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You can find the current article at its original source at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/28/grenfell-tower-refurbishers-knew-cladding-would-fail-inquiry-told
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Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told | Grenfell refurbishers knew cladding would fail, inquiry told |
(about 4 hours later) | |
Emails reveal architect and builders discussed how cladding was not fire resistant | Emails reveal architect and builders discussed how cladding was not fire resistant |
The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the disastrous Grenfell Tower refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in a fire more than two years before 72 people were killed, emails disclosed to the public inquiry have revealed. | The architect, builders and fire engineer who worked on the disastrous Grenfell Tower refurbishment knew the cladding system would fail in a fire more than two years before 72 people were killed, emails disclosed to the public inquiry have revealed. |
Staff at the architecture firm Studio E, the fire engineer Exova, the facade installer Harley, the main contractor, Rydon, discussed how the cladding system they were planning to wrap around the 120-home council block was likely to fail in the event of a fire. | Staff at the architecture firm Studio E, the fire engineer Exova, the facade installer Harley, the main contractor, Rydon, discussed how the cladding system they were planning to wrap around the 120-home council block was likely to fail in the event of a fire. |
“Metal cladding always burns and falls off,” one architect emailed a fire engineer in spring 2015, while the project was under way. An employee of the facade installer told a colleague: “As we all know, the ACM [combustible cladding panels] will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” | “Metal cladding always burns and falls off,” one architect emailed a fire engineer in spring 2015, while the project was under way. An employee of the facade installer told a colleague: “As we all know, the ACM [combustible cladding panels] will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” |
The correspondence was disclosed by Craig Orr QC, counsel for Celotex, the manufacturer of Grenfell’s combustible cladding. It came during the second day of the second phase of the Grenfell Tower public inquiry examining events leading up to the disaster. | The correspondence was disclosed by Craig Orr QC, counsel for Celotex, the manufacturer of Grenfell’s combustible cladding. It came during the second day of the second phase of the Grenfell Tower public inquiry examining events leading up to the disaster. |
In front of bereaved family members and survivors – including Nicholas Burton, who lost his wife, Pily, and Antonio Roncalato, who was not rescued until 6am – the inquiry also heard how the cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained a flammable polyethylene core, were chosen in 2014 to help cut £454,000 from the budget by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants’ Management organisation, which ran the block for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. | In front of bereaved family members and survivors – including Nicholas Burton, who lost his wife, Pily, and Antonio Roncalato, who was not rescued until 6am – the inquiry also heard how the cladding panels made by Arconic, which contained a flammable polyethylene core, were chosen in 2014 to help cut £454,000 from the budget by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenants’ Management organisation, which ran the block for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. |
The companies involved in the refurbishment have repeatedly sought to point blame at each other and at the system for testing the fire safety of materials. That pattern, described as a “merry-go-round of buck-passing” by Richard Millett, the counsel to the inquiry, continued on Tuesday. | The companies involved in the refurbishment have repeatedly sought to point blame at each other and at the system for testing the fire safety of materials. That pattern, described as a “merry-go-round of buck-passing” by Richard Millett, the counsel to the inquiry, continued on Tuesday. |
Arconic said it was not its responsibility “to decide if the product was appropriate to use on a particular project or in a particular configuration”. That was down to designers, contractors and fire engineers. Celotex said its insulation was sold as combustible and its use was down to “a myriad of failings on behalf of the designers, contractors, consultants and building control inspectors”. Both firms insisted they were not shifting blame but rather describing the reality of the balance of responsibility in the construction process. | Arconic said it was not its responsibility “to decide if the product was appropriate to use on a particular project or in a particular configuration”. That was down to designers, contractors and fire engineers. Celotex said its insulation was sold as combustible and its use was down to “a myriad of failings on behalf of the designers, contractors, consultants and building control inspectors”. Both firms insisted they were not shifting blame but rather describing the reality of the balance of responsibility in the construction process. |
On behalf of Celotex, Orr introduced email evidence that began with Daniel Anketell-Jones, a facade engineer at Harley, writing to his managing director, Ray Bailey, about the building of fire-stopping into the facade to prevent fire spread. | On behalf of Celotex, Orr introduced email evidence that began with Daniel Anketell-Jones, a facade engineer at Harley, writing to his managing director, Ray Bailey, about the building of fire-stopping into the facade to prevent fire spread. |
“There is no point,” Anketell-Jones told Bailey on 27 March 2015. “As we all know, the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” | “There is no point,” Anketell-Jones told Bailey on 27 March 2015. “As we all know, the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!” |
Four days later, Terry Ashton, of Exova, emailed Neil Crawford, at Studio E: “It is difficult to see how a firestop would stay in place in the event of a fire where external flaming occurred as this would cause the zinc cladding to fail.” | |
Crawford replied: “Metal cladding always burns and falls off.” | Crawford replied: “Metal cladding always burns and falls off.” |
Tony Pearson, also of Exova, told Ashton on the same day: “However, if significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.” | Tony Pearson, also of Exova, told Ashton on the same day: “However, if significant flames are ejected from the windows, this would lead to failure of the cladding system, with the external surface falling away and exposing the cavity.” |
In a fourth email, Crawford looped in Simon Lawrence, at Rydon. | In a fourth email, Crawford looped in Simon Lawrence, at Rydon. |
“Each of Harley, Studio E, Exova and Rydon was openly acknowledging in these emails that the cladding would fail in the event of a fire with external flaming,” said Orr. “That, tragically, is what happened.” | “Each of Harley, Studio E, Exova and Rydon was openly acknowledging in these emails that the cladding would fail in the event of a fire with external flaming,” said Orr. “That, tragically, is what happened.” |
In its opening submission, Arconic did not comment on a key conclusion of the inquiry’s first phase that its panels were the main cause of fire spread at Grenfell. Stephen Hockman QC, counsel for the firm, said he would also “resist the temptation” to comment on emails disclosed on Monday showing how, before the fire, staff feared its ACM panels were “unsuitable for use on building facades” when folded into cassettes, as they were on Grenfell. | In its opening submission, Arconic did not comment on a key conclusion of the inquiry’s first phase that its panels were the main cause of fire spread at Grenfell. Stephen Hockman QC, counsel for the firm, said he would also “resist the temptation” to comment on emails disclosed on Monday showing how, before the fire, staff feared its ACM panels were “unsuitable for use on building facades” when folded into cassettes, as they were on Grenfell. |
The panels had a fire rating of E when B was the minimum required for a facade in Europe. In 2015, staff again warned they were “dangerous on facades” and said safety certifications were often “obtained largely for marketing purposes”. | The panels had a fire rating of E when B was the minimum required for a facade in Europe. In 2015, staff again warned they were “dangerous on facades” and said safety certifications were often “obtained largely for marketing purposes”. |
Hockman said the panels were capable of achieving class B performance, but there was no guarantee that would always be achievable. Harley had told the inquiry it placed its confidence in the performance certificates. | Hockman said the panels were capable of achieving class B performance, but there was no guarantee that would always be achievable. Harley had told the inquiry it placed its confidence in the performance certificates. |
The inquiry continues. | The inquiry continues. |