that Turner give back 40% of his fees.
Rowena Orr asks why that wasn’t included in their public remuneration report, and the response elicits laughter from the galley.
“Because the – the chair – the former chair did not agree to return any of his fees,” Catherine Livingstone says.
Orr asks whether Livingstone has spoken to Turner since. She hasn’t but says another board colleague has.
“And what has he communicated through one of your colleagues?” Orr asks.
He communicated that – and I’m paraphrasing because I obviously didn’t have the direct conversation – that he didn’t recognise in the Apra report the CBA board that he knew.
Orr: “I’m sorry, could you say that again? I didn’t hear that.”
Livingstone: “That he didn’t recognise in the Apra report the CBA board that he knew.”
Now we’re on the remuneration report for the 2017 financial year.
It was delivered in July, only a few weeks before Austrac commenced civil penalties against the CBA.
Ian Narev, still the CEO, had recommended a 10% reduction for all group executives for long outstanding items and a further 10% reduction for certain group executives, including the now-CEO, Matt Comyn, in relation to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulation.
But then Austrac lodged its proceedings alleging 53,700 breaches of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws against the CBA.
So, when the board met in August, things had changed a little.
Rowena Orr asks Catherine Livingstone if she remembers the meeting. “Vividly,” she says.
“The discussion ... was to determine, in the light of what had happened, what the remuneration consequences should be, and how they should be delivered through the remuneration framework.”
The board decided that all the senior executives, including Narev, should have their short-term variable bonus reduced to zero.
The response from the executives varied:
Some were immediately accepting, some were angry, and others felt that because it had affected the whole group including people who hadn’t been there for very long that it wasn’t fair. But the point of the board taking this view was to emphasise the importance of collective accountability.
Narev, Livingstone says, “recognised that it was appropriate”.
But Narev’s long-term bonus wasn’t affected, and Orr wants to know why.
Given that at that time we were not fully aware of all the matters that were covered in the proceedings. So the view was that we should leave the long-term variable rem on foot in terms of the deferred rem, so that if there was a need for consequences further down the line, we would still have that option to exercise discretion then.
Rowena Orr has been asking Catherine Livingstone about the way the CBA calculates executive bonuses and what goes into that. After the 2016 strike against the remuneration report, the board made a number of changes, including an increased weighting on financial measures.
Orr asks whether the board considered whether that “provided an incentive for misconduct”.
“We didn’t. We didn’t explicitly,” Livingstone says.
We’re then told that since the 2011 financial year the CBA has never reduced an executive’s short-term remuneration as a result of a risk-related issue that had not yet been made public.
Orr asks: “Do you think that sends the right message to CBAs employees?”
“If you draw that conclusion, no, it doesn’t,” Livingstone says.
Orr: “What message do you think it sends?
Livingstone: “Well, clearly, that there will only be consequence if there is a public event, a media event.
Orr: “If it’s found out. If the public learns of the problem?”
Livingstone: “That would be the inference, yes.”
While Catherine Livingstone is being grilled by the commission, the Australian share market has taken a big dive amid a global stock sell-off.
Our man Martin Farrer has this report, which shows that a sell-off in tech, energy and banking stocks has sent the ASX200 plunging to its lowest point for nearly two years.
Just back on CommInsure.
We’re still wrapping our heads around the fact that the head of CBA’s wealth management division had their short-term bonus reduced by 5% – an offensively small 5% – after the CommInsure scandal.
The royal commission touched on this scandal two months ago, when it heard that CommInsure had rejected a woman’s insurance claim for breast cancer treatment by relying on an 18-year old medical definition of what constituted “radical breast surgery”, against the advice of specialists.
The woman had made her claim in August 2016 and her policy’s medical definitions had not been updated since 1998.
[As an aside, the CBA chief executive, Matt Comyn, finally admitted yesterday that CommInsure had deliberately not updated its medical definitions because it was prioritising “financial objectives” – could that be profits? – over its customers].
Anyway, the woman had been paying premiums for more than 20 years, and her policy included cover for malignant tumours with an exclusion for “carcinoma in situ unless leading to radical breast surgery.”
CommInsure tried to argue that the woman didn’t meet the policy definition of cancer because her carcinoma in situ and her treatment didn’t include radical breast surgery, insisting radical surgery only referred to re removal of an entire breast.
