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Top Nuclear Officials From U.S. and Iran Seek to Outline Accord Top Nuclear Officials From U.S. and Iran Seek to Outline Accord
(about 2 hours later)
GENEVA — The top nuclear officials from Iran and the United States took part in high-level talks on Monday as the two sides sought to meet a March deadline for finalizing the outline of an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear program. GENEVA — The top nuclear officials from Iran and the United States met Monday as the two sides sought to finalize the outline of an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear program.
Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, joined Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, in the negotiations, which began Sunday night in a luxury hotel near Lake Geneva. Iran’s decision to include Mr. Salehi in its delegation prompted Washington to arrange for Ernest J. Moniz, the American energy secretary, to join Secretary of State John Kerry on the American side. Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, joined Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, in the negotiations, which began Sunday night in a luxury hotel near Lake Geneva. Iran’s decision to include Mr. Salehi prompted Washington to arrange for Ernest J. Moniz, the American energy secretary, to join Secretary of State John Kerry.
The current round of negotiations signals the first time the talks have been broadened to include the top nuclear officials. Their participation is a reflection of the complexity of the potential agreement, which seeks to place constraints on Iran’s nuclear program in return for suspending and eventually removing economic sanctions. Their participation in the current round of negotiations, the first time the talks have included the countries’ top nuclear officials, is a reflection of the complexity of the potential agreement, which seeks to constrain Iran’s nuclear program in return for suspending and eventually removing economic sanctions.
The presence of Mr. Salehi and Mr. Moniz could ease progress, though there were no indications that an agreement was imminent. The presence of Mr. Salehi and Mr. Moniz could ease progress toward a March deadline, though there were no indications that an agreement was imminent.
“There is a full schedule of meetings planned at the principals and experts levels today for discussions on virtually every topic,” the State Department said in a statement. “These meetings are steps in a long and tough process.” The State Department said in a statement that a full schedule of high-level meetings on almost every topic was planned and that “these meetings are steps in a long and tough process.”
Asked at the start of Monday’s meeting how the negotiations were proceeding, Mr. Zarif said simply, “It is going.”Asked at the start of Monday’s meeting how the negotiations were proceeding, Mr. Zarif said simply, “It is going.”
“Time is passing,” Mr. Kerry chimed in. “We are working.”“Time is passing,” Mr. Kerry chimed in. “We are working.”
But some Western observers have raised concerns that Mr. Salehi, who also served as foreign minister in Iran’s previous hard-line government, might seek to protect the country’s nuclear activities from being subjected to stringent limits and might restrict Mr. Zarif’s room to maneuver.But some Western observers have raised concerns that Mr. Salehi, who also served as foreign minister in Iran’s previous hard-line government, might seek to protect the country’s nuclear activities from being subjected to stringent limits and might restrict Mr. Zarif’s room to maneuver.
In July, for example, Mr. Salehi argued that Iran needed to have industrial-scale ability to enrich uranium by 2021, when a contract under which Russia supplies fuel for Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr is to expire.In July, for example, Mr. Salehi argued that Iran needed to have industrial-scale ability to enrich uranium by 2021, when a contract under which Russia supplies fuel for Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr is to expire.
That stance has been a nonstarter for the United States, which has insisted that any accord should last much longer, to ensure that Iran does not use what it insists is a peaceful nuclear energy program to maintain the infrastructure that could be used to produce nuclear weapons. That point has been a nonstarter for the United States, which has insisted that any accord should last much longer, to ensure that Iran does not use what it insists is a peaceful nuclear energy program to maintain the infrastructure that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.
When the negotiations were extended for a second time in November, American officials outlined a two-step process for making progress. The first step, they said, would be to work out an agreement outlining the main provisions of an accord by the end of March. The final step would be to complete the entire accord, including its technical annexes, by the end of June. When the negotiations were extended for a second time in November, American officials outlined a two-step process for making progress. The first step, they said, would be to work out an agreement outlining the main provisions of an accord by the end of March. The final step would be to complete the accord, including technical requirements, by the end of June.
The two sides have said they are not interested in extending the negotiating deadlines further.The two sides have said they are not interested in extending the negotiating deadlines further.
The March deadline has become an important milestone as the White House is eager to show that progress is being made in order to dissuade Congress from imposing new sanctions on Iran.The March deadline has become an important milestone as the White House is eager to show that progress is being made in order to dissuade Congress from imposing new sanctions on Iran.
It is still unclear, however, what form a March agreement might take, if it is reached. Would it be a signed document that the United States, its allies and Iran would make public? Or would it be a confidential record of the status of the talks on which the Congress might be briefed in closed-door meetings but which would not be published? It is still unclear, however, what form a March agreement might take, if it is reached. Would it be a signed document that the United States, its allies and Iran would make public? Or would it be a confidential record of the status of the talks on which the Congress might be briefed but which would not be published?
Adding to the pressure to show progress, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, is scheduled to address Congress in early March to present his criticism of the potential accord. On Sunday, Mr. Netanyahu said the emerging deal would be “dangerous for Israel.” He added that it was “astonishing” that the talks were continuing since Iran had yet to answer longstanding questions that the International Atomic Energy Agency had posed about Tehran’s suspected work on nuclear designs. Adding to the pressure to show progress, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, is scheduled to address Congress in early March to present his criticism of the potential accord. On Sunday, Mr. Netanyahu said the emerging deal would be “dangerous for Israel.” He added that it was “astonishing” that the talks were continuing since Iran had yet to answer longstanding questions that the International Atomic Energy Agency had posed about Tehran’s suspected work on nuclear designs.
The United States has outlined a clear goal for what a comprehensive agreement should accomplish: It should slow the Iranian nuclear program enough that it would take the country at least a year to make enough material for a nuclear bomb if it decided to “break out” of the accord.The United States has outlined a clear goal for what a comprehensive agreement should accomplish: It should slow the Iranian nuclear program enough that it would take the country at least a year to make enough material for a nuclear bomb if it decided to “break out” of the accord.
Iran has nearly 10,000 operational centrifuges. To achieve what they consider a safe breakout interval, American negotiators initially proposed establishing a limit of 1,500 basic centrifuges that Iran would be allowed to operate while banning the use of more advanced centrifuges. Iran has nearly 10,000 operational centrifuges. To achieve what they consider a safe breakout interval, American negotiators initially proposed a limit of 1,500 basic centrifuges that Iran would be allowed to operate while banning the use of more advanced centrifuges.
Last year, negotiators began exploring a formula under which Iran could have as many as 4,500 first-generation centrifuges if it also agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia or take other steps.Last year, negotiators began exploring a formula under which Iran could have as many as 4,500 first-generation centrifuges if it also agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia or take other steps.
Now, there are reports that the United States might allow Iran to operate 6,500 centrifuges, or perhaps even more, if Iran reconfigured its array of centrifuges or took other steps to reduce their efficiency. Now, there are reports that the United States might allow Iran to operate 6,500 centrifuges, or perhaps more, if Iran reconfigured its array of centrifuges or took other steps to reduce their efficiency.
Other issues in the talks include limits on the research and development of new types of centrifuges, which could be installed in clandestine plants, and constraints on Iran’s ability to produce plutonium, which can be used to make a nuclear bomb. The negotiators also need to agree on monitoring provisions to guard against cheating and on the duration of any agreement.Other issues in the talks include limits on the research and development of new types of centrifuges, which could be installed in clandestine plants, and constraints on Iran’s ability to produce plutonium, which can be used to make a nuclear bomb. The negotiators also need to agree on monitoring provisions to guard against cheating and on the duration of any agreement.