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Iraq violence 'was unprecedented' | Iraq violence 'was unprecedented' |
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Britain may have had "second thoughts" about the Iraq invasion had the scale of post-war violence been anticipated, the Iraq inquiry has heard. | Britain may have had "second thoughts" about the Iraq invasion had the scale of post-war violence been anticipated, the Iraq inquiry has heard. |
Sir John Sawers, now head of MI6, said "very few observers" foresaw that Iraq would attract al-Qaeda terrorists and Shia extremists backed by Iran. | Sir John Sawers, now head of MI6, said "very few observers" foresaw that Iraq would attract al-Qaeda terrorists and Shia extremists backed by Iran. |
Only Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak got it right when he warned it would unleash "100 Bin Ladens". | Only Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak got it right when he warned it would unleash "100 Bin Ladens". |
The inquiry is examining UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009. | The inquiry is examining UK policy towards Iraq between 2001 and 2009. |
Sir John, the UK's special envoy to Iraq from May to July 2003, told the Iraq inquiry: "It was unprecedented, the scale of violence that we faced in Iraq. The mindset of our American colleagues was Germany 1945. | Sir John, the UK's special envoy to Iraq from May to July 2003, told the Iraq inquiry: "It was unprecedented, the scale of violence that we faced in Iraq. The mindset of our American colleagues was Germany 1945. |
AT THE INQUIRY BBC World Affairs correspondent Peter Biles With the steady accumulation of evidence over the past few weeks, there has been a noticeable and welcome change of tone at the inquiry. | AT THE INQUIRY BBC World Affairs correspondent Peter Biles With the steady accumulation of evidence over the past few weeks, there has been a noticeable and welcome change of tone at the inquiry. |
Sir John Chilcot's five-member committee now has some important issues to raise with the key witnesses. A more robust line was taken today as top Whitehall civil servants were asked to assess the cost of the Iraq War. | Sir John Chilcot's five-member committee now has some important issues to raise with the key witnesses. A more robust line was taken today as top Whitehall civil servants were asked to assess the cost of the Iraq War. |
The recurring theme has been the extent to which everyone underestimated the scale of the violence in post-war Iraq. It was so bad that MI6 chief, Sir John Sawers, was forced to admit that Britain might have had "second thoughts" about getting involved, had it been possible to predict the violence. | The recurring theme has been the extent to which everyone underestimated the scale of the violence in post-war Iraq. It was so bad that MI6 chief, Sir John Sawers, was forced to admit that Britain might have had "second thoughts" about getting involved, had it been possible to predict the violence. |
Sir John argued that Iraq is "a better place" than it was before the 2003 invasion, and there has been "no sustained damage" to Britain's reputation in the Islamic world. | Sir John argued that Iraq is "a better place" than it was before the 2003 invasion, and there has been "no sustained damage" to Britain's reputation in the Islamic world. |
But six years on, it is clear there was a desperate need for better planning, improved understanding of Iraq and a more joined-up approach, both in Whitehall, and between London and Washington. | But six years on, it is clear there was a desperate need for better planning, improved understanding of Iraq and a more joined-up approach, both in Whitehall, and between London and Washington. |
"We all have an image of that, a sullen population defeated but no sustained violence against the victorious forces. | "We all have an image of that, a sullen population defeated but no sustained violence against the victorious forces. |
"Very few observers actually highlighted the scale of the violence that we could face. I think about the only person in my recollection who got it right was President Mubarak who warned of unleashing 100 Bin Ladens." | "Very few observers actually highlighted the scale of the violence that we could face. I think about the only person in my recollection who got it right was President Mubarak who warned of unleashing 100 Bin Ladens." |
He said a "gradually more potent insurgency" by undefeated elements of the Baathist regime combined with international terrorists using Iraq as a way of "having a go at the Americans" and Iran-backed "Shia extremists" had created an "onslaught of violence that was not thought through by any observer". | He said a "gradually more potent insurgency" by undefeated elements of the Baathist regime combined with international terrorists using Iraq as a way of "having a go at the Americans" and Iran-backed "Shia extremists" had created an "onslaught of violence that was not thought through by any observer". |
Sir John said: "I think frankly had we known the scale of violence, it might well have led to second thoughts about the entire project and we could certainly have mitigated some aspects of it had we had a clearer appreciation of it in advance." | Sir John said: "I think frankly had we known the scale of violence, it might well have led to second thoughts about the entire project and we could certainly have mitigated some aspects of it had we had a clearer appreciation of it in advance." |