It ignored that fact that specialists advised that medical practice had moved on since the 1990s and radical treatment now involved radiotherapy and breast-conserving therapy and didn’t mean entire breast removal.
To make matters worse, CommInsure updated its cancer treatment definition in May 2017 but didn’t backdate the definition, meaning the woman was still ineligible.
To cut a long story short, CBA eventually had to pay the woman $170,000 after the financial ombudsman service got involved.
That was just one example of the types of thing that was going on in CommInsure. It led to a blistering Four Corners investigation.
Fast forward to today, and we heard that a CBA executive say their short-term bonus reduced by 5% as a consequence.
“A 5% reduction?” Orr asked.
“As I’ve indicated, that is patently inadequate and my board colleagues would recognise that today,” Livingstone replied.
Today. Two years later.
Bevan Shields from Fairfax has done the math on Ian Narev’s total pay packet in 2016. Nice work, if you can get it.
$236,000 a week.... https://t.co/jcIPj42Up4
The CBA’s shareholders ended up rejecting the 2016 remuneration report for 2016. 50.1% of them voted against it. But they were also rejecting an attempt to restructure remuneration to focus on non-financial or shareholder issues.
Orr wants to know if the “two strikes rule” – where shareholders vote against a rem report twice, triggering a spill of the board – prevents the board from focusing on those issues.
Orr asks:
Do you think that the operation of the two strikes rule should be restricted or qualified in any way to better enable financial services entities to adjust their remuneration policies to benefit stakeholders other than shareholders?
Livingstone:
Well, I think, Ms Orr, what we’re observing, in fact, is the two strikes rule and the vote against the remuneration report is actually being used for purposes beyond remuneration. So institutional shareholders may use that vote to register dissatisfaction with other elements, not related to remuneration. And I think this is – this is causing a distortion and compromising, I think, the ability of the two strikes rule to work effectively.
Now to Narev’s pay that year. The former chief executive recommended to the board that he receive 108% of his short-term target bonus, or $2.862m.
Orr appears fairly incredulous at this point:
“For this year, in which there were ongoing investigations into CBA’s life insurance business, known problems with anti-money laundering compliance, it was known that customers had been charged fees for no service, and it was known that consumer credit insurance had been mis-sold?”
“That’s correct,” Livingstone says.
Orr: “Do you agree that they were all things – that was the context for this recommendation by the chair of the board for Mr Narev to receive a short-term variable award of $2.862m?
Livingstone: “I do.”
Orr: “Do you have any reflections on that recommendation, Ms Livingstone?”
Livingstone: “As I’ve indicated, we have all reflected on these outcomes, and would regard them as inappropriate.”
Well. We’re told that in 2016 one executive had a short-term bonus reduced. By 5%. Why, Orr wants to know, did that executive – the head of their wealth management division – receive a reduction?
“My understanding is to reflect the CommInsure issue,” Livingstone says.
“A 5% reduction?” Orr asks.
“As I’ve indicated, that is patently inadequate and my board colleagues would recognise that today.”
The CommInsure problem came to light in March 2016. The former chief medical officer of CBA’s insurance arm made claims about a culture of dishonest and unethical practices to avoid payouts to sick and dying people, revealing that doctors were pressured to change their opinions, outdated medical definitions were used to deny payouts, and medical files disappeared from the internal filing system.
People in the gallery scoff.
We’re seeing a report from Ian Narev, the CBA’s former chief executive, about the 2016 senior-executive remuneration.
“I am not aware of any reasons why deferred [bonus pay] should not be paid in full to all relevant executives,” Narev wrote.
Narev recommended that all of the group executives receive a rating of “fully met” for dealing with risk. He recommended that none of them have their short-term incentive reduced for risk matters, and that each of them – aside from one executive on a different pay scheme – receive more than 100% of their target short-term incentive.
Orr wants to know what Livingstone thinks of that recommendation.
“Well, I think, as I’ve indicated, that there are individuals here for whom the level of award was not appropriate, in light of the risk matters which, as you’ve pointed out, were on foot in the group at the time,” she replies.
“Subsequently, one executive’s [bonus] award was reduced downwards, but even that reduction was patently inadequate for what was going on at the time.
Orr asks what a more appropriate “risk adjustment” would have been.
“Well, in some instances, I – probably 100% reduction, which is the approach that, as you know, we’ve taken subsequently,” she says.