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Talks End With Proposal to Limit Iran’s Nuclear Production for at Least 10 Years Negotiators Weigh Plan to Phase Out Nuclear Limits on Iran
(about 7 hours later)
GENEVA — Iranian and American officials ended a round of high-level nuclear talks here on Monday considering a proposal that would strictly limit for at least 10 years Iran’s ability to produce nuclear material, but gradually ease restrictions on Tehran in the final years of a deal. GENEVA — Iranian and American officials ended a round of high-level nuclear talks here on Monday considering a proposal that would strictly limit for at least 10 years Iran’s ability to produce nuclear material, but gradually ease restrictions on Tehran in the final years of a deal.
A senior American official traveling with Secretary of State John Kerry and Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz said the United States would insist that Iran’s nuclear program be constrained for “at least a double-digit number of years” from being able to produce enough material for a bomb should it decide to “break out” of the accord. The proposed phasing out of restrictions is part of a broader effort to mollify critics in Tehran, where some hard-liners in the government and military oppose any deal that would force Iran to forsake nuclear production for a generation, and Washington, where some members of Congress have objected to an agreement that would expire in less than 10 years.
The United States has insisted that Iran’s breakout capacity be constrained for as long as possible from producing enough nuclear material to create a bomb in a year. The question of how long any agreement would endure is a critical one: President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have said they will not sign an agreement that would give Iran the ability to produce enough fuel for a nuclear weapon in less than a year should it decide to “break out” of the accord. The administration has insisted that Iran’s breakout capacity be constrained for as long as possible, giving the United States, Europe and Israel plenty of warning time to respond to a threat from Tehran. But after an accord expires, so would that warning time.
Iranian officials have said they want an agreement that would allow their country to ramp up the number of centrifuges as soon as possible. By phasing in a gradual easing of limits on Iran’s production, Mr. Kerry and Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz, who joined the negotiations for the first time, aim to extend the length of a potential deal. American officials said they would insist that Iran face hard constraints for “at least a double-digit number of years.”
One way to bridge the difference would be to impose the limits in phases. Strict constraints on the number of centrifuges that Iran could operate might be maintained for the first 10 years of a potential 15-year-agreement and then relaxed in the last five years. Such an approach would allow the Iranians to say the tough constraints would last for only 10 years, and the Americans could say they had a 15-year agreement. Limits on the number of centrifuges Iran would be allowed to operate to enrich uranium, and for how long, are only part of an enormously complex negotiation.
The official, who could not be identified under the Obama administration’s protocol for briefing reporters, was deliberately vague on how long the yearlong limit on breakout time would need to be preserved beyond the first 10 years of an agreement, suggesting that the United States was looking for Iran to make concessions in return for a shortened second phase. “The number in the abstract is meaningless,” Antony J. Blinken, the newly appointed deputy secretary of state, said at the Aspen Institute in Washington on Monday. Warning time, he added, depends on a number of other factors, including how the centrifuges are configured, whether new or more efficient centrifuges would be used for enrichment, and how much nuclear fuel Iran is allowed to stockpile in the country. Part of an agreement would require Iran to ship much of its stockpile to Russia, but it is not clear yet how much.
The official said American and Iranian officials made progress during the negotiations here, that, for the first time, included Mr. Moniz and Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, who joined Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister. The key, Mr. Blinken said, is getting an accord “that gives you plenty of time to do something” if Iran races for a bomb.
The negotiations, which began Sunday night in a luxury hotel near Lake Geneva, sought to make progress toward an agreement before a March deadline for finalizing an outline of an accord to limit Tehran’s nuclear program. The two sides plan to meet again next Monday. He said that he could not predict whether an agreement was possible, but that any deal would have to “cut off all pathway for Iran to get to a nuclear weapon,” including the covert path. That would require highly intrusive inspections, Mr. Blinken said, the details of which were still up for negotiations.
A report last week from the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated that after years of foot-dragging, Iran has answered only one of a dozen questions, many based on evidence provided by the United States and Israel that the Iranian authorities have charged was fabricated.
“What has to result from any agreement is the strongest, most intrusive inspection and access program that any country has ever seen, because Iran has forfeited the trust of the international community,” Mr. Blinken said.
In talking about the effort to bridge the differences on how long an agreement would be in place, an American official in Geneva, who could not be identified under the Obama administration’s protocol for briefing reporters, said strict constraints on the number of centrifuges might be maintained for the first 10 years of a potential 15-year agreement. They would be relaxed in the last five years. Such an approach would allow the Iranians to say the tough constraints would last for only 10 years and the Americans could say they had a 15-year agreement.
The official was deliberately vague on how long the yearlong limit on breakout time would need to be preserved beyond the first 10 years of an agreement. If Iran’s production capacity increased substantially in the last five years of a deal — say, to current levels — breakout time might be reduced to months. Mr. Blinken, speaking in Washington, suggested that as the United States learned more about Iran’s facilities and scientists, and “every nook and cranny” of its program, intelligence abilities would improve.
Mr. Moniz’s participation could suggest that there is more discussion of the seemingly arcane issue of the “plumbing” that connects centrifuges together; configured in some ways, it is not possible to produce bomb-grade fuel quickly. Changing the plumbing would be evident to inspectors.
Mr. Moniz dealt directly with Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, who joined Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, at the talks here. Mr. Salehi was a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology decades ago, when Mr. Moniz was a young professor there.