But he said it was not "reasonable" to assume the violence should have been predicted as it was an "unprecedented scenario". | But he said it was not "reasonable" to assume the violence should have been predicted as it was an "unprecedented scenario". |
Earlier Lt Gen Sir Robert Fry, deputy chief of the defence staff in the run-up to the war, said the UK's role in the March 2003 invasion was crucial. | Earlier Lt Gen Sir Robert Fry, deputy chief of the defence staff in the run-up to the war, said the UK's role in the March 2003 invasion was crucial. |
Asked what the UK stood to lose if it did not contribute troops to the Iraq invasion once planning was advanced, Sir Robert said "maybe the war". | Asked what the UK stood to lose if it did not contribute troops to the Iraq invasion once planning was advanced, Sir Robert said "maybe the war". |
'Potential of failure' | |
Sir Roderic Lyne, one of the five members of the inquiry panel, remarked that the commander was the first witness to suggest that the UK's contribution was "critical" to winning the war. | Sir Roderic Lyne, one of the five members of the inquiry panel, remarked that the commander was the first witness to suggest that the UK's contribution was "critical" to winning the war. |
Gen Fry replied: "Let me put it a different way. The US scheme of manoeuvre had the potential of failure within it." | Gen Fry replied: "Let me put it a different way. The US scheme of manoeuvre had the potential of failure within it." |
Other witnesses have suggested that the UK could have sent fewer troops to Iraq and only chose to send the maximum number to bolster its relationship with Washington. | Other witnesses have suggested that the UK could have sent fewer troops to Iraq and only chose to send the maximum number to bolster its relationship with Washington. |
INQUIRY TIMELINE November-December: Former top civil servants, spy chiefs, diplomats and military commanders to give evidenceJanuary-February 2010: Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and other politicians expected to appear before the panel March 2010: Inquiry expected to adjourn ahead of the general election campaignJuly-August 2010: Inquiry expected to resumeReport set to be published in late 2010 or early 2011 class="" href="/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8378559.stm">Iraq inquiry: Day-by-day timeline class="" href="/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7312757.stm">Q&A: Iraq war inquiry | |
Sir Robert, who became the UK's chief military representative in Iraq in 2006, also criticised UK preparations for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. | Sir Robert, who became the UK's chief military representative in Iraq in 2006, also criticised UK preparations for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. |
He said divisions in government, Cabinet and public opinion over the legitimacy of the war inhibited planning efforts, saying there had been a "breakdown of the consensus over the use of force". | He said divisions in government, Cabinet and public opinion over the legitimacy of the war inhibited planning efforts, saying there had been a "breakdown of the consensus over the use of force". |
Sir Robert criticised the role of the Department for International Development (DFiD), saying some of its officials "could barely conceal their moral disdain" for the military action. | Sir Robert criticised the role of the Department for International Development (DFiD), saying some of its officials "could barely conceal their moral disdain" for the military action. |
Admiral Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff at the time, has already criticised DFiD's involvement - claiming some of its officials were told to "stay in their tents" in Iraq and not help reconstruction efforts. | Admiral Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff at the time, has already criticised DFiD's involvement - claiming some of its officials were told to "stay in their tents" in Iraq and not help reconstruction efforts. |
Clare Short resigned as Secretary of State for International Development in May 2003, saying the US and UK had failed to fulfil commitments to get a UN mandate for post-war administration. | Clare Short resigned as Secretary of State for International Development in May 2003, saying the US and UK had failed to fulfil commitments to get a UN mandate for post-war administration. |
Gen Fry also said finding weapons of mass destruction would have provided "an immediate sense of vindication" for the invasion. | Gen Fry also said finding weapons of mass destruction would have provided "an immediate sense of vindication" for the invasion. |
"I felt that I had embarked upon a war for one imperative and all of a sudden I had an entirely different imperative - to stick Iraq back together again," he said. | "I felt that I had embarked upon a war for one imperative and all of a sudden I had an entirely different imperative - to stick Iraq back together again," he said. |
Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011. | Senior politicians, including Tony Blair, are to appear before the inquiry next year, with its report due to be published in late 2010 or early 2011. |