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'Disagreement' over UN Iraq role 'Disagreement' over UN Iraq role
(about 1 hour later)
The UK wanted the United Nations to play a "leading political role" in post-war Iraq but was thwarted by US views, a top diplomat has said.The UK wanted the United Nations to play a "leading political role" in post-war Iraq but was thwarted by US views, a top diplomat has said.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Chilcot inquiry the UK wanted post-war Iraq to have a "clear UN label" to ensure it was not regarded as an occupying power.Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Chilcot inquiry the UK wanted post-war Iraq to have a "clear UN label" to ensure it was not regarded as an occupying power.
But he said it was clear from early on that the US wanted a "very definite limit" on the UN's responsibility. The ex-UN ambassador said the US wanted a "definite limit" on the UN's role.
The Chilcot inquiry is looking into UK policy on Iraq between 2001 and 2009. After he was posted to a senior role in Iraq in the summer of 2003, he said US officials did not listen to his advice.
The Chilcot inquiry is looking into UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009.
'Sole control''Sole control'
In an earlier appearance before the inquiry, Sir Jeremy said the March 2003 invasion was legal but of "questionable legitimacy" as most UN members did not support it. In an earlier appearance before the inquiry looking at the origins of the March 2003 invasion, Sir Jeremy said he believed it was legal but of "questionable legitimacy" as most UN members did not support it.
Sir Jeremy, UK ambassador to the UN in the run-up to the invasion, said on Tuesday that he was concerned in the weeks after the war that the US planned to be "in sole control" of Iraq after the invasion. On Tuesday Sir Jeremy said the UN's initial contingency planning for post-war Iraq began in October 2002, focused on dealing with an anticipated major refugee crisis.
He said the UN began initial contingency plans for post-war Iraq in October 2002, focused on dealing with an anticipated refugee crisis. We were conscious the US was going to place a very definite limit on the degree of responsibility that it would allow anyone other than the US in dealing with Iraq after the conflict Sir Jeremy Greenstock
It was our natural wish, as the UK, that the UN would be in the lead and we would have a defined smaller role somewhere Sir Jeremy Greenstock Although it did not have the resources to take on "full responsibility" for Iraq, he said the UN envisaged playing a "leading role" on political reconciliation and institution building, a view shared by UK ministers.
It did not see itself taking on "full responsibility" for the governance of Iraq as it did not have the resources to do that. However he said he was concerned early on that the US planned to be "in sole control" after the invasion.
However, he said UN officials and UK ministers envisaged it playing a "leading political role" in Iraq, helping to co-ordinate humanitarian and economic support. "We were conscious that the US was going to place a very definite limit on the degree of responsibility that it would allow anyone other than the US in dealing with Iraq after the conflict."
Quoting a report he sent to London in April 2003, he said he was already worried that US preparations for post-war Iraq were a "bit too top-down, with the US in sole control".
Describing the difference of opinion between the US and UK over the UN's role, he said: "It was our natural wish, as the UK, that the UN would be in the lead and we would have a defined smaller role somewhere.
"But we must have been conscious the US would have its own views on the degree it wanted the UN involved."
He added: "I think we would all have been quite realistic that this was going to have to be a mixed operation of US-UK with as much UN as we could get, particularly in terms of taking the political responsibility, so we weren't seen to take over a country as two western powers but there was a clear UN label on the administration."He added: "I think we would all have been quite realistic that this was going to have to be a mixed operation of US-UK with as much UN as we could get, particularly in terms of taking the political responsibility, so we weren't seen to take over a country as two western powers but there was a clear UN label on the administration."
Sir Jeremy said Tony Blair urged President George W. Bush to give the UN a "vital" role in Iraq and not be seen as subordinate to the US.
But he said Washington viewed the UN's remit as being restricted to practical matters, such as guaranteeing supplies of food and medicine, and not as an equal partner.
InsurgencyInsurgency
Sir Jeremy left the UN in the summer of 2003 to work for the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which ran Iraq until June 2004. Sir Jeremy left the UN to work for the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which ran Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004.
The CPA was supposed to stabilise Iraq, promote reconstruction and pave the way for democratic institutions but was heavily criticised for many of its decisions as violence escalated over the period.The CPA was supposed to stabilise Iraq, promote reconstruction and pave the way for democratic institutions but was heavily criticised for many of its decisions as violence escalated over the period.
INQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiryINQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry
Sir Jeremy also told the inquiry he was warned by his Egyptian counterpart at the UN before the war to "be careful about what you are taking on" due to the amount of violence an attack could unleash. Before arriving in Iraq, Sir Jeremy said he was told by Foreign Office officials that the new administration was "dysfunctional" and "not up to running Iraq" and this view was borne out when he took up the role.
He said he reported the message to officials in London. Sir Jeremy told the inquiry that Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, did not want him as his formal deputy, as opposed to the UK's chief representative on the body, so as to retain US control of the operation.
In its first month, the inquiry has heard from senior civil servants, diplomats and military commanders about the build-up to the March 2003 invasion, Iraq's military threat and post-war contingency planning. In his third day in the job, Sir Jeremy said it became clear that US officials were prepared to disregard his advice.
"He [Bremer] did not want to hear suggestions about how to complete a satisfactory political process that were different from that which the US President had taken," he said.
While maintaining "an independent voice" for British interests, he said he was not able to exert influence over key decisions as the UK did not have the resources in Iraq to be an equal partner.
On the much-criticised decision to disband the Iraqi army, he said the coalition authorities failed to "fill the gap" this created.
In its first month, the inquiry has heard from senior civil servants, diplomats and military commanders about the origins of the invasion, Iraq's military threat and post-war contingency planning.
Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011.Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011.