The negotiations, which began Sunday night in a luxury hotel near Lake Geneva, sought to make progress toward an agreement before a March deadline for finalizing an outline of an agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear program. The two sides plan to meet again next Monday.
“We have made some progress,” a senior administration official told reporters. “We still have a long way to go.”“We have made some progress,” a senior administration official told reporters. “We still have a long way to go.”
The March deadline has become an important milestone as the White House is eager to show that progress is being made in order to dissuade Congress from imposing new sanctions on Iran. The March deadline has become an important milestone as the White House is eager to show that progress is being made to dissuade Congress from moving to impose new sanctions on Iran.
It is unclear what form a March agreement might take, if it is reached. Would it be a signed document that the United States, its allies and Iran would make public? Or would it be a confidential record of the status of the talks on which Congress might be briefed but which would not be published? It is unclear what form a March agreement might take, if it is reached. Would it be a signed document that the United States, its allies and Iran would make public? Or would it be a confidential record of the status of the talks on which Congress might be briefed but which would not be published? American officials did not say.
This latest round of talks is the first time that the countries’ top nuclear officials have participated, a reflection of the complexity of the potential agreement, which seeks to constrain Iran’s nuclear program in return for suspending and eventually removing economic sanctions.
The presence of Mr. Salehi, who received a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Mr. Moniz, who once led the physics department there, could ease progress, though there were no indications that an agreement was imminent.
(President Hassan Rouhani’s brother, Hossein Fereydoon, was also a member of the Iranian delegation here.)
“These meetings are steps in a long and tough process,” the State Department said in a statement.
Asked at the start of Monday’s meeting how the negotiations were proceeding, Mr. Zarif said simply, “It is going.”Asked at the start of Monday’s meeting how the negotiations were proceeding, Mr. Zarif said simply, “It is going.”
“Time is passing,” Mr. Kerry chimed in. “We are working.”“Time is passing,” Mr. Kerry chimed in. “We are working.”
But some Western observers have also raised concerns that Mr. Salehi, who also served as foreign minister in Iran’s previous hard-line government, might seek to protect the country’s nuclear activities from being subjected to stringent limits and restrict Mr. Zarif’s room to maneuver. But some Western observers have also raised concerns that Mr. Salehi, who also served as foreign minister in Iran’s previous hard-line government, might seek to protect the country’s nuclear activities from being subjected to stringent limits and restrict Mr. Zarif’s room for maneuver.
In July, for example, Mr. Salehi argued that Iran needed to have industrial-scale ability to enrich uranium by 2021, when a contract under which Russia supplies fuel for Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr is to expire.In July, for example, Mr. Salehi argued that Iran needed to have industrial-scale ability to enrich uranium by 2021, when a contract under which Russia supplies fuel for Iran’s nuclear reactor at Bushehr is to expire.
When the negotiations were extended in November, United States officials outlined a two-step process for making progress. The first step, they said, would be to work out an agreement outlining the main provisions of an accord by the end of March. The final step would be to complete the entire accord, including its technical requirements, by the end of June. When the negotiations were extended in November, United States officials outlined a two-step process for making progress. The first step, they said, would be to work out an agreement outlining the main provisions of an accord by the end of March. The final step would be to complete the entire accord, including its technical annexes, by the end of June.
Both sides have said they are not interested in extending the negotiating deadlines further.Both sides have said they are not interested in extending the negotiating deadlines further.
Adding to the pressure to show progress, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, is scheduled to address Congress in early March to present his criticism of the potential accord. On Sunday, Mr. Netanyahu said the emerging deal would be “dangerous for Israel.” He added that it was “astonishing” that the talks were continuing since Iran had yet to to answer longstanding questions that the International Atomic Energy Agency had posed about Tehran’s suspected earlier work on nuclear designs. Adding to the pressure to show progress, Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, is scheduled to address Congress in early March to present his criticism of the potential accord. On Sunday, Mr. Netanyahu said it was “astonishing” that the talks were continuing since Iran had yet to answer longstanding questions that the International Atomic Energy Agency had posed about Tehran’s suspected earlier work on nuclear designs.
After the first phase of a potential deal, Iran might not be restrained in how much nuclear material it could produce, a point that has been at the core of Mr. Netanyahu’s objections.
The United States has outlined a clear goal for what a comprehensive agreement should accomplish: It should slow the Iranian nuclear program enough that it would take the country at least a year to make enough material for a nuclear bomb.
Iran has nearly 10,000 operational centrifuges. To achieve what they consider a safe breakout interval, American negotiators initially proposed establishing a limit of 1,500 basic centrifuges that Iran would be allowed to operate while banning the use of more advanced centrifuges.
Last year, negotiators began exploring a formula under which Iran could have as many as 4,500 first-generation centrifuges if it also agreed to ship much of its low-enriched uranium to Russia or take other steps.
Now, there are reports that the United States might allow Iran to operate 6,500 centrifuges, or perhaps more, if Iran reconfigured its array of centrifuges or took other steps to reduce their efficiency.
Other issues in the talks include limits on the research and development of new types of centrifuges, which could be installed in clandestine plants, and constraints on Iran’s ability to produce plutonium, which can be used to make a nuclear bomb. The negotiators also need to agree on monitoring provisions to guard against cheating and on the duration of any agreement.