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'Disagreement' over UN Iraq role Iraq errors 'musn't be repeated'
(about 2 hours later)
The UK wanted the United Nations to play a "leading political role" in post-war Iraq but was thwarted by US views, a top diplomat has said. Mistakes made before and after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 must not happen again, a top diplomat has said.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Chilcot inquiry the UK wanted post-war Iraq to have a "clear UN label" to ensure it was not regarded as an occupying power. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the former UK ambassador to the UN, said the entire mission was "rushed" and did not have enough international input.
The ex-UN ambassador said the US wanted a "definite limit" on the UN's role. He told the Chilcot inquiry the UK was a "minor partner" and did not have enough clout to affect key decisions.
After he was posted to a senior role in Iraq in the summer of 2003, he said US officials did not listen to his advice. The broadcast of Tuesday's hearing was cut off for more than a minute by its chairman on national security grounds.
The Chilcot inquiry is looking into UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009.
'Sole control''Sole control'
In an earlier appearance before the inquiry looking at the origins of the March 2003 invasion, Sir Jeremy said he believed it was legal but of "questionable legitimacy" as most UN members did not support it. Sir John Chilcot said he had interrupted the TV coverage because "sensitive information" was being discussed.
On Tuesday Sir Jeremy said the UN's initial contingency planning for post-war Iraq began in October 2002, focused on dealing with an anticipated major refugee crisis. This was clearly too rushed an exercise for the size of the task we found on the ground Sir Jeremy Greenstock
We were conscious the US was going to place a very definite limit on the degree of responsibility that it would allow anyone other than the US in dealing with Iraq after the conflict Sir Jeremy Greenstock Asked about the lessons from the UK's involvement in the invasion and its aftermath, Sir Jeremy said post-war planning must be regarded as just as important as the military campaign while security had to be prioritised if anything else was to be achieved.
Although it did not have the resources to take on "full responsibility" for Iraq, he said the UN envisaged playing a "leading role" on political reconciliation and institution building, a view shared by UK ministers. "This was clearly too rushed an exercise for the size of the task we found on the ground, a task which some people had been predicting would be as difficult as it was," he said.
However he said he was concerned early on that the US planned to be "in sole control" after the invasion. "To have this degree of mismatch is something which has to be avoided in the future."
"We were conscious that the US was going to place a very definite limit on the degree of responsibility that it would allow anyone other than the US in dealing with Iraq after the conflict." There was not sufficient "international input" into the post-war administration of Iraq, he said, eroding support for the mission.
He added: "I think we would all have been quite realistic that this was going to have to be a mixed operation of US-UK with as much UN as we could get, particularly in terms of taking the political responsibility, so we weren't seen to take over a country as two western powers but there was a clear UN label on the administration." UN officials envisaged playing a "leading role" in political reconciliation and institution building in Iraq, a view shared by UK ministers.
Sir Jeremy said Tony Blair urged President George W. Bush to give the UN a "vital" role in Iraq and not be seen as subordinate to the US. But it became clear in the weeks after the invasion that the US planned to be "in sole control".
"We were conscious that the US was going to place a very definite limit on the degree of responsibility that it would allow anyone other than the US in dealing with Iraq after the conflict," he said.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair urged President George W. Bush to give the UN a "vital" role in Iraq and not be seen as subordinate to the US, Sir Jeremy added.
But he said Washington viewed the UN's remit as being restricted to practical matters, such as guaranteeing supplies of food and medicine, and not as an equal partner.But he said Washington viewed the UN's remit as being restricted to practical matters, such as guaranteeing supplies of food and medicine, and not as an equal partner.
Insurgency 'Limited influence'
Sir Jeremy left the UN to work for the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which ran Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004.Sir Jeremy left the UN to work for the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which ran Iraq from May 2003 until June 2004.
The CPA was supposed to stabilise Iraq, promote reconstruction and pave the way for democratic institutions but was heavily criticised for many of its decisions as violence escalated over the period.The CPA was supposed to stabilise Iraq, promote reconstruction and pave the way for democratic institutions but was heavily criticised for many of its decisions as violence escalated over the period.
INQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiryINQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline Q&A: Iraq war inquiry
Before arriving in Iraq, Sir Jeremy said he was told by Foreign Office officials that the new administration was "dysfunctional" and "not up to running Iraq" and this view was borne out when he took up the role. Sir Jeremy told the inquiry that Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, did not want him as his formal deputy, as opposed to the UK's chief representative on the body, in order to keep US control of the operation.
Sir Jeremy told the inquiry that Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, did not want him as his formal deputy, as opposed to the UK's chief representative on the body, so as to retain US control of the operation. While maintaining "an independent voice" for British interests, he said he was not able to exert influence over key decisions outside the UK's direct area of operation in the south of the country.
In his third day in the job, Sir Jeremy said it became clear that US officials were prepared to disregard his advice. "We were uncomfortable about the low-level of planning for post-conflict Iraq, had worries about under-resourcing, and were never able to persuade the Americans why we thought it should be done differently.
"He [Bremer] did not want to hear suggestions about how to complete a satisfactory political process that were different from that which the US President had taken," he said. "In that very major respect, our influence was too low."
While maintaining "an independent voice" for British interests, he said he was not able to exert influence over key decisions as the UK did not have the resources in Iraq to be an equal partner. He blamed this on a lack of UK troops and resources on the ground.
On the much-criticised decision to disband the Iraqi army, he said the coalition authorities failed to "fill the gap" this created. "Money means influence...with the Americans as much as argument or position of first ally." he said.
In its first month, the inquiry has heard from senior civil servants, diplomats and military commanders about the origins of the invasion, Iraq's military threat and post-war contingency planning.In its first month, the inquiry has heard from senior civil servants, diplomats and military commanders about the origins of the invasion, Iraq's military threat and post-war contingency planning.
In an earlier appearance, Sir Jeremy said he believed the invasion was of "questionable legitimacy" as most UN members did not support it.
Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011.Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011.