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Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told
(about 5 hours later)
Emails reveal architect and builders discussed how cladding was not fire-resistant Emails reveal architect and builders discussed how cladding was not fire resistant
The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the disastrous Grenfell Tower refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in the event of a fire more than two years before 72 people were killed, according to emails revealed at the public inquiry on Tuesday. The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the disastrous Grenfell Tower refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in a fire more than two years before 72 people were killed, emails disclosed to the public inquiry have revealed.
Staff at architects Studio E, the fire engineer Exova, the facade installer Harley, and Rydon, the main contractor, discussed how the cladding system they were planning to wrap around the 120-home apartment block was likely to fail in the event of a fire. Staff at the architecture firm Studio E, the fire engineer Exova, the facade installer Harley, the main contractor, Rydon, discussed how the cladding system they were planning to wrap around the 120-home council block was likely to fail in the event of a fire.
“Metal cladding always burns and falls off,” an architect emailed a fire engineer in spring 2015. An employee of the facade installer told a colleague: “As we all know, the ACM [the combustible cladding panels] will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” “Metal cladding always burns and falls off,” one architect emailed a fire engineer in spring 2015, while the project was under way. An employee of the facade installer told a colleague: “As we all know, the ACM [combustible cladding panels] will be gone rather quickly in a fire!”
The shocking correspondence during the refurbishment works was disclosed to the inquiry by Craig Orr QC, counsel for Celotex, the manufacturer of the combustible insulation used on the building. It came during the second day of phase two of the Grenfell Tower public inquiry, which is examining events leading up to the disaster. The correspondence was disclosed by Craig Orr QC, counsel for Celotex, the manufacturer of Grenfell’s combustible cladding. It came during the second day of the second phase of the Grenfell Tower public inquiry examining events leading up to the disaster.
In front of bereaved and survivors, including Nicholas Burton, who lost his wife, Pily, and Antonio Roncalato, who was not rescued until 6am, the inquiry also heard how, in 2014, the combustible cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained a flammable polyethylene core, were chosen as part of an attempt to cut £454,000 from the budget by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants’ Management organisation. In front of bereaved family members and survivors – including Nicholas Burton, who lost his wife, Pily, and Antonio Roncalato, who was not rescued until 6am – the inquiry also heard how the cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained a flammable polyethylene core, were chosen in 2014 to help cut £454,000 from the budget by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants’ Management organisation, which ran the block for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
During the opening of the inquiry, the companies involved in the refurbishment have repeatedly sought to point blame at each other and at the system of testing the fire safety of materials. That pattern, described by the counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett, as a “merry-go-round of buck-passing” continued on Tuesday. The companies involved in the refurbishment have repeatedly sought to point blame at each other and at the system for testing the fire safety of materials. That pattern, described as a “merry-go-round of buck-passing” by Richard Millett, the counsel to the inquiry, continued on Tuesday.
Arconic said it was not its responsibility “to decide if the product was appropriate to use on a particular project or in a particular configuration”, but rather the designers, contractors and fire engineers working on the project. Arconic said it was not its responsibility “to decide if the product was appropriate to use on a particular project or in a particular configuration”. That was down to designers, contractors and fire engineers. Celotex said its insulation was sold as combustible and its use was down to “a myriad of failings on behalf of the designers, contractors, consultants and building control inspectors”. Both firms insisted they were not shifting blame but rather describing the reality of the balance of responsibility in the construction process.
Celotex said its insulation was sold as combustible and its use was down to “a myriad of failings on behalf of the designers, contractors, consultants and building control inspectors”. Both firms insisted they were not shifting blame but rather describing the reality of the balance of responsibility in the construction process. On behalf of Celotex, Orr introduced email evidence that began with Daniel Anketell-Jones, a facade engineer at Harley, writing to his managing director, Ray Bailey, about the building of fire-stopping into the facade to prevent fire spread.
On behalf of Celotex, Orr told the inquiry the risk of the cladding system failing in a fire was “expressly foreseen by the designers, contractors and fire safety consultants responsible for the Grenfell Tower refurbishment”. “There is no point,” Anketell-Jones told Bailey on 27 March 2015. “As we all know, the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!”
He introduced email evidence that began with Daniel Anketell-Jones, a facade engineer at Harley Facades, writing to company director Ray Bailey about the need to introduce fire stopping within the facade to prevent flames spreading across the building in the event of a fire breaking out of a flat. Four days later, Terry Ashton, of Exova, emailed Neil Crawford, at Studio E: “It is difficult to see how a fire-stop would stay in place in the event of a fire where external flaming occurred as this would cause the zinc cladding to fail.”
“There is no point in fire stopping,” Anketell-Jones told Bailey on 27 March 2015. “As we all know, the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire! The whole point is to stop ‘unseen’ fire spreading in the cavity.” Crawford replied: “Metal cladding always burns and falls off.”
Four days later, Terry Ashton, at the fire engineer Exova, emailed Neil Crawford, at the architects Studio E, to warn: “It is difficult to see how a fire-stop would stay in place in the event of a fire where external flaming occurred as this would cause the zinc cladding to fail.” Tony Pearson, also of Exova, told Ashton on the same day: “However, if significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.”
Crawford replied to Ashton: “Hi Terry, this was my point as well. Metal cladding always burns and falls off hence fire stopping is usually just to the back of the cladding line”. In a fourth email, Crawford looped in Simon Lawrence, at Rydon.
The inquiry then heard that Tony Pearson, also at Exova, told his colleague Ashton on 31 March 2015: “We would not rule out that the fire could enter the cavity if there is flaming through the windows. However, if significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.” “Each of Harley, Studio E, Exova and Rydon was openly acknowledging in these emails that the cladding would fail in the event of a fire with external flaming,” said Orr. “That, tragically, is what happened.”
In a fourth email, Crawford looped in Simon Lawrence, at Rydon, the main contractor. In its opening submission, Arconic did not comment on a key conclusion of the inquiry’s first phase that its panels were the main cause of fire spread at Grenfell. Stephen Hockman QC, counsel for the firm, said he would also “resist the temptation” to comment on emails disclosed on Monday showing how, before the fire, staff feared its ACM panels were “unsuitable for use on building facades” when folded into cassettes, as they were on Grenfell.
“Each of Harley, Studio E, Exova and Rydon was openly acknowledging in these emails that the cladding would fail in the event of a fire with external flaming,” said Orr. “That tragically is what happened.” The panels had a fire rating of E when B was the minimum required for a facade in Europe. In 2015, staff again warned they were “dangerous on facades” and said safety certifications were often “obtained largely for marketing purposes”.
Hockman said the panels were capable of achieving class B performance, but there was no guarantee that would always be achievable. Harley had told the inquiry it placed its confidence in the performance certificates.
The inquiry continues.The inquiry continues.